

JPRS 82999

3 March 1983

Near East/South Asia Report

No. 2716



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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3 March 1983

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OPPOSITION PRESS CAMPAIGN AGAINST 'UTHMAN AHMAD 'UTHMAN

'Uthman's Union Candidacy Deplored

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 29 Dec 82 p 5

/Article by Eng 'Adil al-Mushidd/

/Text/ At the end of this month the door will open for the race for the position of head of the Engineers' Union, and it will go on for 2 weeks. Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman has started preparing to run as a candidate for the second time, for the position he occupied 4 years ago. In this article, Eng 'Adil al-Mushidd cries out, in consternation:

Does the engineering profession have no patriotic leaders who can put a limit to Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman's scornful treatment of the interests of engineers and his extreme damage to the interests of the nation?

On Sunday 12 December the three official morning newspapers brought us news of the "Higher Council of the Union of Engineers'" pledge of support for Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman as head of the Engineers' Union for a second term.

Once we realize that a large number of the members of the Higher Council represent the union on the boards of the investment companies that the union established in the era of Eng 'Uthman and that they receive bonuses and allowances that are estimated in the thousands of pounds for attending the sessions (for instance, the engineer's insurance company, on whose board the union is represented by Eng Ahmad Fayiz Sha'ban and Zakariyat Zaki 'Uthman, distributed 32,820 pounds as bonuses to the board of directors--AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI, No 724), you would say that if we had known that, we would not have been surprised at the union council's pledge of support. Interests seem intertwined to the point where it is difficult to tell them apart. Therefore I am not concerned, to a large or small degree, about the union council's pledge; that is something that has already been given. What does concern me, rather, is the position the engineers who are not linked to the union's investments by any interests, and who do not benefit from them in any way, have taken.

Four years have elapsed from the time Eng 'Uthman represented the engineers, and a great deal of water has flowed in the course of those 4 years.

In the context of the union, a sufficient period has elapsed to permit us to judge 'Uthman's policies in the union.

In the general political context, numerous cases of corruption have burst forth. In none of those has 'Uthman been officially charged, but his name has been the greatest common denominator in all the investigations and in the accused persons' statements to the press.

The question facing us therefore is: is Eng 'Uthman fit to be head of the Engineers' Union?

A defense of Dignity

One condition for membership in the Engineers' Union, according to the law governing it (Article Three) is that one be "of good conduct and have a proper reputation." I realize that that is a pompous stipulation, but in any event it is one of the stipulations in the law on the union.

Since the law on the union considers that this should be the case with respect to ordinary members, we have the right to infer that the proper reputation and good conduct of the head of the Engineers' Union must not be open to doubt or the subject of contestation in any way.

Article 28 of the law on the union states that one of the duties of the council is "to get in contact with government bodies, public institutions, authorities and individuals as regards the affairs of the union, to defend its rights and its dignity," and so forth. There is no doubt that the dignity of the union head is part of the dignity of the union, because what is known as his reputation will affect the reputation of every engineer. And why not, since he is the head of their union?

Since this is the case, the higher council ought to have got in movement to make a defense against the doubts regarding the head of the Engineers' Union, whom Rashad 'Uthman accused of being responsible for the crimes of Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy and who was accused of helping spirit Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy out of the country, although he knew that he was wanted for investigation, enabled Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy to borrow 2 million pounds from the Engineers' Bank (that is, in the last analysis, money belonging to the union's retirement fund) without collateral, and so forth.

I will not go on reciting the charges, which come to much more than that. We have all followed them on the pages of the newspapers. They have affected the reputation of the head of the Engineers' Union to the core. The union council therefore ought to have investigated the degree of veracity of these charges, which affect the dignity of the union and consequently the dignity of the engineers. Wouldn't this be more fruitful than a resolution of a pledge of support for another term?

Good Conduct

If the Union council is not performing its duty in this regard, we have the right to do what the council ought to have done, since it is our duty and our

right to make sure that the law on the union applies to the man who has represented us for 4 years and aspires to represent us for another term, as far as the question whether he is of good conduct and proper reputation goes.

I consider, going by my limited understanding of "good conduct and proper reputation," that that includes the fact that the person should state only the truth, especially if the matter concerns responsibility he assumes in his work, especially if that responsibility is a heavy one; for instance if the man is a minister or representative in parliament. If it is known, through written documents, that Eng 'Uthman says one thing, and then the opposite, as far as matters concerning his good conduct go, that in no way constitutes a proper reputation, and I give you examples of that:

In the People's Assembly session of 10 February 1976, the session in which Dr Mahmud al-Qadi (may God have mercy on him) leveled 26 charges against Eng 'Uthman, regarding the fact that 'Uthman and his management owned private companies in his name abroad, which was a violation of the constitution, and, in addition, a question from Dr al-Qadi on these companies' profits, and whether or not Eng 'Uthman was being held accountable for their profits:

Eng 'Uthman replied,

"I do not have a single share in private companies, and if a company uses my name, what can I do?"

In his book "My Experience," Eng 'Uthman says, in these words exactly:

"A company was founded in Saudi Arabia under the name of 'The Saudi Contractors, 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman and partners,'" then, "The way in which these companies were formed was based on having the Arab country in which the company was to be established participate in the financing through people who had money there. I would participate along with them through my management experience and my ability to engage in the performance of the work. We would agree that the Arab partner would receive one third of the profits and the Egyptian partner would receive two thirds."

That is one example; it does not just involve a mere statement that conflicts with the truth--rather, it involves a violation of the constitution, and also tax evasion.

Dr al-Qadi, on whom God have mercy, made an accusation against Eng 'Uthman, at the same session of the People's Assembly, to the effect that the Arab Contractors Company built villas and buildings for him and many officials, and he asked about the accounting method used in these activities. Eng 'Uthman, according to the assembly transcripts, said,

"The companies build bridges, factories, and dams, that is, they do not build villas. That I would like to say is to explain matters to the gentlemen members."

In his book "My Experience," talking about officials in the sixties, /he said/:

"I built villas and buildings for them, and I challenge any of them to deny that no contracting firm in Egypt /built/ any for him, his son or his daughter."

That is the second example. That, too, does not just involve an untrue statement; rather, it also, if what was stated in his book is true, involves a crime, and bribery, which is punishable by law.

In this book of his, Eng 'Uthman mentions many facts and he has been rebutted on them in the pages of the newspapers by Gen Muhammad Fawzi, Amin Huwaydi, Hatim Sadiq, 'Abd-al-'Aziz Hijazi, Sha'rawi Jum'ah and so forth. Until this time, Eng 'Uthman has not defended himself by confronting explicit charges with rebuttals.

In 1976, Mr Manduh Salim, the prime minister at that time, demanded that the minister of justice make an investigation into some charge made against Eng 'Uthman regarding an agreement to export 100,000 tons of cement to Saudi Arabia (at a time when work was being suspended on redevelopment projects because there was no cement) at a price that was \$20 below the market price, in exchange for commissions which Eng 'Uthman and other senior officials received.

The People's Assembly has not yet been informed about what has been done regarding this investigation!

A Union Head for the First Time!

Eng 'Uthman's election platform is centered around his promise to carry out the law on allowances for hard currency issued in 1977. Instead of trying to bring about what he promised, especially since he was in a position very close to the "decision-maker" at that time, Eng 'Uthman kept totally silent on this matter. In fact, he has been stressing on every occasion that he didn't want anything from the government, and that he intended to solve the engineers' problems through the establishment of investment companies.

Duty required, at the very least, that he say that he had sought to realize this demand but that his efforts had not been a success. However, for him to ridicule the same demand that he had endorsed during the previous election campaign is very strange. He stated, in an interview that ROSE AL-YUSUF held with him, "The engineer's entire concern is just to get the allowance, while my goal has been to have us create incomes for engineers out of investments which will stimulate the union and will stimulate its members."

The investments did indeed stimulate a number of union members, but unfortunately they constituted an extremely small number, confined to the members of the council.

Regarding the union investments, whose details Eng 'Uthman is anxious not to discuss in detail--contenting himself with creating the greatest possible

amount of media noise about them--it is enough for you to realize that the yield on these investments was 3 and 7 percent in 1980 and 1981 and that the total profits received by the union budget came to 717,413 pounds over those 2 years. Had the union bought investment certificates, it would have realized a profit of 1,507,000 pounds--that is, the result was a loss of 790,000 pounds, in terms of profit and loss--not to talk about the atmosphere of corruption that the investments spread about the halls of the union. There no longer is scope to defend the interests of the engineers and endorse their demands; the council members are preoccupied with receiving bonuses and allowances for attending meetings and there no longer is room for a sound union spirit based on the desire to serve colleagues without material compensation. The aroma of the dollar fills the place.

We demand that the detailed budgets on the Engineers' Bank be disclosed. For example, what did they do with the sum of 2 million pounds that Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy borrowed from the bank without collateral? Do they still consider that an account receivable, and are they issuing illusory budgets on that basis, or do they consider it a questionable debt and consequently deduct it from the assets? In the latter case, we must seize the person who squandered the money of the widows and people on pension.

The Friend of the Israelis

The head of the Engineers' Union did not content himself with appropriating the engineers' rights to express their opinions regarding issues of concern to the Egyptian nation. Indeed, he inflicted a disgrace on all the engineers which it will be difficult to erase, since he was in the "vanguard" of the people dealing with the Israeli enemy.

I was one of more than 100 engineers who presented a request to the union council to explain the truth of what was being repeated, to the effect that the Engineers' Insurance Company had insured the Israeli embassy in Cairo, at a time when all Egyptian insurance companies had refrained from doing so. This item of news was published in the two newspapers AL-SHA'B and AL-AHALI. In fact, the situation reached the point where some of us imposed themselves on the Higher Union Council to ask for an explanation of the truth of this matter. None of this was met with anything but a suspicious silence by the council.

Then What?

After all this, then what?

That is a question we are not directing at the union council. They are standing in their proper place, defending their interests and therefore are pledging support for 'Uthman as a union head for a second term. Rather, the question is being directed at all engineers--is it proper, after all this, that Eng 'Uthman should represent us for a second term? It is a question that is also directed to the national engineering leadership. Does the engineering profession have no patriotic leaders who will put a limit to this scornful

treatment of the interests of the engineers, and this grievous damage to the interests of the nation? I do not think so, and I do not believe that we will be waiting long for people who must present themselves so that the coming elections will be a national struggle against disregard for the interests of the nation--a struggle to defend the interests of the engineers against the reaping of personal benefit and opportunism.

'Uthman's Union Candidacy Rejected

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 5 Jan 83 p 1

/Text/ Eng Sami Mukhaymir, member of the Higher Council of the Engineers' Union, has denied that the council has decided to pledge its support for Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman for a second electoral term. He said, "The matter does not go beyond hypocritical behavior on the part of some people to protect their personal interests, and the matter was not included in the agenda."

In another area, more than 1,000 engineers have signed a petition rejecting 'Uthman's candidacy "In light of the fact that his reputation has been spoiled in all the corruption cases, because he has established companies so that a few members of the board of the union may benefit from them to the exclusion of the engineers as a whole, and because he retreated from his election promises on hard currency allowances, the construction of a hospital and housing for engineers, and so forth--not to mention the fact that he was in the forefront of the people dealing with the Israeli enemy, defying the patriotic feelings of the engineers."

'Uthman's Payola Schemes Exposed

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 12 Jan 83 p 1

Some National Party leaders continue to squander millions of the Egyptian people's money for the benefit of liberalization companies, relatives and in-laws, exploiting their positions in the executive branch.

The Governor of al-Isma'iliyah, 'Abd-al-Mun'im 'Amarah, sold 2,080 feddans of government land (8,736,000 /square/meters) in the Serapium area south of al-Isma'iliyah to the Egypt Poultry Company, one of the liberalization companies formed by 'Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, relying on the General Poultry Company equipment, for the sum of 156,000 Egyptian pounds, that is, a price of 75 pounds per feddan or 1.8 millimes per /square/ meter! The per feddan price in this area ranges from 600 to 800 pounds. The strange thing is that the governorate had reduced the total price, which came to 208,000 pounds, a price of 100 pounds per feddan, by 25 percent on the excuse that the company was paying the price in a lump sum. Another odd thing is that the sales contract has been exempted from levies, in accordance with the Investment Law.

In addition to this tremendous area of land, the sales contract includes the government road which is situated in it, which had been set aside for citizens in the adjacent villages--that is, the governorate sold everything for a sum that was not enough to pave a few kilometers of roads.

In another area, the Bitter Lakes Development Agency has agreed to sell 246 feddans on the lake shore to Eng Samih Hasaballah, the son of the daughter of Eng 'Uthman, Ahmad 'Uthman and a member of the board of Arab Contractors, for the sum of 3,000 pounds per feddan, with a down payment of just 10 percent and the rest due over 30 years. The price per feddan in the Bitter Lakes has now reached 80,000 pounds. It is noteworthy that the sales decision presented to the board of directors of the project without mentioning the area of land, the price per feddan or the value of the down payment. The board contented itself with mentioning, in section eight of the minutes of its meetings, "The subject of Samih Hasaballah was raised, and he asked to purchase and obtain an amount equal to 10 percent of the sales price, in addition to delayed rent. The board agreed and was informed."

According to the family system, the Governor of al-Isma'iliyah decreed that telephone lines were to be extended to the Bitter Lakes area and that telephone number one that was installed there would go to Eng Samih Hasaballah.

'Uthman, Others in Scandal

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 10 Jan 83 p 5

/Text/ The names of five major public government personalities were mentioned in the hall of the court of values when the latter was reviewing the case of Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy last week. Some of these people were witnesses in the case of Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy's appropriation of 15 million pounds in the form of loans, 9 million of which were from the Suez Canal Bank alone, and the names of some of the others were mentioned by the witnesses themselves. Who are these officials? What did they say before the court? What did the witnesses say about them?

'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman

During the questioning by the court of values of the witness Isma'il 'Uthman, the son of 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman's brother, Counsellor Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor and representative of the plaintiff in the case, said "Among the items of information from the Central Bank is the fact that Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy was a head of AL-TA'MIR magazine and an advisor to Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman." Counsellor Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid then asked the witness Isma'il 'Uthman "Is this correct?"

Isma'il 'Uthman said that that was not correct.

The chairman of the court told Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, representative of the Plaintiff, "Where did you get that statement from, Husni?"

Husni said, "From the Central Bank report."

The court chairman: He was a financial advisor of 'Uthman's, and not just an advisor?

The representative of the plaintiff:

No, he was just an advisor. That was in the Central Bank report, page five.

The chairman of the court read the Central Bank report that Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid had referred to

He then stated, directing his words to Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, "Do you mean the committee made up of Muhammad Ibrahim Qurmah as chairman and 'Abdallah al-Zakawi and 'Umar Bashir? The part bearing on the investigation into Tawfiq's dealings with the Egyptian Bank?"

The representative of the Plaintiff: Read page five.

The chairman of the court read: "My information is that Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy Salim worked as the editor in chief of AL-TA'MIR magazine and as a consultant to Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman."

Isma'il 'Uthman: That statement is untrue. He was not a consultant to Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman.

The chairman of the court: Did Tawfiq pay the costs of printing the magazine?

Isma'il 'Uthman: No, the ministry contributed those.

The chairman: Who was the minister of redevelopment at that time?

The witness: Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman.

The chairman: Was he aware of the matter of the magazine?

The witness: Yes, sir.

Hasaballah al-Kafrawi

During the court's questioning of Eng Isma'il 'Uthman, mention was made of Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi, the minister of housing, redevelopment and new communities.

A conversation took place between the chairman of the court and the witness:

The chairman: What was the organization in AL-TA'MIR magazine, whose editor was Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy?

The witness: Ibrahim Zaki Qinawi was chairman of the board of the magazine.

The chairman: Who was the magazine's consultant?

The witness: Eng Hasaballah al-Kafrawi directed us.

The chairman: What does that mean? That he was getting compensation from it?

The witness: No, there were no material transactions.

Zakariya Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Fattah

Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, the plaintiff's representative in the Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy case, declared that Zakariya Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Fattah, Mustafa Hablas and Hamzah al-'Adawi, officials in the Canal Bank, would be the subjects of interrogation before the agency of the socialist public prosecutor as soon as the procedures in the case were completed, since their statements had revealed that there had been instances of grievous negligence that had led to the squandering of bank money over which they were the trustees.

'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan

Husni 'Abd-al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, stood before the board of the court, representing the plaintiff, and said:

"A response has been received from the Tae Kwon Do Federation stating that Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy was a candidate, in a reserve capacity, to the delegation on which a decree had been issued by 'Abd-al-Hamid Hasan, the chairman of the Higher Youth and Sports Council at that time, but did not travel with the delegation. His travel was arranged through means other than the delegation. As far as the costs of the trip are concerned, the International Tae Kwon Do Federation paid those, not the Egyptian federation."

Isma'il 'Uthman

Eng Isma'il 'Uthman, the son of the brother of Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman, stood up to face the charge the prosecution had made against him, to the effect that he was behind Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy's appropriation of 9 million pounds from the Suez Canal Bank.

The chairman of the court said: "The Suez Canal Bank's dealings with Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy started through Husayn 'Uthman, as Tawfiq Qurmah said. However, Qurmah turned around and mentioned that that came from Isma'il 'Uthman and that the memorandum could be found in the Suez Canal Bank."

The witness Isma'il 'Uthman: I heard about this memorandum, in which it was said that I had advised Tawfiq, in the days when the people on the board were talking (he meant the board of directors of the Suez Canal Bank), and they said, regarding me, "Isma'il, you gave advice," and I said, "No, that was just talk that people were saying." According to my information, this memorandum did not get to the board, because they said that Isma'il did not present anyone, and I withdrew this memorandum.

The chairman: Who was it that wrote this memorandum?

The witness: It was the board of the bank. There is no name that I can remember; it was the board of directors. My information comes to us from

outside. I can assert that I did not submit any papers, sir, and I did not make telephone contacts.

The chairman: Didn't you attend the general meeting of the Suez Canal Bank?

The witness: As it happened, I did not attend any general meeting.

The chairman: And what was done with those 9 million, Mr. Isma'il? Show us how they were spent.

The witness: As an Egyptian citizen, we watch over our own money with our own eyes, and anyone who does wrong is punished, once his guilt is established.

The conversation went on between the chairman of the court and Isma'il 'Uthman, as follows:

The chairman: Do you know Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy Salim Abu-al-Ata?

The witness: Yes, sir.

The chairman: How do you know him?

The witness: We were in the Ministry of Redevelopment. I was working in the technical office. At that time Tawfiq came to us and said, "I want to know what you do regarding development."

He came to the ministry and said, "What are you going?"

The chairman: He came into the room or into the corridor?

The witness: He came into the room, and they told him, "Isma'il is here." Then Tawfiq said, "I am putting out a magazine called SAWT AL-TULLAB, and I talk about corruption, bribery and patronage." He started out by saying it was necessary to do away with bribery. He had the intention of making a campaign. We told him, "We have nothing to do with anything." Then he started to see what was going on in the Redevelopment /Ministry/.

Eng Isma'il 'Uthman said, holding a copy of SAWT AL-TULLAB in his hand, "Tawfiq told us, 'Your efforts are good ones, but why don't you put out a publication that will show these efforts on your behalf?'"

The witness went on, "At that time, Tawfiq didn't have any companies or any economic activity."

The witness added, "When he made that statement, we said, 'So what? We are doing a publication about the ministry.' Tawfiq has the ability to make up an issue overnight. I was one of the people in charge of the magazine."

The chairman: What are these pictures that you have put into your magazine?

He pointed to a picture that showed Anwar al-Sadat and another one of Eng 'Uthman Ahmad 'Uthman.

The witness: That is a picture of the ministry. That was the entire task up to 1976. Everyone played his part in things up to 1981, when we started AL-TA'MIR. The relationship ended altogether. Then after that Tawfiq appeared, I do not know what to say, he had become someone with money and our lord had made him a success, and my connection with him ended when our connection with the magazine ended. Then after that he appeared to be a man with money, and he had his own company. We did not take part in the establishment of that company or anything else. That was the relationship, sir.

The chairman: Did you stay on in the Ministry of Redevelopment?

The witness: I left the Ministry of Redevelopment and went back to the /Arab/ Contractors.

The chairman: And did the magazine continue?

The witness: Just 12 issues of the magazine came out, and then it stopped.

The chairman: Did you read the magazine?

The witness: Yes, and I wrote everything about redevelopment and anything that had a connection with redevelopment in it.

The chairman: Who was responsible for the magazine?

The witness: Eng Ibrahim Qinawi was the chairman of the board. He is a distinguished man. He gave us guidance.

The chairman: Did Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy do editorial work in this magazine?

The witness: He was the editor in chief of the magazine and he wrote.

The chairman: Who gave him his salary?

The witness: The board of directors would give him a small amount.

The chairman: How Much?

The witness: No more than 100 pounds an issue. I was the vice chairman of the board of the magazine.

The chairman: What did Qinawi do?

The witness: He was the chairman of the Redevelopment Agency and the Chairman of the board.

The chairman: Was Tawfiq the editor in chief?

The witness: Yes, because of his ability.

The chairman: Is he registered with the Journalists' Union?

The witness: I do not know.

The chairman: Did the permit to issue the magazine come from the Ministry of the Interior or from the competent agency?

The witness: There was a permit in it.

The chairman: Was the magazine confidential?

The witness: No.

The chairman: Who went through the permit procedures?

The witness: I do not remember.

The chairman: Was Fatin al-Ashwah, Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy's wife, a writer for the magazine?

The witness: I believe he produced articles in her name.

The chairman: We never heard of the magazine.

The witness: It just recorded events in the Redevelopment /Ministry/. It had no purpose other than that.

The chairman: Was it sold on the market?

The witness: No.

Husayn 'Abd-al-Hamid, the assistant socialist public prosecutor, intervened to question the witness Isma'il 'Uthman.

The chairman: Did any passerby have the right to go into your office in the ministry and be appointed to a magazine that was on public funds with a salary of 100 pounds?

The witness: He came in as a journalist. In those days nothing had been proved against him, and he was not a passerby.

The chairman: Did you investigate, before he assumed the position of editor in chief, whether he was registered in the Journalists' Union?

The witness: That did not happen.

The chairman: Did the magazine appear before Tawfiq 'Abd-al-Hayy came around to you?

The witness: It did not. The idea was there, and he helped us carry it out.

The chairman: Who was the authority that was competent to determine Tawfiq's compensation?

The witness: The board of directors.

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INTEGRATION WITH SUDAN, RELATIONS WITH LIBYA PROBED

Cairo AL-WADI in Arabic No 46, Feb. 82 pp 18-23

[Interview With Dr Usamah al-Baz, Undersecretary of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by 'Abd al-Sattar al-Tawilah; "Most Daring Interview With Dr Usamah al-Baz: Integration Requires \$58 Billion; Our Relationship With Libya Is Extremely Important Strategic Relationship; We Are Seeking to Convene African Summit in New Delhi Prior to Nonalignment Summit; Before Independence, Northerners Were Banned From Entering South Without Permit; Emigration of Egyptian Farmers to Iraq Is Much Bigger Than Their Emigration to Sudan; OAU Needs to Be Rescued in Wake of Failure of Tripoli Conference"]

[Text] Dr Usamah al-Baz, the undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the director of President Husni Mubarak's political office, has been known by the Arab citizen and the Arab and world press as an expert in international politics and a well-versed expert in the complex and intricate Middle East problem. He has been contributing to dealing with this problem for 9 years. In his memoirs which are still arousing a big uproar, Muhammad Kamil Ibrahim, a former minister of foreign affairs, says that the late President Anwar al-Sadat relied on Dr Usamah al-Baz in the negotiations [with Israel] and that he performed his duty so perfectly and patriotically that he aroused Mr Begin's criticism who described al-Baz as a "zealot."

This time, AL-WADI is happy to host Dr Usamah al-Baz and to present him in a different image unknown to the reader--the image of a well-established expert on Egyptian-Sudanese affairs who will tell us about integration between the 2 countries and its problems and dimensions. He speaks in his utterly lucid and frank way because integration is, as he has told us, "the issue of the 2 Egyptian and Sudanese peoples primarily and fundamentally."

Al-WADI's inlet into the interview is that the integration has become a tangible reality. Even though it has not completed all its mainstays yet, it can be said that we have made a stride on the path. We are facing obstacles and hindrances, including the so-called integration sensitivities.

Dr Usamah interrupted me with a laugh: There is no sensitivity in integration as long as we have established it with a popular will. Rather say that there are thorny problems inherited from the era when both Egypt and Sudan were under occupation.

Egyptians Are Coming

[Question] Whether sensitivity or thorny problems, the important thing is that we want to put them forth for discussion.

There are some people in Sudan who are apprehensive of integration because they imagine that hundreds of thousands or millions of Egyptian farmers will march to the Sudanese territories and create a form of colonization and will drain Sudan's resources. What is the basis of these apprehensions and how do we assure those who hold them that the mutual benefit will inundate the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples?

[Answer] No political movement between 2 countries is free of the caution, suspicion or sensitivity of some apprehensive groups who fear for their interests.

Let me give you a contemporary example. At one time, there was a number of wealthy and educated Arabs who embraced pan-Arab ideas and called for Arab unity but when they reached a certain top position they became "sensitive" to the issue of unity because they saw it as a danger threatening this certain position of theirs. What I mean to say is that people's attitudes are affected by their interests. However, some of the sensitivities felt by some people are not necessarily a reflection of certain class or individual interests.

A major event such as integration between Egypt and Sudan--an event pertaining to the development of the 2 countries where nearly 60 million people live--must by necessity generate fears among some groups.

One of these fears is the issue of Egypt exploiting the opportunity of integration to launch a human invasion of Sudan. Isn't this what they mean by the so-called Egyptian colonization?

[Question] Yes, and they justify it by the population growth in Egypt.

[Answer] The fact is that this visualization or this apprehension is as far as can be from the truth. Here are the details:

First, even though the door is open for the Egyptians to go to Sudan at any time, we have not seen waves of Egyptian emigration to Sudan, not even in the past. It suffices to note that the number of Egyptians who have gone to live in Iraq either permanently, such as the farmers, or for varying periods of time, such as craftsmen, workers and industrialists, has exceeded one million people in a period of no more than 5 years whereas all the Egyptians who have emigrated to Sudan under the canopy of all the movement facilities given to the citizens of both countries have not exceeded several thousand citizens.

This faulty visualization is built on faulty premises. It is founded on the basis that Egypt has a surplus agricultural and industrial labor and that it is looking for an outlet for this surplus in a fraternal country like Sudan. The fact is that Egypt is suffering from an evident shortage of agricultural manpower, for example. This is why the new agricultural projects depend on mechanization fundamentally.

(At this point, Dr Usamah al-Baz disclosed important agricultural news which happened in Egypt last summer, saying:)

It is no secret that many Egyptian farmers did not perform the (second cotton harvest) due to the unavailability of adequate manpower and that this resulted in the loss of large quantities of cotton which were ploughed into the soil with the weeds!

[Question] What about industrial labor?

[Answer] The industrial development projects allocated in the five-year plan will absorb 65 percent of the new manpower added to the industrial workforce in this period. As for the remaining percentage, it will head for numerous Arab countries. A small percentage will go to the European countries, the United States and Canada.

The outcome of all this is that there isn't in Egypt a surplus of labor of any type to emigrate to Sudan in large numbers that it may evoke the concern of anybody.

Human Congruence

(Dr Usamah al-Baz paused for a moment and then resumed:)

These doubters or apprehensive people have really no justification because they disregard the element of "human congruence" between the Sudanese and Egyptian peoples, meaning that if one half million Egyptians emigrate to Sudan over 10 years, for example, they will be fused into the Sudanese society by virtue of the unity [sic] of the social, intellectual and cultural climate in the 2 countries. They will thus become Sudanese citizens like the Sudanese who come to Egypt and merge in the Egyptian environment, thus becoming an indivisible part of the Egyptian environment in a few years. The marriage relationships existing between individuals and families from the 2 peoples are the best proof of this.

Regime's Sensitivity

[Question] What is your opinion of the statement by some Sudanese brothers opposed to the regime in Sudan who say that the purpose of the integration is to protect the government of President Ja'far Numayri from his opponents and who, consequently, do not welcome but rather oppose the integration?

[Answer] You have done well to bring up this question. Neither we nor the Sudanese regime itself have any sensitivity at all [sic].

I tell you that this view or this idea is wrong altogether. The integration has not been established to protect the regime in Sudan by creating an alliance with it.

It is true that we in Egypt view President Numayri and his government as allies and brothers and that we are proud of our common friendship in all spheres. But the essence of this alliance and of this relationships generally is derived from their being the representatives of the Sudanese people. We consider ourselves the allies of the Sudanese people with all their factions and groups. This has been Egypt's position since the early days of Sudan's independence. Egypt has dealt with all the Sudanese trends, even those which took an official position against unity with Egypt.

(Dr Usamah added:) If the idea were just to support the Sudanese government, there would have been no need to issue the integration charter and to take all these steps which constitute a part of a complete visualization of the firm strategic relationship between Egypt and Sudan.

Combine Two Paupers

[Question] Let us turn over the leaf of sensitivity and begin reading a new leaf of the book of integration in the mind of the director of the political office of the president of Egypt.

How can the economic integration projects in particular be implemented when they are enormous projects requiring billions?

[Answer] (Dr al-Baz interrupted me to say:) \$58 billions, according to the estimates of the international market.

[Question] This is an awe-striking figure, as you can see. In both Egypt and Sudan, the heart is willing but the flesh is weak. So how can we secure this sum?

[Answer] Without implementing the major integration projects, the integration will remain a mere wish. It may even turn into just another experiment like the past experiments in the Arab nation's history since the 1950's--experiments that were not destined to succeed.

This is why we in Egypt are determined to make the experiment successful by implementing joint projects with our Sudanese brothers.

I remember here the statement of a commentator who has said that "integration is the joining of 2 paupers." In my opinion, this is a wrong inlet to analyzing the integration.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because it ignores the fact that the financing necessary for the production projects can be secured as long as the proper climate is there.

The most important guarantees to create this climate is for the projects to be serious and well-studied from all their social and economic aspects so that they may attract the foreign capital looking for projects that need financing.

[Question] Is the mere seriousness of the projects enough to attract financing?

[Answer] The fact is that there is no difficulty in obtaining financing as long as a project is economically rewarding. In any case, we can encourage the financiers, whoever they may be, if we present a good example in the first projects that we will implement with intrinsic financing, regardless of their size, so that this example may indicate our seriousness, the priority that we give the integration projects and our ability to implement these projects capably and efficiently.

[Question] Don't you think that foreign loans have a major negative aspect, namely inflation? We and Sudan are paying tens of millions annually as exorbitant interest costs for the loans.

[Answer] This is of course reiterated by many people who speak of the increasing burdens of the developing countries as a result of their debt burdens. But in our case, this objection can be answered easily.

First, we can acquire soft-term loans with simple interest rates for some of the integration projects, either from the Agriculture and Food Development Organization whose Board of Directors is headed by Ambassador 'Abd al-Muhsin al-Suwayri, who is an Arab, or from some international financing establishments.

Second, it is my assessment that the near future will see a number of Arab investors turning to production projects within the integration framework because these projects give them an adequate guarantee of obtaining certain profit.

[Question] But what benefit will these Arab financiers reap from participating in the integration projects when they earn high interest rates for their deposits in banks or in tourist projects in the Canary Islands or somewhere else?

[Answer] As I have said, the profit yielded by the integration projects will be no less, if not more, than the profit yielded by bank deposits. But the Arab financiers must view the matter more comprehensively because the integration projects constitute in fact a major strategic and security guarantee for the entire Arab area, especially when compared with the stock and bond speculation operations or with the investment of vast sums of money outside the Arab area and keeping in mind that Sudan's land is

fertile land, that water is abundant and that machinery, fertilizers and superior-quality seeds and pesticides will be made available, thus enabling these projects to produce a high yield in short years in comparison to numerous land reclamation projects in other parts of the world where the financiers can reap a profit only after 10 or 15 years.

Africans in South

[Question] Some people note that the talk about integration most frequently deals with North, but not South, Sudan. They interpret this racially, saying that the basically Arab people of Egypt will integrate with the people of North Sudan, who are also ARabs basically, and not the people of South Sudan who are pure Africans. What is the truth in this regard, especially since the south is in direr need of development projects to enhance its backward level?

[Answer] (Answering this thorny question, Dr al-Baz says:)

This is a totally wrong visualization often foisted from outside the 2 countries because there are certain circles (opportunist circles) that view this integration as a threat to their interests and therefore try to fight it with such false rumors.

That fact is that the close cooperation generated by the integration will stop at no certain geographic or ethnic limit in Sudan but will extend to the southernmost parts.

We here in Egypt share the Sudanese Government's interest in the southern development projects. Moreover, the integration plans have given the priority to a number of projects which will be set up in the south due to the economic and social considerations involved.

Insofar as we are concerned, South Sudan is a part of the southern Nile Valley that is dear to us and there is no difference at all between it and North Sudan. Its inhabitants are brothers to whom we are tied by the same bonds. Throughout its history, Egypt has been concerned with developing the cultural and civilizational ties with the south despite all the endeavors made by the British occupation before Sudan's independence when the Egyptians, like the northern Sudanese, were prohibited from entering the south without a special permit.

The oneness of the destiny and of the strategic interest that ties us to Sudan dictates that we all achieve the civilizational unity of the entire Nile Valley, and first with South Sudan through further economic and social development and without any sensitivity. We have no jingoistic or racial attitude toward any citizen because he is from an Arab or an African origin. If the demographic structure of South Sudan is different from that of North Sudan, this is not an important issue and the inhabitants of the south are the same as those of Khartoum, Asyut, Alexandria and so forth.

Egyptian Apprehensions

[Question] Having discussed the apprehensions of some Sudanese brothers regarding integration, it is now time to discuss what some people in Egypt have raised when they said that the integration agreement may pull Egypt backward in its foreign policy. They cite as an example Egypt's refusal to attend the OAU conference. Efforts were made to convene this conference in Tripoli nearly 2 months ago but Egypt refused to attend it in order to please the Sudanese Government which had hastened from the outset to declare its refusal to attend.

These people believe that this position has resulted in diminishing Egypt's role within the organization even though Egypt had played a prominent, if not the leadership, role in the organization at one time. What does Dr Usamah al-Baz, the first undersecretary of the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, say to this Egyptian apprehension this time?

[Answer] The fact is that the integration does not weaken Egypt's role in Africa but rather bolsters the role of each of Egypt and Sudan in the continent.

I would like to assert that neither of the 2 states dictates an position to the other or raises a veto in the face of any movement on which the other state wants to embark.

What exists is a coordination of the political positions because the view of both countries toward the African issues is the same and is based on the belief in the need to bolster the movement toward unity in Africa.

[Question] What are the means to bolster this movement?

[Answer] Fighting the spheres of influence and division within the movement and exerting efforts to settle the African problems through mutual consent and not by resorting to violence or to alliance with foreign forces.

We have been in the habit of coordinating our positions with Sudan, even before the emergence of the integration.

[Question] Did we refrain from attending the Tripoli conference out of solidarity with Sudan, no more and no less?

[Answer] This is not at all true. The issue was not one of pleasing Sudan. We and Sudan have reached the independent conviction that participating in the 2 Tripoli conferences, which are in fact a single conference, would produce no benefit to the single African movement.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because in both "conferences" Libya has chosen to take a position which it knows in advance will result in a split between the organization member states and in the failure of the 2 endeavors to hold a summit conference and that, moreover, the gap between the organization's 2 wings will widen.

In the first time, they raised the issue of the POLISARIO, thus creating a sharp split. To the amazement of the observers, the same position recurred in the second conference through bringing up the Chad issue, thus causing second failure.

[Question] But if Libya is responsible for raising these 2 issues, then why don't the other states which have refused to accept the Libyan viewpoint also shoulder the responsibility?

[Answer] We believe that it is not in the interest of any of the organization's member states to raise these subsidiary issues because they do not, for example, constitute issues of liberating African land from foreign colonization and exploitation. Essentially, these are issues that provoke sharp conflicts between a large number of the states and are issues that fall within the framework of polarization, thus making it inevitable not to entrench the disagreement between these states.

A state hosting a conference should be careful not to create subsidiary and unprincipled problems that cause the conference to fail. This is why the hosting state is held accountable before any other party. You cannot, and it is unbecoming to, force a party to adopt your viewpoint. But you can attract such a party to sit with you around one table to discuss the points of agreement first.

[Question] Then our position of not attending did not reflect any hostility toward the Libyan regime?

[Answer] Absolutely not. We had hoped that Libya would not persist in its policy in this regard in order to safeguard the organization's unity. We had also hoped that the second summit would be held in Addis Ababa, considering that it is the capital where the [OAU] headquarters are located. Had this happened, it would have been certain that Ethiopia would observe the rules by which the headquarters country abides in preparing for such a conference.

[Question] But Egypt's role in the OAU is still limited. What should we do to regain our traditionally prominent role so as to strengthen the organization?

[Answer] We still hope that the organization will overcome this slip. In any case, an Egyptian delegation is currently touring a number of the African countries concerned to hold consultations on the ideal means to deal with the situation resulting from the failure of the Tripoli conference.

Important News

At this point, Dr al-Baz told AL-WADI the exclusive news that efforts are currently underway to convene an African summit in New Delhi prior to the convocation of the nonalignment summit next March so that this conference may be an important accomplishment toward adopting a united African position in the nonalignment conference and toward healing Africa from the wounds of division caused by the Tripoli conference.

Libya and Lesser Africa

[Question] One day in the 1970's a lesser African continent comprising Egypt, Libya and Sudan was born within the greater African continent through the conclusion of the unity and integration treaties by the leaders of these 3 countries: the late al-Sadat, President Numayri and Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi.

But this lesser continent was not destined to survive. It split up and the storms of disagreement, even conflict, tore it apart.

Can we permit ourselves to restore that lesser African continent, at least in our dreams?

Will the 2 integration states continue to be in constant controversy with Col Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi? Cannot a meeting be brought about?

[Answer] The relationship between us and Libya is governed by objective considerations and is not moved by sensitivities or complexes.

The first of these objective considerations is that the relationship between the 3 peoples of Egypt and Sudan and Libya is an indivisible strategic relationships. Consequently, the political disagreements that emerge in the horizon are transient manifestations that cannot affect the essence and that cannot generate a real contradiction between the interests of these peoples.

[Question] What is the minimal political action in which each government must engage so that the estrangement currently existing between the 3 countries may not occur [presumably meaning persist]?

[Answer] The minimal limit of cooperation between the governments lies in having each government develop the conviction that it must [refrain] from harming the other countries. It is unacceptable, for example, that Libya say that it believes in moving toward unity between the 3 countries while it engages at the same time in actions liable to threaten the Sudanese people's security. However, Libya may adopt opposing stances on some issues.

[Question] What is the secret behind Colonel al-Qadhdhafi's incompatibility with President Numayri?

[Answer] (Dr Usamah smiled, saying:) Tribal issues.

[Question] What is Colonel al-Qadhdhafi required to do in order for the relations with Libya to be normalized after this long and totally unrestrained Arab estrangement?

[Answer] The fact is that nothing impossible is required. All that is required is to stop threatening Sudan's security and to abandon the theory that justifies intervention in the domestic affairs of the Arab countries just because of the feeling of fervor and eagerness for Arab unity.

Is it reasonable that this feeling should lead to attracting certain elements in Sudan and training them to create internal unrest?

This is not disagreement between governments but intervention in domestic affairs.

[Question] What are the points on which the 3 countries of Egypt, Libya and Sudan can reach an understanding in order to meet anew?

[Answer] Any of the 3 countries can present to the 2 other countries certain issues to be discussed and agreed upon, such as the African issues, border disputes, Arab issues, the issue of liquidating colonialism in the continent, obstructing foreign intervention in the area, the concept of the continent's strategic security, development and other issues.

Is it possible to meet on objective bases and not on a personal basis.

Ethiopia Also

[Question] If, through integration, we have entered the sphere of settling old disputes, or at least having the honor to make the attempt, then what about Ethiopia? What prevents our improving our relationship with it?

[Answer] Ethiopia is a neighboring African country to which we are tied by strong historical and cultural bonds, not to mention the bond of the Nile basin. Therefore, there can be no incompatibility of interest between us.

[Question] Isn't the Ethiopian regime's adoption of Marxism causing us any sensitivity?

[Answer] Not at all. Neither we nor Sudan deny Ethiopia or any other country the right to choose the economic and social system that realizes its development and progress. Consequently, we do not deny its right to choose the foreign policy it wishes.

[Question] Then why has the relationship between us become tense?

[Answer] The relations have not become tense but clouds have developed in the sphere of these relations because of Ethiopian positions by which, it seems to us, Ethiopia is entering into blocs hostile to Egypt. On the other hand, the situation between Ethiopia and Somalia has turned tense at a time when we are tied to Somalia by a firm relationship.

[Question] Cannot the 2 integration states exert efforts to settle the bloody dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia that has been prolonged fruitlessly?

[Answer] In our view, and I believe the Sudanese view is similar, it is not in the African interest or the Arab interest for this armed conflict to continue. We believe that it can be settled peacefully and we are prepared to perform any role that brings the 2 states closer to each other, puts an end to this war and settles the border dispute.

It is not in our interest to see Ethiopia weakened and drained by the war. On the contrary, what is required is for both Ethiopia and Somalia to devote their efforts to their economic and social development process.

[Question] What about Eritrea?

[Answer] There is no doubt that within the integration framework, our ability to perform a positive role, whether in connection with the Eritrean or the Somali issue, is greater and is still improving, especially since Sudan has already made a long stride on this path.

With Arab Group

[Question] Can the integration be considered, as some imagine it to be, a new axis in the Arab world?

[Answer] No, the integration is not at all an attempt to establish a new axis. On the other hand, we don't believe that the integration will have a direct impact on the Arab level in the near future. But this new formula of cooperation and solidarity between 2 Arab peoples between whom a great cultural and economic proximity exists can serve the Arab nation in 2 ways:

First, bolster the Arab nation's strategic security by supplying agricultural and animal food [resources] without reliance on foreign resources.

Second, we believe that the integration can create a model to be followed in establishing gradual rapprochement and ever-growing unity between 2 or more Arab sides through calculated steps in the wake of the negative experiences endured by the Arab nation as a result of the immediate and comprehensive cases of unity which are based on constitutional merger before the foundations of unity are entrenched at the popular levels.

Addition to Nonalignment

[Question] Can the integration be considered a new addition to the Egyptian efforts within the nonalignment group? How will this be achieved?

[Answer] The integration will strengthen not only the Egyptian efforts but also the Sudanese efforts to play a prominent role within the nonaligned countries group because the experiment it offers in regard to self-reliance and to amassing the resources for development is an experiment that creates a new model for the third world countries to follow. It will also strengthen the tendency to give priority to cooperation between these countries basically.

Citing an example in this respect, Dr al-Baz said that within the framework of their emphasis on food production, Egypt and Sudan will find in India's experiments to achieve self-sufficiency in wheat a model to be followed. They will also benefit from the Philippines' experiments in rice cultivation, Mexico's experiments in cultivating Mexican wheat, Peru's

experiment in animal food and China's experiment in developing rural areas and so forth instead of seeking the aid of countries from outside the third world.

[Question] What can the integration achieve within the national liberation movement?

[Answer] It provides us with a greater opportunity to support these movements in the African continent, especially if we take into our consideration the fact that Sudan's borders are not that far from the areas exploding with struggle against racism.

[Question] Can you tell me in one sentence how we can make the integration agreements successful?

[Answer] By confronting all the thorny problems frankly and without sensitivity and by letting the 2 peoples participate in this confrontation.

8494

CSO: 4504/184

BREAD CRISIS IN ALEXANDRIA EXAMINED

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 25 Jan 83 p 7

[Article by Faruq 'Abd al-Mun'im: "Bread Crisis Before Alexandria Local Council; 90 Percent of Bakeries' Capacity Is Idle Due to Labor Shortage"]

[Text] Alexandria--Throughout 3 full hours, a heated debate has taken place in the Alexandria Governorate Local Council over the bread crisis.

The discussions have proven that 90 percent of the production capacity of the public sector bakeries is idle due to the lack of the trained and skilled manpower needed to operate the bakeries. Governor Fawzi Ma'adh has demanded that help be sought from the Ministries of Defense and Interior so that they may dispatch some of their trained conscripts to work in the bakeries for a rewarding recompense amounting to nearly 60 pounds a month.

The session was attended by Maj Gen Fawzi Ma'adh, the governor of Alexandria; 'Izzat Qadus, the deputy chairman of the Alexandria Local Council; Maj Gen Mahmud 'Abd al-'Aziz, the governorate security director, and a number of members of the People's Assembly.

At the outset, the council deputy chairman reviewed a report by the Supply Committee on the bread crisis saying that Alexandria's bread consumption is estimated at 2 million loaves daily whereas the actual production of the public sector bakeries does not exceed 101,000 loaves [daily], meaning that the production does not represent more than 10 percent of the required volume. As a result of this situation, the private sector has exploited this shortfall to offer a poor-quality production. The report notes that the reason for this shortfall is the presence of a severe shortage in the manpower needed for the bakeries and the fact that some bakeries begin their operations at 1200, i.e. they work one half the time [a shift].

In response, Fawzi Ma'adh, the governor of Alexandria, said that even though the automatic bakeries are unable to produce at full capacity, bread is still available in the city but that the bakeries must be operated at full capacity. But there is a problem pertaining to manpower. Even though the governorate offers bonuses amounting to nearly 20 percent of the wages of the public sector workers, no interest is shown in this work. The governor added that Alexandria has 16 automatic bakeries of which only 9 are in operation due to the shortage of manpower.

The governor said that the problem is one of manpower, adding: I will personally contact the ministers of defense and interior to supply a number of second class privates who work within the security teams to work in the bakeries in return for a recompense amounting to 2 pounds daily, especially since there is a plan to raise the number of bakeries in Alexandria from 16 to 21 bakeries.

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CSO: 4504/184

EDITORIAL ON EGYPTIAN DIPLOMACY IN 1983

Cairo AL-SIYASAH AL-DUWALIYAH [INTERNATIONAL POLICY] in Arabic No 81, Jan 83
pp 4-7

[Publication is a quarterly published by AL-AHRAM's Center for Strategic and Political Studies. Butrus Butrus Ghali is editor-in-chief and al-Sayyid Yasin, managing editor]

[Text] "I say to those who claim that I am reconsidering Camp David that Egypt is not thinking of that at all. Camp David is the only Israeli commitment in our hands, and we have implemented the part pertaining to us. As for the second part, pertaining to the Palestinians and their right to self-determination, we will spare no effort to enable them to take their cause in their own hands, bearing the responsibility and making the decision which they want at the negotiating table."

President Muhammad Husni Mubarak
16 December 1982

"Egypt will move quickly within the scope of its intense political efforts to encircle the disputes among the nonaligned states before the nonaligned summit conference convenes."

President Muhammad Husni Mubarak
2 December 1982

"The apartheid regime in South Africa defies the will and feelings of the peoples of the continent, whether by the unjust practices which it pursues against the owners of land and property, or by the obstinate position which it is taking against the independence of Namibia, which violates the unanimous resolution of the international family. These are situations which we cannot accept or fail to confront."

President Muhammad Husni Mubarak
21 December 1982

As 1983 begins, we should look ahead to see what weighty matters might face Egyptian diplomacy in the coming months.

In Africa, we find the new course toward integration between the north and south of the Nile Valley, which requires earnest and tireless effort to bring integration from a mere hope to the realm of fact. There is the crisis which threatens the existence of the OAU and has paralyzed it since the failure of the First and Second Tripoli Conferences. Egypt must move to confront that crisis and cooperate with the rest of the African states to overcome it, because the OAU (which Egypt played a large part in establishing in 1963) is the effective framework for consultation and coordination of African action. It is the symbol and embodiment of African solidarity, and the organization must be preserved no matter how weak and feeble it has become.

There is also the constant battle against imperialism, discrimination and racism in South Africa. This is an issue to which Egyptian diplomacy must direct its attention so that 1983 becomes the year of Namibian independence.

The problem of Chad still exists, and Egypt in the past has supported the Chadian government against sabotage attempts and conspiracies hatched abroad, not to speak of extending a helping hand to Chad in the struggle to build and rebuild.

There are also disputes among the fraternal African states which are tearing the continent apart and opening the door to attempts at foreign supremacy and to the infiltration of the Cold War to the continent. Responsibility rests on Egypt in particular to work quietly to participate in settling those disputes peacefully so that Africa can concentrate its efforts on the field of development, progress and the comforts of life.

As for the Arab environment, changing political circumstances indicate that it is possible to move the Arab world in 1983 to face its contradictions and overcome the discord which has a negative effect on the Arab situation. Arab reconciliation, returning solidarity to the Arab ranks, in the end does not serve any one Arab state so much as it serves the Palestinian cause. Therefore, Egyptian diplomacy, in its tireless efforts to attain the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, must study ways to achieve this solidarity again.

In the field of movement to the advantage of the Palestinian people, there is the Reagan initiative with its positive and negative aspects. However, if we rose above these positive and negative points we would find that the basic problem with this initiative, which constitutes an important American move in the right direction, is the manner of putting it into effect, the manner of translating it from the realm of theory to the realm of practical fact.

Egyptian diplomacy must devote its efforts in 1983 to achieving that and guiding the initiative, which includes securing the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, so that we do not let another favorable opportunity for peace slip away. Our method in that is to hold intensive consultations with the Americans and the Arab parties, since both parties would like to see some movement.

The role of the PLO and Jordan come at the forefront of the Arab movement. It is quite obvious that a coordinated, agreed upon Jordanian-Palestinian movement adds a new dimension to the peace attempt and creates pressure on all parties. Egypt undoubtedly has an important role in achieving that.

However, Egypt's concern with the Reagan initiative and its conversations with the United States, Jordan and the PLO in this regard are not incompatible with its interest in alternate solutions and its preparedness for the day when the situations requires these solutions. In the forefront of these solutions is the Egyptian-French plan submitted to the Security Council, which could be a basis for new diplomatic movement within the framework of the UN and in consultation and cooperation with the major powers who are members of the Security Council.

Also, the decisions of the Fez Summit could be a starting point for careful Arab movement toward a complete and just peace.

In addition, the continued Israeli occupation of Lebanon is something which cannot be endured. Egyptian diplomacy must redouble its contacts and its efforts to achieve Israeli withdrawal and work sincerely to support the legitimate Lebanese government, since that alone is responsible for guaranteeing the security, independence, unity and peace of the Lebanese land.

Egyptian diplomacy must bear in mind that the plans which it is drawing up must include achieving short-term and long-term goals as well.

On the nonaligned front, 1983 will witness the eighth summit conference of nonaligned nations, which will convene in New Delhi in March. It will be preceded by a ministerial meeting in Managua, the capital of Nicaragua, in mid-January, and a second ministerial meeting in New Delhi shortly before the summit meeting.

Preparations for these important meetings require that Egyptian diplomacy concentrate on bilateral contacts with the nonaligned states to develop a joint concept of methods to support the movement, deepen its sound path emanating from the pure wells of the movement, create new dynamics for it, and preserve its independence because that leads in the end to defending the rights of developing states, world peace, and the principles on which the nonaligned movement is based. There is no doubt that a forceful new impetus for Egyptian diplomatic movement in this respect has been generated by the two important visits which President Husni Mubarak paid to Belgrade and New Delhi in the second half of 1982.

To Egypt, nonalignment is a creed, a political program, a moral principle, and a method of action, and Egyptian diplomacy must move on this basis to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and pass over the unusual crisis to which Egyptian-Soviet relations have been exposed, since the presence of fundamental political differences and incompatibility in points of view cannot impede the establishment of normal relations between two states, in contemporary international life.

Egypt diplomatic action in 1983 cannot be restricted to movement within those three circles only, but will doubtless extend to all parts of the world.

This movement will be represented by visits which the Egyptian president will make to Asian, African and American capitals and international organizations. Egyptian diplomacy must also work to strengthen Egypt's positive role in various international organizations.

Perhaps what explains that is that Egypt's mission is not restricted to exerting efforts on behalf of peace in the Middle East but extends beyond the area of the Middle East to action on the international level for the sake of peace and prosperity for all peoples and nations, for our world is indivisible. A better world is one which knows no war, poverty or hunger in any spot of the world.

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CSO: 4504/152

BIRTH CONTROL ACTIVITIES DISCUSSED

Cairo TANZIM AL-USRAH [FAMILY PLANNING] in Arabic No 14, Sep-Oct 82
pp 4-5

[Article: "From Here and There"]

[Text] New Records for Centers:

The [Family Planning] Association has prepared forms for new additional records that serve the work at the family planning centers controlled by the association. These forms are tantamount to receipt books used when collecting dues for services rendered to women who frequent the centers, daily records for the coils [supplied] and for visits to the centers, as well as a record for the traffic in monthly contraceptives. These records will be used instead of the forms that have been filled monthly by the center.

These records will help the process of acquiring data pertaining to the activity of the centers. They are also considered a basis for the process of the internal regulation of these centers.

Targeted Training:

The Cairo Family Planning Association has met under the chairmanship of Fakhriyah Qasim to discuss the training programs conducted by the association to enhance the standard of the workers in the family planning centers (doctors, women specialists, women doctors and secretaries).

Sana' al-A'sar, the training specialist who cooperates with the association by offering her technical experience to the training programs, took part in the meeting. The committee reviewed the training courses already conducted and the courses scheduled to be implemented by the end of the year in order to set a timetable for them. The committee has stressed the need to survey the actual training needs of the workers at the centers through the on-the-spot followup carried out by the association's Control and Followup Committee so the training may achieve its goals.

Young Women's Camp in Port Said:

During September, the association conducted a recreational cultural camp in Port Said for 50 members of the Young Women's Cultural Club of Zaynham. The camp program included cultural activities consisting of lectures and enlightenment courses and recreational activity including a visit by the members to Port Said port, a cruise of the Suez Canal and free tours of the city. At the end of the camp, a recreational party was held for the girls during which some of the members presented some recreational performances.

General Association's Enlightenment Committee:

The Enlightenment Committee of the General Family Planning Association has asked the Cairo Association to prepare a paper explaining the activities of the Young Women's Cultural Club which is attached to the model center in Zaynham so as to use this paper as a guideline when setting up similar young women's clubs in the other governments. The Enlightenment Committee had visited the model center and the Young Women's Club in February 1982 and familiarized itself with its various activities.

Storage Unit to Serve Centers:

The Egyptian Childcare Association in al-Khudayri has agreed to set aside a room at its headquarters on Qadri Street in al-Sayyidah Zaynab to be used as a storage unit for the Cairo Family Planning Association and to serve the family planning centers within the jurisdiction. The association hopes that this storage unit will go into operation at the beginning of 1983.

On-The-Spot Followup of Family Planning Centers:

The Cairo social affairs directorates are presently cooperating with the association in following up on and evaluating the inoperative and weak centers in preparation for boosting the weak among them and for transferring the inoperative ones to other areas where the service is needed.

Food Services Center and Drop in Pill Percentages:

It will be noticed that during the first 9 months of this year there has been a drop in the percentage of women using contraceptive pills at the association's centers for the purpose of birth control in comparison to the corresponding period of last year. In view of the fact that the project has been implemented for a period of 5 years, ending with the end of 1981, in 47 centers, there was a considerable increase in the number of women using birth control pills during the period of the plan. When the agreement was renewed for 3 more years at the beginning of this year, the number of centers in Cairo was reduced to 14 centers, with the 33 other centers excluded in accordance with the renewal terms. This drop in the number of centers has been coupled with a drop in the number of women

using the pill. Here, numerous questions are raised: What is the relationship between the food program and the demand shown by the women frequenting these centers and using the pill? Is there a transformation toward other means? Has termination of the food program motivated these women to get their pills from other places closer to them, such as the pharmacies which sell the pill at the same price?

These questions need to be studied and evaluated. So that the study may be more comprehensive and the evaluation more inclusive, they must be conducted after conclusion of the renewed plan which ends with the end of 1984.

8494

CSO: 4504/184

DETAILS OF 1981 BATTLES WITH RADICAL RELIGIOUS GROUPS REPORTED

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2518, 26 Jan 83 pp 10-13

[Article by Sayyid 'Abd al-Qadir: "After 15 Months: Full Details of Longest Day in Asyut's History; Secrets of Battle Between RADical Religious Groups and Security Men; How 82 Persons Fell Dead and 132 Wounded in Single Day; One Soldier Survived Attack on Security Directorate"]

[Text] In the wake of the platform incident at noon on 6 October [al-Sadat's assassination], the city of Asyut witnessed a chain of bloody events. A total of 82 persons fell dead and 132 wounded in a single day. Amidst the onrush of the events and the grief that engulfed everything, people didn't know what happened exactly, why it happened and how it happened. Fifteen months after that terrible day, AKHIR SA'AH has obtained the full details of what happened on the soil of Upper Egypt's capital. It has interviewed the victims of that day, some with an amputated leg, others with a gouged eye and some with a son or a brother lost. Many homes were filled with orphans. The days pass but 8 October 1981 remains in the eyes, hearts and minds of these people a day with a more bitter taste than that of colocynth. It is an unforgettable day because it is the day of grief.

On that day, 8 October 1981, Cairo, like the other Egyptian governorates, was submerged in its grief and its tranquility following the major event. But the grieved city (Asyut) did not know the taste of tranquillity. With the break of dawn on that day, fired bullets shattered the morning silence, awakened the sleepy, scared the worshippers and interrupted the holiday prayers.

People awakened to wonder: What has happened? Who is attacking whom? Who is killing whom and in whose interest? Until a late hour of the day, the calm inhabitants didn't know what was going on in the city streets. They were content to stay home for fear of a stray bullet fired in their direction, and many a bullet were fired on that day to hit the chests of the young and the old.

In fact, there were many victims by the end of the day.

A total of 82 people were killed: 4 police officers, 65 policemen and 13 civilians. The wounded amounted to 132 persons: 16 officers, 95 policemen and 21 civilians.

Some of the wounds have not healed yet. The grief persists despite the passage of 15 months. Many facts about the true nature of what took place on that sad day are still unknown to the people.

What Happened

Come let us re-live what happened.

The arms of the clock go backward and we are on the day of 8 October 1981. The place is the city of Asyut and the time is 0555 of the first day of al-Adha Feast. The congregators are still repeating the holiday prayers.

At this time, the first bullet was fired from a rifle carried by a member of one of the radical religious groups that had planned to seize the city to implement a scheme which had been studied by the groups' leaders and amirs.

The attack started against 6 points:

- The first police precinct.
- The Asyut Security Directorate.
- The second police precinct.
- Nasir Mosque.
- The Asyut Supply Intelligence Section.
- The Ibrahim police post.

Every point was attacked by a number of members of the religious groups who had gathered in the city hours earlier. Some of them were inhabitants of Asyut and others came to the city from other governorates to carry out the plan. Some of the members were armed with automatic weapons and others accompanied the armed members to seize the weapons of the policemen after killing their owners.

The first group began its attack against the Security Directorate. The attack operation started with killing the directorate guards, storming the building and seizing the weapons cache. The group then captured the directorate building for 6 hours after which the police forces regained it.

The fact that many don't know is that of all those present in the Security Directorate, only one policeman escaped the bullets of the religious groups.

My Father Is My Supreme Ideal

Heading the list of those martyred was Brig Gen Rida Shukri who was preparing to end his nightlong shift.

Brig Gen Rida Shukri is the father of 3 children: 2 girls, one of them a junior high school student and the second a freshman in high school, and a son, Sharif who is the oldest and a student in the general high school.

Sharif, the eldest of martyr Brig Gen Rida Shukri's children, recounts the story of that day as he lived it, saying:

In the evening, my father left the house for his regular shift. He had no apprehensions and neither did we. But as was his habit, he implied to us that he may or may not return because he was leaving to perform his duty. We were used to this from him. As usual, he urged me to take care of my mother and 2 sisters and departed. In the morning, I awakened to the sounds of bullets. When the shooting began to intensify we started to experience fear. I contacted my father's office at the directorate repeatedly but nobody answered. All of Thursday, 8 October 1981, passed without our being able to know our father's fate. On Friday, a person at the directorate answered us for the first time. I asked him about my father's fate and he said that my father had gone out with a force. He refused to tell us that my father had been martyred since the pervious evening. On Friday afternoon, my uncle came from Cairo and told us of the news which he had learned from another uncle who lives in Asyut. This uncle was afriad to tell us the news.

We lived days as balck as hell but remained patient.

Sharif pauses for moments and then adds:

What happened to my father is an honor to him and to me because he fell while performing his duty toward his work and his country. My father was the model of a great police officer. All his [evaluation] reports were excellent.

I asked Sharif: Is it possible that you think of enrolling in the Police College after what has happened to your father?

He answered decisively: My father was the martyr of duty and it is an honor to me to enroll in the Police College to complete the march he had started but did not finish.

Engineer Muhsin Shukri, the brother of Brig Gen Rida Shukri, said:

My brother was the eldest of 7 brothers. He became the actual family supporter when my father and mother advanced in age. Upon my father's death, my mother expressed her wishes to him to move to Asyut to take care of her and be close to her. He fulfilled her wish and lived in the same apartment building where she lives. But her dream did not last long. My brother was martyred and it was a big loss for all of us. As for my mother, it is hard for her to imagine what happened.

Fiercest Battle

The fiercest battle witnessed by the city took place in the first police precinct of Asyut. This was the second point on which the groups had focused after their battle at the Security Directorate.

There, at al-Bandar Square, the fire exchange lasted long hours in that populated area. The question that rushed to our mind was: How did the battle start and how did it end?

Soldier Najib Zakhari is one of those who took part in that battle whose effect will stay with him for the rest of his life. He was wounded while defending his guard post and had to have his right leg amputated. Though unable to express his feelings, he said:

I am 23 years old and I work as a farmer. At the time, I was a conscript in the security forces. I came to the precinct as part of a reinforcement to defend the post. I was surrounded by bullets. I was standing with a colleague and the force officer. Minutes later, my colleague was killed and the force officer was wounded. Suddenly, a bullet hit me in the foot bone and I screamed. The firing went on I fainted. When I awoke, I found that my right foot had been amputated. This is all I remember.

I asked First Sergeant Sirri 'Abd al-Maqsud Muhammad Shihatah: What happened in the first precinct battle?

He said: Al-Himar [donkey] house?

What is al-Himar house?

He began to gather his thoughts and knit his brows while remembering:

They (meaning members of the groups) were riding a big central security vehicle which they had seized. When they stopped in front of the precinct, nobody expected them to come out shooting at the police precinct. We thought they were soldiers. They entered the precinct quickly while firing their weapons in the face of whomever encountered them. They headed for the weapons storeroom and ordered Cpl. 'Id Tuni, the guard in charge of the weapons, to open the door. He refused and they shot him dead. They seized the weapons and killed First Lt 'Isam Makhluuf and another corporal named Kamil Ahmad Mahmud. When one of the precinct's soldiers opened fire on them, they thought that they had been attacked from the rear and fled rapidly. While departing from the precinct, one of them was wounded. They were not able to move him and so they themselves killed him.

Quickly, they entered the first house they saw. It happened to be al-Himar house. Al-Himar is the name of the family that owns the house. The occupants fled and the deserted house turned into a "stronghold" from which they hunted down whoever was at the precinct. Traffic in al-Bandar square where the precinct is located became impossible.

Baby Delivered at Police Precinct

Cpl 'Abd al-Maqsud goes no to say:

One of the women who fled the house, namely the landlord's daughter in law, came to the precinct. She was in her ninth month of pregnancy. Because of her extreme fear, her labor started and she delivered her baby at the precinct. None of those at the precinct know what to do with the woman or her baby. Had it not been for kind fate, the woman and her baby would have died. One of the soldiers sneaked away and brought a midwife from her nearby house, sneaking with her back into the precinct through a back door. The midwife completed the delivery operation and stayed with the woman at the precinct for 12 hours till an ambulance came to take them to the hospital.

The battle lasted a full 24 hours during which 6 soldiers and an officer were killed. The precinct's intelligence officer, Maj Mabruk Farghali, was hit by several bullets in his leg, thigh and side after having run the battle bravely and heroically. He was hit by one of the group members hiding in al-Himar house while trying to call by telephone for a reinforcement to bolster the force at the precinct.

We are now looking at the most famous house in Asyut--al-Himar house which has turned into ruins and is awaiting the decision to be demolished because its walls have been chewed up by the bullet fire. I asked some of those present to go up with me to look inside the house. We managed to do so with difficulty. Climbing into the house which until recently was alive with the laughter and activity of its inhabitants has become an adventure.

Parts of the stone wall, remnants of the house furniture, empty food cans and boxes are scattered all over the narrow stairway. The remnants of the house's demolished furniture are heaped in 2 rooms. Bullet marks are seen all over the walls and the ceiling. The windows are dismantled. I looked out of the window into the balcony and realized why this house turned into some sort of a stronghold. I found that it overlooked the top part of the precinct building and the adjacent firefighting station.

A memorial has been built in the precinct lobby for the precinct martyrs. A marble plate carries the names of First Lt 'Isam al-Din Makhluf, Cpl 'Id Tuni Abu al-Siba' (the heroic guard of the weapons storeroom) and Cpl Kamil Ahmad Mahmud.

Appointment That Did not Materialize

At the home of martyr 'Isam al-Din Makhluf, I asked his 62-year old father Muhammad 'Ali Hasan Makhluf: What do you remember about 8 October 1981?

With total composure, the man who works as first supervisor of Arabic at the Asyut Education Directorate said:

I remember all that happened on that day. As is our custom, we were spending the day preceding the holiday and the first day of the holiday in our village of Bani 'Adi. My son, the martyred 'Isam, was supposed to come with his wife, to whom he had been wedded but with whom he had not yet consummated the marriage, to have lunch with us. But he did not show up. We called the precinct repeatedly, but to no avail. After several attempts, somebody answered the phone and told us that 'Isam had been wounded. Some of the family members went quickly to reassure themselves about him. I and his mother remained behind, waiting. In the evening we learned the news.

Martyr 'Isam Makhluf was 24 years old and has 3 sisters and a brother who works as a teacher. He is the grandson of Shaykh Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman Makhluf, a prominent al-Azhar scholar. His mother's uncle is Shaykh Husayn Makhluf, a former mufti of Egypt.

I asked his father: How did you receive the news?

He said: I am a man who believes in God and His fate. I told my self: This is God's will and there is no changing God's will and heaven is 'Isam's lot because he has been martyred.

How did his mother and his brothers receive the news?

He paused for a time and then said: We kept the news from his mother throughout the day. When she learned of it, she was deeply grieved and, along with his sisters, is still grieved. My son was a good, pious and mild-mannered man who was loved by his colleagues and friends. But we believe in God's will and fate and thank God for everything.

Blood in Mosque Square

The third attack took place in front of Nasir Mosque, the biggest mosque in Asyut, while the holiday prayers were still being held.

I asked Yusuf Ramzi Labib, who was at the time with the force guarding the congregation at the big mosque, about what he saw on 8 October.

Yusuf, who is 25 years old and works as a farmer in 'Izbat Nasir and whose military service was terminated because of his wound, said:

I was sitting in the vehicle with my colleagues. Each had a [riot] shield and a club only. In front of each truck (carrying 36 soldiers) stood 2 soldiers carrying rifles. We were happy with the holiday and were waiting for the service to end. We were exchanging best wishes on the occasion and a few minutes later they attacked us.

I asked him: Who attacked you?

In his spontaneous manner, he said: The Sunnis, sir. They killed the guards standing in front of the vehicle and then opened their fire on all those who were in the vehicle. We couldn't even climb out of it.

Yusuf then pointed to the spot where he was wounded. A bullet penetrated his ear and shattered his temple. He required a surgery. As a result, his right eye remains open, cannot blink and cannot be shut. This is why it is always inflamed and why it has developed a cataract.

Soldier 'Abd al-Rahim Hasanayn was sitting in the same place. All he saw was a black car from which armed men climbed out. He heard many bullets and he was hit by some of them in his left leg. Since then, pain has not left him throughout the past 15 months.

I asked Dr Mustafa al-Najjar, the head of the bone section at the Asyut General Hospital and the physician treating Hasanayn: What kind of wound is this wound that would not heal in 15 months?

He said: 'Abd al-Rahim suffers from a multiple fracture of the leg bones which have been smashed, thus affecting the foot nerves, blood vessels and toes. The result is a chronic bone inflammation and decay in some parts. The treatment in this case requires a long period of time interspersed by a number of surgeries. The treatment period may range from several months to years and may, regrettably, ultimately and with amputation.

I said to the doctor: This case must have certainly been the most difficult case you encountered on that day. He answered negatively:

No, there were more difficult and more deeply touching cases. The worst was perhaps the case of a young woman called Mirfat Kamil. Mirfat, who was a senior at the Business College and who is an only child, awakened to the sounds of bullets on that morning. She proceeded to open a window to find out what was happening and was hit by a bullet in her vertebral column which has led to paralysis in the lower half of her body. The parents' beautiful dream has turned into a ruined young woman who lies in her bed and who cannot even control her bowel movement.

Doctors in Armored Vehicle

The casualties on that day were numerous, according to Dr Salah Isma'il 'Isa, the director of the Asyut General Hospital, but the problem at the outset was in how to get the doctors to the hospital. I, the doctors and the nurses were brought here by an armed vehicle and we worked from 0800 to 2300. The wounded and the dead were lying on the roads and the morgue was filled with bodies. On the first day, there were 39 bodies and on the second day 24 more bodies. This was at the Asyut General Hospital alone.

Sha'ban, Butcher's Boy

The stories about the casualties are numerous and to some of them applies the saying that "the worst tragedy is none that evokes laughter."

The story of Sha'ban, the butcher's [errand] boy, which is told by all of Asyut's inhabitants is perhaps the one to which this saying applies best. However, this story does not evoke as much laughter as it evokes tears.

On that morning, Sha'ban, as was his custom on the morning of every morning of the Greater Feast, proceeded to go to his employer so that they may slaughter the feast sacrifices. Before reaching his employer's house, he found himself engulfed by bullet fire. He tried to hide but the bullets tore his arm. The result has been more than one surgery on his arm and 4 fingers in his right hand which he cannot move. Sha'ban has come to realize that he cannot use his hand for any work. He has lost the work from which he earned his livelihood. Sha'ban has 11 brothers, not to mention his mother. His father, who has married another woman from whom he has had 2 children, is a small employee with a monthly salary of 40 pounds. Before the incident, Sha'ban was a major source of income for his brothers. Now, it does not take much deduction to know how this big family lives. It is a difficult equation that even a computer would be unable to solve.

The other story is that of citizen Sa'd Thabit, nicknamed Sa'd Sima, who recounts:

My father died of natural causes on that day. When I learned of his death, I endured all kinds of hardship to get to his house which is only 500 meters away from mine. Regrettably, I couldn't bury my father's body for 24 hours during which it remained captive in the house.

Children Also Have Their Grief

Even children have their painful stories with that day. A child went out to buy bread for his family and was brought home a lifeless body. Citizen Mahmud Muhammad 'Ibadah was sitting at home when a bomb fell on top of the house claiming 18 victims, including his daughter which had not yet reached the age of 11.

Child Nawal Hasan Sha'ban, 5 years old, was sitting amidst her family when an explosion boomed close to the window. Nawal cried out of fear but when her father approached her, he found blood flowing profusely from her hand. The small hand that had committed no sin was broken and remained in a cast for 1.5 months.

Grief of Upper Egypt's People

In front of the Asyut Supply Intelligence, the area crowded with homes witnessed another battle between the police and the members of the radical religious groups.

In this area where 3 central security vehicles were stationed to guard the congregators, the group members launched another attack against the police.

I asked a soldier who was a part of this force: What do you remember of that day's events?

He said: My name is Mahmud Ahmad 'Abd al-'Aziz and I am 22 years old. My original work is a farmer in Bani Mazar village and I am a conscript in the central security forces. On the day of the feast, I was returning from leave taken for my father's death. I was thinking of how I had become the supporter for my mother and my 3 sisters. My colleagues had spent the night on duty. In the morning, they surprised us with bullets and cleavers. I saw nothing after that.

Mahmud was hit by a bullet in the eye and bled until he fainted. The other eye has weakened and he can hardly see. He is now unemployed and sightless and his family is without a supporter. Mahmud is still waiting for his turn to get a pension to support him and his family. He said: "When I awoke at the hospital, I learned that 'Abd al-Rahim had died." He means First Lt 'Abd al-Rahim Sayyid 'Umar, his force commander.

In the village of Bani Murr, located 3 kilometers from Asyut, where the home of martyred First Lt 'Abd al-Rahim Sayyid 'Umar is found, the story has more to it.

It is the story of a mother killed by grief, a mother weeping with anguish as she has wept every day while remembering her son, the joy of her heart whom she loved and who had lighted her eyes every time he entered the house with his military uniform.

She has since grieved his death, and how killing is the grief of Upper Egypt's people, as they say. Since his death, she has not tasted any vegetable "her loved one" cannot eat and has not eaten a fruit he cannot enjoy. Every Friday, she spends the entire day with her chest on his grave hoping the earth would perhaps extinguish the fire in her burning heart.

"I want no pension, no consolation, no mosque and no blood money. I want you to cool the fire in my heart."

These were her words while her tears poured from her eyes, wetting her face and flowing between its wrinkles that have deepened with grief.

"It was the Thursday I will hate for the rest of my life, the day I waited for my loved one for whom I had prepared the meal for al-Adha feast. I was waiting for him and heard a scream. I thought it was a scuffle. Then I saw his sisters crying and screaming. I wept. I know it was my loved one."

The martyr's mother remembered, with tears filling her eyes and with the words uttered with emotion and without any order:

"He was pious and God-fearing man. I had gotten him engaged to a girl 55 days earlier and he died before he could show the engagement pictures to his fiancée. His father had died 10 months earlier and I thought I was lonely. But only now do I know the fire in my heart."

The day of 7 [presumably meaning 8] October--the longest day in Asyut's history and the day of tragedies and catastrophes--ended. It was a day which people had thought would be like any other day and would merit no special pause. But it turned out to be a day different from other days because it has become an unforgettable day--the day of the great grief.

8494

C30: 4504/184

SUPPLY MINISTER DISCUSSES NEW TWO-TIER RATION CARD SYSTEM

Cairo AKHIR SA'AH in Arabic No 2516, 12 Jan 83 p 11

/Article by Suhayr al-Husayni: "A Conversation with the Supply Minister: Who Will Get the 1983 Supply Cards?"/

/Text/ Who will get the 1983 cards? Why?

What groups will obtain the new cards? What is the scope of the new supply cards? How much will they save the government treasury? Are there measures to guarantee that the groups will be tabulated, after the new cards are prepared? Will any opportunities be given to people with grievances who are deprived of the new cards? To which body may they present their complaints?

It is around these questions that the conversation with the minister of supply, Ahmad Nuh, revolved. However, before getting into the new cards, we must shed some light on the issue of subsidies and their evolution.

People's opinions on dealing with the problem of subsidies have become ramified and multifarious. Researchers have exerted personal judgment to find solutions to it. All of them have exchanged views from a specific angle; as a result, opinions have conflicted to a large degree and the problem of subsidies and the way to get them to the people who are truly entitled to them has become a pressing economic problem, in view of the great burden on the government budget the subsidies represent.

Solving this problem has become difficult, because of the premise that it is not an ordinary economic problem to which traditional economic theories can be applied but rather is a problem with two parts, an economic part and a social part, which both affect the other accordingly, and attempts to find a solution in terms of the philosophy of either part will have a bad effect on the other part. The studies that various agencies and economic researchers have made on the subject of subsidies have resulted in the emergence of two approaches:

The first considers that subsidies must be abrogated by raising the prices of the subsidized commodities to a level that is on a par with their real costs, or close to them, and that the classes with limited incomes must be compensated by an alternative in the form of cash (such as increased salaries).

The second claims that the subsidies should be retained, on grounds that they are a means for redistributing national income among individuals by affecting the relative prices of various commodities and that they help stabilize prices and consequently lead to social stability.

Retaining Subsidies

It seems that the second approach, that subsidies should be retained and that an attempt should be made to set out certain solutions that will help guide subsidies, is the one that is being supported. One of the most important solutions that have been proposed is the possibility of guiding the subsidies of supply card commodity quotas.

With a quick glance at the growth of supply cards, we will see that Egypt resorted to the use of the supply card system in 1936 to guarantee that citizens were provided with basic commodities in the event the threat of war occurred. The system of supply cards remained in effect and a number of decrees were issued regulating that in the period 1939-79. A comprehensive review of supply cards was made in 1979 and this resulted in the removal of 1.6 million persons from the cards drawn up at that time.

In 1980, the Ministry of Supply issued Decree 22 for 1980 issuing new supply cards for citizens, while excluding six high-income groups from access to the cards though giving them uncontrolled commodity cards so that they could be given the commodities covered by cards at the prevailing uncontrolled prices.

10 Million Persons Committing Violations!

In an attempt to evaluate the extent to which the enforcement of Decree 22 for 1980 has succeeded in the past 2 years, that is, since the decree first went into force, and what it has achieved in terms of defining excluded high-income groups, we come up with the following facts, which we have received from the Ministry of Supply:

The number of families and individuals excluded from access to supply cards, who were to receive quotas at the stipulated partially subsidized uncontrolled price, came to about 216,000 families or an average of 4.36 persons per family; according to the data for the month of April 1982, these were broken down as follows:

People who had emigrated: 109,895 persons

People working abroad: 725,045 persons

People working in international organizations: 829 persons

People working in foreign investment companies: 4,138 persons

People owning 10 feddans or more: 110,378 persons

People subject to general revenue tax: 15,648 persons

Local cards: 30,317 persons

Foreign cards: 5,008 persons

These figures show that a total of 1,091,258 persons were in these groups but only 941 people undertook to follow the exclusion restrictions, while the remaining persons to whom the restrictions applied did not undertake to use cards for commodities at the uncontrolled prices, but rather, continued to use the subsidized supply cards, in spite of their signed acknowledgments that fines and penalties would be imposed for the commission of crime if fraudulent conduct was discovered on their part.

One can specify the causes for the excluded groups' evasion of commitment to the decrees as follows, as the Supply Ministry has stated:

The bodies that supervise the administration of these groups' activities have not been responsive with the Supply Ministry in giving notice regarding the people to whom the exclusion rules are to apply.

The ministerial decree that was issued did not compel these bodies, whether they were subordinate to the government administrative apparatus, such as the government departments, tax office and agricultural inspectorates, or were subordinate to ministries supervising the authorities, investment companies and foreign organizations, to inform the ministry about these people.

7 Pounds per Person

A rapid glance at the volume of subsidies on commodities connected to supply cards that individuals who are registered on the new supply cards are now receiving will show that:

The number of supply cards throughout the republic, according to the data for 1981, comes to about 8,103,000; about 39,463,000 persons are registered on them, of whom 19,392,000 are in cities and 20,040,000 are in villages.

Thus the annual per capita subsidies come to about 720 piasters in differences between the two prices. Considering that the number of people who are entered on the cards is 39.5 million, the total subsidies that citizens who are registered on supply cards receive come to about 284.5 million pounds. The Supply Ministry has presented a number of recommendations for guiding subsidies on the commodities on cards. Ahmad Nuh, the minister of Supply and internal trade, also announced these when he said:

"The results and indices of the evaluation of the supply cards and the extent to which subsidies get to the people who are really entitled to them have shown that many of the people who are now registered on supply cards have high incomes, and that should exclude them from the stipulated subsidies on commodities connected to the supply cards."

The minister of supply went on to say,

"Therefore, in order to guarantee that the subsidies reach the people who are really entitled to them, in the form of people with limited incomes only, the situation requires that there be a review of the present supply cards and that a supply card be issued in accordance with an expansion in the excluded categories, which will include all groups with incomes above a limited amount. In this regard, we have recommended that new supply cards be drawn up for all citizens, which will be made out by the grocers that are used at present. Green supply cards for full subsidies will be allotted to families with limited incomes, and red supply cards will go for limited subsidies (at the uncontrolled price, for the excluded groups)."

The Excluded Groups

The minister of supply and internal trade, Ahmad Nuh, spelled out the groups that are excluded from full subsidies as follows:

Owners of stores, tourist facilities and transportation companies, owners of import-export offices, commercial agents, contractors, and persons who own factories and workshops to whom permits to engage in activities have been issued by the competent government bodies; they number 3,243,913 persons.

Professional people who belong to professional unions, who graduated more than 15 years ago and have engaged in private activities, even if they have been employees of the government and the public sector. That includes people belonging to private staffs and their families. They number 14,400 persons.

People, and their wives and minor children, who own more than 10 feddans in the form of agricultural land or orchards of fruit trees, on condition that no land tax be connected with that: 297,600 persons.

People on loan and on contract to work abroad and emigrants and their families: 1.92 million people.

People working in companies subject to the Investment Law and their families, except for people working in other services (auxiliary): 171,474 persons.

People working in branches of international organizations and foreign companies in Egypt and people working in the League of Arab States, the League of Islamic Peoples and foreign schools and universities that have branches in Egypt, and their families: 20,000 persons.

People working in embassies, consulates and offices of diplomatic representation in Egypt and their families: 10,000 persons.

People who have general income tax obligations and their families: 710,000 persons.

Owners of real estate who receive a net rental in excess of 2,000 pounds a year (the exemption level) from their property and their families: 39,813 persons.

Owners of private cars with engines of more than four cylinders or a capacity of 2,000 cubic centimeters or more and their families.

People owning two or more private cars and their families.

Savings of 47 Million Pounds

The minister of supply and internal trade went on: "The total subsidies, through the execution of this recommendation, considering that the number of people currently registered on supply cards totals 39.5 million persons and the removal of the members of the excluded groups, who are defined, as presented in the recommendation, at about 6.6 million persons, so that the number of persons in the limited income groups who are entitled to subsidies will be about 33 million persons, and considering that the average subsidies for persons on the cards will be estimated at about 7.2 pounds a year--the total subsidies, through the execution of this recommendation, will be about 137.5 million pounds, instead of 284.5 million, and thus the savings in subsidies will be about 47 million pounds.

"In estimating the number of people in these excluded groups, attention has been given to assuming that they will be the minimum in practical reality in this sphere."

Are there measures to guarantee that these groups will be counted, once the new cards are prepared?

The minister said, "It is possible to carry out an actual field count of these groups with the aid of all the agencies and bodies concerned, in cooperation with the Ministry of Supply, so that it will be possible to count the number of people who are on loan or have contracted to work abroad through the various government channels, such as the Office of Expertise of the Ministry of State for Manpower, the Permits Issuance Office of the Ministry of the Interior and so forth. It will also be possible to enumerate the owners of real property through the data coming into Real Estate Notification Office registers and real estate tax registers. It will also be necessary for the people leaving the country for work or emigration purposes to present material proving that they have handed over their supply cards to the competent body, as a basic condition for receiving permission to work abroad or emigrate."

New Cards

The minister of supply and internal trade continued, "When this system goes into effect, supply cards will be drawn up for all citizens, to eliminate the negative features that appeared when the system of red cards was adopted, provided that indigent citizens enjoy total subsidies in accordance with the green cards handed out to them. People who are well off will have partial subsidies on commodities on a phased basis, in accordance with the red cards.

"In order for success to be achieved in this system, it will be necessary that all the government agencies and bodies concerned undertake to cooperate

and coordinate with the supply ministers in their various fields of specialization, in the light of the directives the ministers concerned issue in this regard to the agencies subordinate to them."

People Present their Grievances

/Question/ What if a citizen is one of those to whom the conditions of exclusion apply but his conditions nonetheless now put him in need of subsidies?

The minister said, "The persons suffering from losses who belong to groups to which red supply cards are issued, with partial subsidies, must present themselves to the supply office in whose area they live, with a statement of grievance containing the reasons for their grievance, supported with documents. These grievances will be investigated on a central basis."

/Question/ How much will it cost to print the new supply cards?

/Answer/ It is expected that the costs of the necessary runs of printing to produce the proposed new supply cards will come to about 500,000 pounds, in addition to about 300,000 pounds which will be set aside as incentives for the employees who are carrying out the project. It will be possible to obtain the revenues to meet these costs (800,000 pounds) by collecting the costs of the cards, at a rate of 10 piasters per card. One should bear in mind that it is expected that 8 million new cards will be given out, and it is assumed that the project will take about 6 months from the date work starts."

11887

CSO: 4504/167

UNIVERSITY CREDENTIALS OF AL-SADAT'S WIDOW, SON QUESTIONED

Contestation of Qualifications

Cairo AL-AHRAR in Arabic 17 Jan 83 p 1

/Text/ On Tuesday 8 February, the administrative judiciary court will review suits that have been filed by three cassation lawyers contesting the educational credentials which Jamal Anwar al-Sadat and Jihan al-Sadat received from Cairo University.

The court will review the three suits under the chairmanship of Counsellor Jalal 'Abd-al-Hamid, with 'Abd-Amir and Wajih Sha'ban as secretaries.

The first suit was filed by the lawyer 'Abd-al-Halim Ramadan against the president of Cairo University and the dean of the Faculty of Letters, demanding that the decree accepting the registration of the female student Jihan al-Sadat as a student in the Faculty of Letters and the comprehensive effects that her receipt of a bachelor's and master's degree and her appointment as a reader and assistant instructor have resulted in.

In the petition of the suit it was stated "Out of negligence on people's part, an unknown person decided to admit Mrs Jihan al-Sadat as a student in the Faculty of Letters in Cairo University. This registration was done in an invalid manner, in violation of the laws and rules that have been set forth on the admission of students to the faculty. This invalid conduct has harmed me as a guardian and as a former student in the university."

The Case of Jamal

The second suit was also filed by 'Abd-a-Halim Ramadan. In it, he demanded that the grant of a bachelor's degree in engineering to the student Jamal Anwar al-Sadat be rescinded and considered as if it never had existed, along with the effects resulting from that.

He stated that he had sent a letter to the university on 30 December on the same subject and had given the university a week to reply to his letter; however, it had not done so.

In the petition of his suit, the lawyer said that that entailed an infringement on the trusteeship and responsibility toward learning in the mother of the Egyptian universities, and an infringement on the graduates. The lawyer based himself on the administrative court's ruling in favor of the professor in the engineering faculty who had discovered a falsification of the examination results of the student Jamal al-Sadat.

The Third Suit

The third suit is also against Jamal al-Sadat, and was filed by Muhammad 'Ali 'Abd-al-Rahim 'Anbar and Farid Muhammad 'Anbar, cassation lawyers. In it, they filed suit against the chairman of the court to deal with the matter from the political and administrative angles and the socialist public prosecutor to consider the case an official notice so that he could take legal steps in regard to it. The two lawyers also filed suit with Dr Sufi Abu Talib, the chairman of the People's Assembly and former president of Cairo University, Dr Hasan Hamdi, the current president of Cairo University, and the dean of the Faculty of Engineering.

The petition of the suit stated, "After Dr Muhammad 'Ali Salih, the chairman of the Chemical Engineering Department of Cairo University, had declared that Jamal al-Sadat had obtained a bachelor's degree in engineering through fraud, the nationwide papers did not publish any response to the serious, provocative occurrences that infringe upon the dignity of the university, indeed on the dignity of the nation, and are detrimental to an important principle in the constitution, which is equality of opportunity for all citizens, a matter which is connected to the integrity of government and administration in general. It is a matter that inspires one to believe that these were true occurrences, especially since they infringe upon the integrity of some professors concerned in the Engineering Faculty and point to the testimony of some others, resulting in matters which are of the utmost seriousness for the university and the government alike. Therefore the two petitioners, in their intent to purify the reputation of the university, consider that this national issue should be resolved before its effects become exacerbated through neglect and abandonment, and the scope of the chaos that it has created in the spirits of all the citizens extends to infringe upon a principle which all constitutions, including the Egyptian constitution, have upheld, namely the right of equality which is guaranteed every citizen."

Cairo University Statement

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Jan 83 p 1

/Text/ AL-AKHBAR has transmitted the following statement from Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, the president of Cairo University, issued by Cairo University, and the special statement regarding the legal status of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat in the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University. Herewith is a text of the statement;

Cairo AL-AKHBAR in Arabic 18 Jan 83 p 1

/Text/ AL-AKHBAR has transmitted the following statement from Dr Hasan Hamdi Ibrahim, the president of Cairo University, issued by Cairo University, and the special statement regarding the legal status of Mrs Jihan al-Sadat in the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University. Herewith is a text of the statement:

A statement from the University of Cairo

"On the basis of official documents on file in the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University, it is stated that Mrs Jihan Safwat Ra'uf was admitted to the Faculty of Letters at Cairo University by official nomination of the Office of Coordination of Admissions to the Universities and Higher Institutes in September 1974, after she had received the GCE certificate with a grade of 75 percent in the literature section. That certificate is equivalent to the general secondary education certificate. On the basis of this official documentation from the Office of Coordination of Admissions to the Universities and Higher Institutes, she was admitted to the Faculty of Letters for the academic year 1974-75."

That concludes the Cairo University statement. An opposition newspaper yesterday published material casting doubt on the validity of Mrs. Jihan's legal admission to the Cairo University Faculty of Letters.

11887

CSO: 4504/177

UNITY MOVES WITH TUNISIA REVIEWED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 7

[Text]

THE PROJECT for a union between the Jamahiriya and its western neighbour Tunisia has come a step nearer to fulfillment with the signature of a wide-ranging economic and cultural co-operation agreement during a visit to Tunis by Libya's Secretaries for Planning and for Economy and Light Industry.

Described by the Jamahiriya news agency JANA on 9th December as setting out 'a general framework for integration in planning, communications, education and information,' the agreement calls *inter alia* for the establishment of a unified customs tariff, with each country giving priority to the other's goods, and for the formulation of an expanded list of goods exempted from duty.

The co-operation agreement, signed on 7th December by Economy and Light Industry Secretary Musa Abu Freiwa and Tunisian Economy Minister Mr Abdulaziz Asram, also commits the two countries to revising the social security accord they signed in June 1973.

Earlier, Tunisian Premier Muhammad Mzali held wide-ranging talks with Mr Abu Freiwa, and with Mr Fawzi Shakshouki, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Planning. Also present was Mr Jum'a Fazzani, who heads the Libyan side on the joint commission set up early last year to examine practical measures aimed at an eventual merger of the two countries.

The project for a Tunisian-Libyan merger was proposed by revolutionary leader Muammer Qadhafi during a visit to Tunisia last January. Following the pattern already set in similar moves between the Jamahiriya and Algeria and Syria, the aim was not an 'instant union' of territory and political systems, but rather the inauguration of a long-term process entailing the integration of economic and social systems as the foundation for ultimate political union. The Tunisian-Libyan Joint Commission was set up after Colonel Qadhafi's visit, and it was agreed that the Libyan General People's Committee and the Tunisian cabinet would hold joint meetings every six months to examine the progress achieved.

CSO: 4500/89

CANADIAN OIL EXPERTS RECRUITED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 6

[Text]

THE LIBYAN Jamahiriya has recruited thirty four Canadian oil specialists to replace US oil workers who pulled out of Libya in response to the Reagan administration's calls on American workers to leave the country. A team of Libyan officials has been in Canada to recruit the oilmen, and on 5th November the London weekly *Middle East Economic Digest* disclosed that applicants were being interviewed for a further ninety jobs.

In December 1981 the Reagan administration banned US citizens from travelling to or through the Jamahiriya, and called on those already there to leave. The move was in response to wild and unsubstantiated allegations circulating in Washington that Libya had sent 'hit squads' to assassinate the US President. Later, in March last year, the Reagan administration stepped up its campaign to undermine the Jamahiriya's economy by declaring an economic boycott of Libya.

Reagan's efforts have been only partially successful. Most Americans refused to leave Libya, while friendly countries placed oil technicians at the Jamahiriya's disposal to overcome any temporary dislocations caused by the departure of those few US workers who heeded Reagan's call. In May, for example, ten Iranian oil engineers arrived in Tripoli, and another thirty nine were expected to follow them.

CONDUITS FOR AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT AID LISTED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 9

[Article by Majid al-Mansour]

[Text] ADDRESSING AFRICAN heads of state at their Tripoli summit in November, Muammer Qadhafi urged that the highest priority should be given to confronting the continent's pressing economic and social challenges, as well as to aiding the struggle against racism in South Africa and Namibia. Whether or not the OAU summit convened, he added, was in itself much less important than achieving practical progress on inter-African co-operation.

Firm evidence of the sincerity of the Libyan leader's call has come with the recent conclusion of co-operation agreements with Cape Verde and the Central African Republic. Technical and economic co-operation accords and a cultural agreement providing for the exchange of experts and educational delegations, and co-operation in training schemes, were signed in Tripoli in late November during a visit by Premier Pedro Verona Rodrigues of Cape Verde. In addition, the two countries agreed on the formation of a joint committee at ministerial level to oversee the development of relations in all fields.

A joint communique on 30th November showed that the Jamahiriya and Cape Verde share a common perception of the challenges facing Africa. Both expressed their 'concern regarding increased foreign interference in Africa's internal affairs', and affirmed 'the importance of economic, political and cultural co-ordination, solidarity and co-operation between African countries'.

Similar agreements, providing for economic, social and cultural co-operation,

and for the establishment of a joint committee for the consolidation of economic and social ties, were signed during a visit to Libya by the Foreign Minister of the Central African Republic, the Jamahiriya news agency JANA announced on 2nd December.

And in a further recent move aimed at increased inter-African co-operation, the Madagascan Foreign Minister Christian Remi Richardo arrived for talks in the Jamahiriya on 1st December, accompanied by the Director-General of the Central Bank of Madagascar.

Priority

The Al Fateh Revolution has consistently given high priority to the provisions of development assistance to the poorer countries of Africa, and impressive progress has been achieved. Much of the Jamahiriya's foreign aid is channelled through *multilateral agencies* of which the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) and the OPEC Special Fund are the largest. In the past seven years BADEA has distributed aid totalling \$7 billion, and in 1980 alone the figure was \$1.5 billion. In 1981 alone the OPEC Special Fund disbursed aid to the Third World totalling \$7 billion. The Jamahiriya also contributes to the Islamic Development Bank and the UAE-Libyan Fund for African Development.

It is *joint banks* and development companies, however, which form the backbone of the Jamahiriya's aid programme in Africa. Joint development banks have been

set up with Togo, Chad, Uganda, Niger and Mauritania. The Libyan-Togolese bank, in which half the ten million French franc capital was contributed by Libya, typifies these institutions' financial structure.

Joint holding companies, with subsidiaries involved in a range of development activities, have been set up with Uganda and Burundi, and there are plans for another in Ghana. The Libyan Arab-Uganda Holding Company has a capital of \$50 million, and oversees the operations of five subsidiaries.

A third major conduit for development aid are jointly funded *development companies*. In Guinea, for example, there is a joint Agricultural Corporation, a joint Maritime Fishing Company, and a joint Alumina Company, engaged in bauxite mining and alumina production, in which the Jamahiriya is involved with five other Arab countries. Other African countries in which some companies have been established include Gabon, Benin, Rwanda, the Malagasey Republic, Togo, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Mauritania.

In addition to channelling cash aid through the multilateral aid agencies, the Libyan Jamahiriya also extends *'soft' loans* directly linked to specific development schemes. In 1978, for example, Libya loaned \$50 million to Guinea to meet part of the construction costs of a dam and an

alumina plant.

Road development

African countries have also benefitted from *direct grants* from Libya to finance specific projects. In Burundi, for example, Libya is financing a road development programme entailing the upgrading of three roads, totalling 324 kilometres, at a cost of \$128.8 million. Direct grants in kind are another way in which the Jamahiriya aids African nations. In 1981 Tripoli donated to Benin a French-built Dassault-Breguet Mystere-Falcon 50 executive jet, to assure greater mobility for the west African country's leadership. Last year, Libya acted to help Ghana overcome a short-term economic crisis by sending large shipments of oil, food aid, and medical supplies.

A final tier in the Jamahiriya's aid programme reflects Tripoli's commitment to Islam, and naturally focusses on African countries with large Muslim communities. Through the UAE-Libyan Commission for Islamic Cultural Centres, Libya is helping to fund the establishment of cultural centres in Africa. The latest centre was opened in Rwanda in 1981, and another is under construction in the Gambian capital Bangui. Tenders have been invited for another in Togo. At the centre of each is a mosque, and other facilities include schools, libraries, lecture halls and medical dispensaries.

FIGURES ON FOREIGN WORKERS RELEASED

London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English NO 32, Jan 83 p 18

[Text]

LIKE ALL Third World countries, the Libyan Jamahiriya has comparatively small numbers of skilled technicians and managers, and an emphasis on training and education for Libyans forms a major theme of the 1981-85 development plan. Another constraint on development is posed by the restricted size of the overall labour force, which reflects the relatively small total population. The Jamahiriya acknowledges that until the transition phase of labour intensive large scale construction has passed, and until more Libyans gain the necessary skills, there is no option but to recruit foreign workers to meet the demands of the economic and social development programme.

The process is mutually rewarding: the Jamahiriya benefits from the expatriate workers' contribution to the country's development programme, while the foreigners usually earn higher incomes in Libya than they could be expected to enjoy in their own countries, some of which are amongst the poorest in the world.

A recent survey by the Libyan General Administration of Passports and Immigration shows that the Jamahiriya currently hosts about 569,000 foreigners from more than 34 countries, accounting for 18 per cent of the official population of 3.2 million. The largest non-Libyan communities come from the Jamahiriya's immediate neighbours — 174,158 Egyptians and 73,582 Tunisians. Other major groups from the Arab homeland and other parts of the Third World include 44,546 Turks, 23,680

Pakistanis, 23,472 Indians, 23,227 Syrians, 18,053 Sudanese and 17,483 South Koreans.

The largest group from the socialist countries of East Europe is formed by the Romanians, numbering 17,868, while other major groups are the 12,707 Yugoslavs, 10,430 Poles, 8,942 Bulgarians and 6,233 Russians.

The 14,906 Italians form the largest western group followed by the British, who number 10,674. There are 2,743 French expatriates, 2,777 Greeks and 1,024 Irish.

In 1981 the Reagan administration imposed a ban on travel by US citizens to or through Libya, in response to wholly unsubstantiated reports emanating from Washington that Tripoli had sent 'hit squads' to assassinate the US President. But the Passports and Immigration administration figures show 2,608 workers from North America, and even allowing for the presence in the total of Canadians, this is still a remarkably higher figure than the 300-400 US citizens claimed by Washington as being currently resident in the Jamahiriya.

Other large foreign communities in the Jamahiriya include 13,383 Thais and 12,042 Palestinians. There are 5,570 Germans, but the statistics do not show whether these are from East or West Germany.

The survey notes that the overall figures for some countries might be understated because certain nationalities, such as Syrians, Algerians, and Tunisians do not need visas.

HOUSING SECRETARY DESCRIBES MASSIVE NEW PROJECTS

Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 14 Jan 83 p 6

/Article by Ibrahim al-Faqih Hasan: "The Secretariat of the General People's Committee on Social Insurance and the National Real Estate Council: A Statement on Investment Housing"/

/Text/ Introduction

There is no doubt that the mobilization of local savings and their investment channels are the motive force for the economic development of society. The better able a government is to divert a greater portion of its domestic product from consumer spending to investment and profitable areas, the better able it will be to move the wheel of development and progress forward more rapidly.

While numerous savings channels contribute to mobilizing savings and directing them into various economic sectors, be they agricultural, industrial or social, the Secretariat of Social Insurance, as represented by the Social Insurance Fund, and the National Real Estate Investment Council are two agencies that are earnestly seeking to achieve the prosperity of the Libyan citizen as the great 1 September revolution envisages it, for the sake of his welfare and to satisfy his needs in the form of education, health, culture, suitable housing and an appropriate style of living.

In the framework of the regime of the masses and in the era of the glorious revolution, many statutes have been passed and numerous projects have been carried out, causing the first jamahiriyyah on earth to leap forward from the ranks of the backward or developing countries to the ranks of the countries that have started along their road to progress.

The Social Insurance Fund of the Secretariat of the General People's Committee on Social Insurance has been one of the most important savings channels that have contributed to the attainment of the goals of the great 1 September revolution in two parallel directions:

The first direction: It has approved many progressive statutes from the dawn of the revolution to now; the most conspicuous and comprehensive of these have been the following:

The statute on complete, integrated social insurance, which covers all the people's requirements in times of sickness, disability, death or old age. That is in effect now.

The statute on the handicapped, which covers groups whom fate has kept from being of sound body. This statute has raised them to a better level, and it is in effect now.

The social welfare statute, which achieves welfare and happiness for the individual, the family and the society. It is in the process of being approved and put into effect.

The second direction: In addition to the important role that the Social Insurance Secretariat is playing in the social area, it is one channel that is active in mobilizing savings through the Social Insurance Fund, since it has managed to mobilize massive amounts of money for investment purposes. In addition, this secretariat has embraced the establishment of the National Real Estate Investment Council, since the basic purpose was for it to mobilize public savings by consolidating the other channels of savings in banks, insurance, the Holy War Fund and other financial organizations, in addition to the Social Insurance Fund.

The abovementioned statutes and institutions have contributed to the constructive course of the revolution in numerous fields, in the form of services performed for beneficiaries and in the form of investments bringing prosperity and growth to the society and the domestic economy.

Among the investment projects that have started to be constructed or have been completed, there are the numerous housing projects in the various areas of the jamahiriyah.

Different Types of Housing Projects

Housing projects in the revolutionary mass society are diversified by a number of types which one might classify as follows:

1. Projects which the housing sector is carrying out directly, in order to provide housing for people who do not have housing and do not have the ability to build or acquire it, as well as to provide the housing projects that are attached to some public buildings, such as hospitals and so forth, to provide the necessary housing for the people working in them.
2. Projects which individuals or housing societies are carrying out through loans or borrowing through banks (savings banks) or housing societies. The individuals follow through with the procedures of building their homes by themselves or through their societies.
3. A third group of projects that certain funds or authorities with public functions, such as the National Real Estate Council, the Social Insurance Fund or the Libya Insurance Company, carry out. These are projects which these

bodies carry out to rent out or deed the housing, according to the study and the purpose for which they were established. In constructing this sort of project, we have a number of economic, social and financial goals, and they could be described as investment housing projects.

Investment Housing

The bodies or sectors that are engaged in combining their reserves of funds to meet their commitments to the people benefiting from them in the future have the aim of carrying out investment activities with these reserves through a number of means, one of which is to establish housing investment projects for ownership or rental. When these sectors perform activities of this sort, they are not aiming at a profit or a loss. Rather, they have the goal of preserving the money of the beneficiaries and the people who are participating with them, while realizing an economic and social goal, which is to help construct homes for people who can rent or take possession of them in exchange for a form of payment in which consideration is given to getting a return on the money that was spent on the project in the form of engineering, construction and administrative costs, as well as obtaining a financial return, and not a profit, which these invested funds by nature aim at, in excess of the reserve funds allocated to the payment of commitments in satisfying the beneficiaries from the services that are offered by these funds, authorities and organizations, in order to meet the continuous rise in costs of living and economic life in general.

Investment Housing Projects under Construction

In 1981, contracts were reached for the construction of a number of investment housing units, which are now being built by numerous companies of various nationalities. Herewith is a statement on that:

The Social Insurance Fund

This is building 2,160 housing units in the initial stage. These are distributed as follows:

216 in Sabha, 108 in Gharayan, al-Zawiyah, Tarhunah, Zulaytin and Misuratah, and 54 in Barak (Birqan and Adri), Ubari, Ghat, Mazdah, Abu Qarin, al-Khums, Suq al-Khamis, Masalatah, Bani Walid, al-'Allus, Qasr Khiyar, Tajura', and Suq al-Jum'ah in Tripoli.

/Also/ al-Zahra', Sabratah, Surman, al-'Ujaylat, al-Jamil, Ghadamis, Nalut, al-Zintan, Jadu, al-'Aziziyah, Suwani ibn Adam, and Raqdalín.

As for the second stage units, these have been given allocations and preparations are being made to build them. These are distributed as follows:

108 housing units in Tubruq, Darnah, al-Bayda' and al-Marj. Fifty-four housing units in al-Kufrah, Agedabia, Brega, Sirt, Ibn Jawad, al-Jafrah, al-Abyar,

al-'Aquriyah, Shahat, al-Qubbah, Qaminas, Gialo, Murzuq, al-Qarabulli, Zuwarah, Yifran and Qasr ibn Ghashir.

The National Real Estate Investment Council

In the first stage, 11,040 investment housing units are being built, broken down as follows:

Tripoli, 5,000 units in the center of the city, Janzur and al-Qarabulli.

Benghazi, 2,000 units within the city plan.

Al-Zawiyah, 1,000 units within the city plan.

The five points, 500 units, 350 in Zuwarah and 150 in al-'Ujaylat.

Gharayan, 540 in the center of the town and in the suburbs.

Misuratah, 1,000 units--250 in the center of the town and 750 in al-Jazirah.

Al-Jabal al-Akhdar, 500 units, 400 in al-Bayda' and 100 in Shahat.

Carnah, 500 units, 350 in Darnah and 150 in al-Qubbah.

Preparations are underway to construct the remaining units in the second stage that are contracted for in 1982. These are broken down as follows:

The municipality of Ghadmis, 200 units

al-'Aziziyah, 100 units

Yifran, 200 units

Tarhumah, 500 units

al-Khums, 500 units

Zulaytin, 300 units

The municipality of Suq-al-Jin, 200 units

Sirt, 100 units

The municipality of al-Jafrah, 150 units

Sabha, 100 units

Barak, 100 units

Murzuq, 100 units

Ubari, 100 units

al-Kufrah, 100 units

Ajdabiyah, 200 units

Brega, 100 units

Tubruq, 400 units

We will soon provide you with another announcement including figures on the most important details and data related to the design methods, types, areas, costs, methods of management, the numbers set aside for deeding, the conditions for that, and other general, essential information on these projects.

May God give us all success in what is beneficial for all.

/Signed/ Ibrahim al-Faqih Hasan, secretary of the General People's Committee for Social Insurance and chairman of the National Real Estate Investment Council.

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CSO: 4504/174

AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS PROCEED IN AL-QARABULLI

Valletta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

•A surface area of 200 hectares has been added to al Qaraboulli agricultural project in which 65 per cent of the production rate has been achieved. The area has been divided into farms of 10 to 15 hectares each. Work is underway to build 400 poultry pens each holding between 1000 to 1200 birds.

It is worth mentioning that the project's total surface is estimated at 24,500 hectares, divided into 1050 farms, including 900 farms, each of these has 26 hectares, 3 hectares of irrigated land, 23 hectares of land thriving on natural water supply, in addition to 100 other farms each of 6 hectares. Irrigated land, and 50 farms each of 10 hectares irrigated land.

The project also includes 4 villages each including a school, a market, a mosque, a dispensary, a depot for agricultural tractors and 219 kms of routes to facilitate transport between the farms. There are also 120 wells each between 200 to 400 metres deep.

☐ SPECIAL

A special programme has been set up to train the daughters and wives of the farmers on different household and traditional crafts. Another programme was set up for the training of farmers on agriculture. Each farmer will be given 5 bee-

hives at the end of his training session.

Meanwhile sources at the General People's Committee for agrarian reform and land reclamation said 1,187,672 hectares were reclaimed in different parts of the Jamahiriya up till the end of last September.

From 1981 till mid-September 1982, 13,333 farms were distributed to farmers, 9,515 rural houses were constructed, 10,289 farmers were trained on various agricultural methods, 2,730 water wells were drilled, 84,915 hectares were covered by irrigation systems, Roads linking various agricultural projects were asphalted and 13,468 Macadam roads were completed.

The sources added that 117,666 sheep, 3,515 cows, 167,280 chickens and 2,311 beehives were distributed to farmers up till the end of September 1982.

The sources said that during the current agricultural season, 17,314,946 hectares were planted with fruit and date trees, and that 63,157,517 forest tree seedlings, 50,930,185 wind braking trees, and 62,532,090 grazing bushes were planted.

Moreover 405,047 hectares have been upgraded for use as pastureland and 229,465.6 hectares were planted with wheat and barley.

THOUSANDS OF FRUIT TREES PLANTED

Vallette JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Jan 83 p 3

[Text] SOURCES of Al Jabal Al Akhdar agricultural projects in Al Fateh municipality said that preparations are underway to plant the largest number of fruit trees within the agricultural projects of Al Fateh, Al Jabal Al Akhdar and Derna municipalities.

The total number of fruit trees are estimated at 1,196,950 distributed as follows:

- 30,000 vines and 69,000 various nuts at Gut al Sultan project

- 65,000 vines and 28,000 apples in Al Wasita

- 35,000 olives, 27,000 vines and 20,000 figs in Umm Al Ruz

- 17,000 vines and 4,000 figs at figs and grapes project in Dursiyah

- 288 vines and 97,000 various nuts at Al Jabal Al Akhdar project - at Marjdait

- 48,000 apples, 13,000 vines, 32,000 various nuts and 140,000 apples in Sal-tana Quba and Abrak

- 2,100,000 forest trees in Al Kharouba pastures and Abrak and the same number of pastures south of Abyan and Al Jabal Al Akhdar.

"Al Ardh" newspaper said that preparations are underway to insure the success of the grand project at Al Jabal Al Akhdar, Al Fateh and Derna to be implemented within 15 days and which includes the planting of 3,359 hectares with various fruit trees.

CSO: 4500/90

POULTRY PENS UNDER CONSTRUCTION

Valletta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Jan 83 p 3

[Text]

60 per cent of the work in progress for the construction of a poultry farm in the Toueisha region with a capacity of 5 million chickens, has already been completed.

93 per cent, 55 per cent, 86 per cent and 88 per cent of work on similar farms in Zawiya, Misurata, Derna and Sebha respectively has also been completed.

These farms' projected production is 24 million eggs per annum.

Meanwhile, work is in progress on the construction of 71 egg-laying chicken pens, 199 chicken pens, 42 turkey pens and 42 rabbit pens in various municipalities in the Jamahiriya. 93 per cent of work on the construction of a model station for poultry production and distribution in Bani Walid, has been completed.

Furthermore, 7 veterinary infirmaries at Benghazi Dawoon, Elmaya, Niqat Al Khams, Zintan, Sinawan, Ghdames and Umm Al Aranib are currently being constructed. 76 per cent of construction work on a veterinary drugs depot in Benghazi has already been completed.

BRIEFS

GHAT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT--Another revolutionary achievement in the realm of the construction of civilization for the mass society was realized when the Ghat international airport was inaugurated and a popular celebration held on the occasion the day before yesterday in the morning. Our brother the secretary of the General Popular Committee inaugurated this revolutionary achievement, and the meeting was attended by the secretaries of the General People's Committee on Transportation and Marine Transport, the General People's Committee on Housing, the secretaries of the specific people's committees in the municipality of Ubari, and a substantial gathering of citizens. The Ghat international airport, which has been designed to accommodate massive jumbo aircraft, contains a passenger terminal in addition to other attached facilities which have been designed in the most up-to-date ways. /Text/ /Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 30 Dec 82 p 8/

AL-FATIH FRUIT TREES--Sources in the al-Jabal al-Akhdar agricultural project in the municipality of al-Fatih have pointed out that preparations are now underway to plant the largest amount of fruit trees in the agricultural projects located within the context of the municipalities of al-Fatih, al-Jabal al-Akhdar and Darnah. The number of fruit trees that are to be planted this season come to 1,196,950, including 30,000 grapevines and 69,000 almond seedlings in the Ghat al-Sultan project, 65,000 grapevines and 28,000 apple seedlings in the al-Wasitah area, 35,000 olive seedlings, 27,000 grapevines and 20,000 fig seedlings in the Umm-al-Razm area, 17,000 grapevines and 5,000 fig seedlings in the fig and grape arbor project in al-Darsiyah, 288 grapevines and 97,000 almond seedlings in the al-Jabal al-Akhdar agricultural project, al-Marj unit, and 48,000 apple seedlings, 13,000 grapevines, 32,000 almond seedlings and 14,000 apple seedlings in the areas of Sultanah, al-Qubbah and al-Abraq, in addition to the planting of 2.1 million forest seedlings in the pasture areas of al-Kharrubah and al-Abraq and in the pasture areas of southern al-Abyar and al-Jabal al-Akhdar. It was mentioned yesterday that preparations are now underway to make a success of the great project that will be carried out in the areas of al-Jabal al-Akhdar, al-Fatih and Darnah in a period of 2 weeks. This will include the planting of 3,359 hectares with various fruit trees in the areas of these projects. /Text/ /Tripoli AL-FAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 12 Jan 83 p 4/

INCREASED AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT--Sources in the General People's Committee for Land Reclamation and Development have stated that the production in the wheat

and barley crop agricultural projects belonging to this secretariat in the period from January to September 1982 came to 105,978 tons of wheat and 89,495 tons of barley, 2,267 tons of (al Shufanah), 476,091 bales of hay, and 164,187 bales of oats. Vegetable and fruit production during this period came to 171,582 tons, 22,922 tons of which were of fruit. These sources stated that during this period 22,272 head of sheep were sold and slaughtered, 5,670 head of cattle were sold and slaughtered, 89 head of camels were sold, 1,927,162 units of poultry were killed, and 11,028,879 chicks were sold. In addition, 25,208 turkeys were sold and 25,962,582 liters of milk, 141,922,108 eggs, 58,106 kilograms of honey and 66,744 kilograms of wool were produced. /Text/ /Tripoli AL-PAJR AL-JADID in Arabic 14 Jan 83 p 2/

COUNTRY UK'S FIFTH LARGEST ARAB MARKET--DESPITE A slowdown of British exports to the Jamahiriya this year, Libya is the fifth largest market for UK companies in the Arab homeland, according to statistics for the first half of 1982 just released by the Department of Trade. British exports to Libya fell from £246.1 million in the first half of 1981 to £146.2 million in the corresponding period of 1982. Despite the UK having its own oilfields in the North Sea, Libya exported to Britain oil and petroleum products worth £88.3 million in the first half of last year, accounting for most of the Jamahiriya's £95.7 million exports to Britain in the period. British exports to the region as a whole rose to £2.1 billion in the first six months of 1982, an eighteen per cent increase over the figure for the equivalent period in 1981. The major markets for British firms were Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt, in that order. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 18]

YUGOSLAVIA TO DRILL FOR WATER--THE YUGOSLAVIAN firm Geotehnika is well placed to win a \$70 million contract to drill 270 water wells at Tazerbo and Sarir, deep in the Sahara south of Benghazi, Middle East Economic Digest disclosed on 26th November. The eighteen-month contract is part of the Jamahiriya's \$5 billion scheme to pump subterranean water north from the desert to the regions of greatest demand along the coast. The project carries a high priority because groundwater reserves along the coast have become depleted in recent years, and will be unable to meet the requirements of Libya's planned industrial, agricultural and urban developments in the zone. The desert's subterranean reserves are estimated to be the equivalent of twenty years' flow of the river Nile. Client for the scheme is the Coastal Belt Water Authority, based in Benghazi, a division of the Jamahiriya's Land Reclamation and Agrarian Reform Secretariat. Britain's Brown & Root is management contractor for the project, excluding the well-drilling. As many as fifty major contractors will be awarded for the aqueduct project, including awards for the construction of pipe-manufacturing plants and for underground pipelaying. Already, contracts have been won by the West German firm Roland Fladner, for mapping the pipeline route, by the Yugoslavian concern Rudis, for a geotechnical survey of aggregate resources along the route, and by Britain's Portakabin for temporary housing. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 pp 18-19]

BULGARIAN WAREHOUSES--THE BULGARIAN firm Technoexportstroy has started work on a contract to build 94 warehouses for storage at the Jamahiriya's ports. Most of the new facilities will be at Tripoli and Benghazi, while some will be destined for Tobruk and Sirte. The company recently placed a \$1.6 million sub-contract with Britain's Coolag Purlboard, part of the Tarmac group, to supply insulated roofing, with final delivery in May. Technoexportstroy is the largest Bulgarian concern involved in the Jamahiriya's development programme. Its contracts have included civil works for an ethylene plant at the petrochemicals complex under construction at Ras Lanouf, work on a new terminal and runways at Sebha airport, and several hospital projects. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 19]

PORT ANTI-CORROSION SYSTEM--BRITAIN'S METAL & Pipeline Endurance has an order to design and supply a cathodic protection system to prevent salt water corrosion of steel piling in jetties at Misrata's bulk berth port. The order, valued at about \$85,000 is for completion in 1983. The Misrata bulk port will serve the steelworks under construction in the town. A \$282 million contract for the port's first phase was won in 1980 by the Turkish firm Turkes Feyzi Akkaya. The port will have an initial unloading capacity of 2,000 tonnes of iron ore or 1,300 tonnes of coal per hour. The projected second and third phases will raise the hourly unloading capacity of iron ore to 4,000 tonnes and of coal to 8,000 tonnes. [Text] London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 19]

INTERNATIONAL FAIR POSTPONED--THE TRIPOLI International Fair has been postponed for the second consecutive year, and is not expected to take place until 5-25th March 1984, the Jamahiriya has announced. The delay has been necessitated to allow maintenance and repairs to the fair's pavilions and services. [Text] [London JAMAHIRIYA REVIEW in English No 32, Jan 83 p 19]

CLOUD SEEDING--A new successful operation has been carried out in Jamahiriya to plant clouds using a modern scientific method. Planes of the clouds planting projects accomplished the operation in an area stretching from Benghazi to Bega. The operation's success was attested by a big down pour of rain. [Text] [Valletta JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Jan 83 p 6]

SHIPS UNLOADED BY STUDENTS--INTENSIVE volunteer works carried out by students of various secondary barracks and institutes continue in Tripoli port to unload ships. The students of the secondary barracks 'vanguards of unity' today unloaded dozens of tonnes of merchandise aboard ships anchored at Tripoli harbour. These volunteer campaigns are carried out by the Jamahiriyah students in response to the leaders call for the necessity for self-reliance in the services sector as part of the comprehensive mobilisation plan. [Vallette JAMAHIRIYA MAIL in English 22 Jan 83 p 12]

CSO: 4500/89

CONSEQUENCES OF WAR ANALYZED

Paris LE MONDE in French 25, 26 Jan 83

[Article by Roland Delcour: "Morocco Under the Burden of War"]

[25 Jan 83 p 5]

[Text] I. Difficult Life

Rabat--A modest shop window on Avenue Mohamed V, the Champs Elysees of Rabat, between the movie theaters and jewelry stores, offers passers-by a selection of photos. Constantly changing, they have recently shown King Hassan II receiving Arab kings and chiefs of state on 12 September in Fes, the king visiting the United States, the king speaking before the United Nations. Inside, a constant stream files by the gallery of portraits of the royal family. Young or old, in jeans or djellaba, each looks without commenting. Outwardly at least, the crowd here respects its sovereign and aspires to nothing more than seeing him reign as long as possible.

And yet, in the streets, at the marketplaces and on the packed buses, for which there is an interminable wait, grumbling is heard everywhere. Rarely is the sovereign or his policies attacked. Everyone in Morocco knows the taboos: the king, the monarchy, the "national cause" (the Sahara) and naturally, Islam. What remains? The government, whose inactivity, impotence, incompetence and corruption from top to bottom are freely condemned. Parliament, whose uselessness, absenteeism, endless debates and unanswered questions are pilloried. As if it wanted to raise its own unpopularity to new heights, the government recently decided to increase ministers' salaries by 50 percent and Parliament did the same for its deputies, while civil servants had to wait for 1 January to receive the meager 5 percent that does not even amount to half the annual inflation rate!

The vertiginous increase in prices has spared only basic, subsidized products (bread, flour, milk, butter, sugar and oil). It has the hardest impact on very large families and the middle classes, which are determined, in spite of everything, to maintain their rank and set themselves apart from the poverty-stricken masses of the shantytowns. The exasperation of both could be measured on 20 June 1981, when the abrupt elimination of subsidies brought the poor of the Casablanca slums out into the streets. The government went back on its decision *in extremis* and reduced the increases imposed by half. However, it

was too late to prevent the explosion. The population is burgeoning and the results of the September census to be published in February will probably show a Morocco with at least 24 to 25 million inhabitants. Out of the 10 million potentially active persons, under half are considered as holding jobs. Rural areas are emptying out, sending their surplus inactive, hungry population to the cities (during the major drought of 1980-1981, up to ten persons arrived an hour in the Casablanca slums, which already had over 2 million). Finally, begging and corruption complete the gloomy picture presented by Morocco.

Unemployment of Young

Everywhere the burning question returns: How to live, or rather, how to survive? The communist daily AL BAYANE long ago began a column entitled: "Daily Life: That Hell." There do undoubtedly exist safety valves, subtle mechanisms of compensation: Transfers of Moroccan workers abroad amount to from 3 to 4 billion dirhams a year (1 dirham = 1.15 francs); smuggling is very active in the north, thanks to the Spanish *presidios* of Ceuta and Mellila whose return to the motherland is nevertheless claimed; and trafficking of all kinds flourishes, especially drugs (kif growing is tolerated in part of the Rif), without forgetting the oldest profession in the world. In December, the Moroccan press waged a harsh campaign against the development of prostitution, exposing the activity of a "beauty salon" located in downtown Rabat; alongside the Detective Headquarters, or that of the sumptuous villas in Casablanca whose made customers were Saudis!

In such a situation, those hardest hit are the young, students, graduates, those taught to expect everything from life, to work hard to pass exams that lead nowhere. The unemployment of graduates, especially in letters, sociology, philosophy and law, is a plague that the administration cannot check, unless it resorts to the famous Circular 504 prohibiting all young civil servants from enrolling in the university. The 120,000 Moroccan students, 25,000 of which are studying in France, are more and more tempted to go abroad. Those in France who have married French women find upon their return a situation so bad they often leave again. The "brain drain" to France, but also to Quebec or the United States, is manifested, just as it is in most Arab countries. The fact that scholarships are more generous for Moroccan students abroad than for those remaining at home contributes to the phenomenon.

How could one then be surprised to see part of the young people tempted by extremism? On the left, there is a whole host of groups or splinter groups, Marxist or claiming to be: the Ilal Amam group, the 23 March group, and so on. The split of the Moroccan UNEM [National Union of Moroccan Students], which at the end of 1981 led to the departure of representatives of the USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] from the student group, left these groups free rein. However, it was short-lived because by the beginning of 1982, all leftist leaders of the UNEM were under lock and key. The students, threatened with immediate exclusion for striking, no longer dared to demonstrate and by the beginning of the 1982 academic year, it was the high school students in Oujda and the north who took their place, also risking brutal repression. Within the socialist opposition itself (the communists, many fewer in number and better organized, are less vulnerable), an entire marching wing reluctantly

accepted the return of deputies to the House of Representatives, a return it deemed premature, inasmuch as the liberalization measures announced for the USFP were still awaited. It should be noted that the arrest of five socialist leaders in August 1981 provoked no demonstration by young people or students.

Fundamentalist Temptation

In contrast, people take refuge in *integrisme* or, as it is called elsewhere, fundamentalism. The Arabist students, still a minority, are naturally particularly exposed; dress codes or other watchwords circulate. Cassettes are played and speeches given in the mosques or outside, when that is not possible. Penetration seems to come from the north, the Tangiers region, sensitive to what goes on in neighboring Algeria and Tunisia. Naturally, here also, the king-commander of the believers (all Malekites) and the ulemas keep a watchful eye. It is thanks to them that Morocco is still relatively protected, but it is not immunized.

This is the expression of the "vacuum" denounced by Prime Minister Maati Bouabid and the despair of the entire youth. Beyond the leftist or religious extremism, one finds only naked violence, examples of which are plentiful recently. How can the vacuum be filled and the "daily hell" of too many Moroccans be transformed? To begin with, the economy has to be put back on its feet.

[26 Jan 83 p 6]

[Text] II. Faltering Economy

"Daily life, that hell": The column begun by the communist daily AL BAYANE sums up the difficulties encountered by the people in a country bent under the burden of the war in the Sahara. Those hardest hit are the young, particularly unemployed graduates. Confronted with the "vacuum" denounced by the prime minister, young people seek refuge in leftist or rightist extremism (LE MONDE, 25 January).

Rabat--In these last days of January, the country is already green and even in flower. On this generous soil, only a little water in December and February, the rainy months, is needed to bring out all the flowers and turn the country into a garden. With rainfall normal in December 1982, the fields are covered with tiny yellow flowers and the wheat is spring up even on the foothills of the Rif, where peasants struggle to cultivate slopes often ravaged by erosion.

Nevertheless, Moroccan agriculture is constantly threatened by what geographers cautiously call "semi-aridity," which is distinguished from complete aridity only when precipitation reaches at least 400 millimeters a year. That is why the radio here never fails to report rainfall in each province, even if it is a few millimeters. Two years of drought in 1980 and 1981 transformed Morocco into a desert from Tangiers to Marrakech, the dams are empty and the underground water level has dropped dangerously. More than half of all livestock, the traditional wealth of the little farmer, has disappeared. Years will be

needed to rebuild the herds and in 1982, the king had to ask his subjects to abstain from sacrificing the ritual sheep for Aid el Kabir, as he did in 1981.

Even with normal rainfall, Moroccan agriculture obtains only from 10 to 12 quintals a hectare, on the average. In normal periods, 17 million quintals of grain have to be imported a year, almost as much as the country produces. In 1981, imports had to be doubled and the chronic imbalance in commercial trade worsened. In 1982, coverage of imports by exports dropped below 50 percent. And yet, in addition to its 7 million arable hectares, 1 million of which will soon be irrigated and produce the tasty Moroccan oranges, the prime export product, the country has an almost inexhaustible resource: phosphates. But here also, the drop in prices after the excessive increase in 1973, when Morocco thought it could hitch the price of its phosphates to that of oil, and the setbacks in sales stabilized exports, while imports, especially oil, became more and more costly. In order to pay the price of the 5 million tons of oil it imports annually, Morocco has to sacrifice three-quarters of its phosphate receipts.

The country had to go into debt. The public debt will amount to \$8 billion soon and service on that debt already absorbs over \$5 billion dirhams (1 dirham = 1.15 francs). Loans from international organizations are more costly and harder to find, even from Arab oil countries. This crisis explains Morocco's increasing difficulty in marketing its production of citrus fruits on the foreign market, especially those of the EEC with which it is nevertheless associated. Since December, those driving on the road from Meknes to Rabat have seen huge piles of mandarins or oranges offered for 10 dirhams a crate.

Profitable Projects Stymied

The 5-year plan embarked upon by Morocco in 1981 could not be carried out even the first year. Actually, the deficit in the 1982 budget could not be borne except at the expense of investments included in the plan, reduced by 7 billion dirhams. The same could be true for 1983, as the deficit of the budget for this year was set based on estimates which the minister of finance put at 7.9 billion dirhams. These restrictions are all the more harmful because Morocco has embarked upon a large number of very profitable projects, such as the construction of a major chemical industry based on its phosphates in order to turn them into phosphoric acid, easier to market. The infrastructure, mainly the roads and railroads mainly inherited from the protectorate, also requires major investments. Thirty years after its independence, Morocco does not yet have a complete highway between Casablanca and Rabat or a railroad in both directions. Work to build such a railroad is underway.

Some of these big projects, especially in the Saharan provinces, reflect political concerns (construction of a railroad from Casablanca to El-Aioun), while the needs of the people, especially schools and hospitals, are far from covered. In the cities, the delay in housing construction compared with the population increase gives rise to burgeoning slums and shantytowns, not only in Casablanca, but in nearly all the large cities, including Rabat-Sale.

In the 1983 budget, military expenditures amount to 6.6 billion dirhams in operating credits out of a total budget of 52.6 billion, more than what is spent on national education. Actually, equipment expenditures not mentioned double the sum. Part of the purchases of military materiel receive special financing (aid from Saudi Arabia) or spread out payments (to France, for example). Although these military expenditures, generally an estimated 40 percent of the budget, have some positive effects on the economy, especially in the south, the fact remains that a return to a lasting peace in the Western Sahara is a prime condition for any improvement in public finances and the terms of trade and for a real rehabilitation of the Moroccan economy. The latter could then receive all the investments included in the 5-year plan.

In addition, once confidence is restored, the private investors to whom new Minister of Finance Jouahri made an urgent appeal in his presentation of the budget, could perhaps cast off some of their reserve. For the time being, they confine themselves to luxury real estate investments aimed at foreigners and diplomats, import-export operations, assembly activities, subcontracting and services (luxury tourism).

The same observation is valid for foreign investors, whom the Moroccan Government hopes to attract with the new investment code still being discussed in Parliament. This code gives up the "Moroccanization" of foreign enterprises, which would no longer be required to have majority Moroccan participation and could transfer part of their profit and, in case of failure, the invested capital, in foreign exchange.

The economy thus brings one back to politics. Will the war come to an end in the Western Sahara in 1983? For the first time since 1975, information would seem to allow one to hope so. The mediation of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who went to Algeria in December, has reportedly made it possible to look again to the prospect of a sommet meeting of King Hassan II and President Chadli. Different cities have even been named for the conferences of the two chiefs of state. For the first time, the Moroccan Parliament would take up at its coming session the Algerian-Moroccan border agreement signed in Ifrane in 1972, an agreement it never ratified. Will the country, so sorely tested by the burden of the conflict, finally be able to lay it down?

Press in Morocco

On the occasion of Mitterrand's visit to Rabat, the AGENCE MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE and the Foreign Press Association in France are organizing an exposition on the theme "The Press in Morocco Yesterday and Today," to be held from 20 to 30 January at the Maison du Maroc, 161 Rue Saint-Honore. With the aid of documents, it will retrace the history of newspapers in that country since 1820.

11,464

CSO: 4519/140

ISRAEL

DEVELOPMENT OF NESHER FIGHTER DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Oct 82 pp 26-28

[Article by Yosef Bundski: "Swifter than Eagles, Stronger than Lions"]

[Text] Since 1957 Israel has been directly involved in the stages of aircraft development in France. The Marcel Dassault Company has been aided by Israeli knowledge and the combat experience of Israeli pilots who have flown its aircraft in order to develop the next generation of fighter aircraft. Israeli engineers and pilots collaborated in all the stages of the development of the Mirage-3. The then chief test pilot of the air force, Dani Shapira, was one of the first to fly the prototype of the Mirage.

In 1964 after the extraction of the first lessons from the operation of the Mirage-3C, the air force submitted a number of suggestions for improving the aircraft. Israeli engineers and pilots were involved in determining the operations envelope of the new Mirage. The Government of Israel committed itself to the procurement of 50 aircraft at the stage when they began to sketch the aircraft. A year later Israel acquired an option for 50 more aircraft. The plane was designed to be of the same size as the Mirage with similar performance characteristics but with a greater range and the ability to carry more armament. It came at the cost of the sophistication of its interception system. On 19 May 1967 the prototype of this new Mirage, the Mirage-5, flew. The first aircraft were to have been turned over to Israel in October 1967. On 3 June the French embargo was imposed, and Israel was left without the aircraft.

The post-Six Day War air force was in an uncomfortable situation. The embargo left it without any fighters of the next generation and without any replacement for the losses which it suffered during the war.

Concurrently with the feverish probes throughout the world to find a substitute for the frozen Mirages, it was decided to try and see what could be done in Israel. The Aircraft Industries had been involved through the years in the repair and maintenance of the Mirage aircraft and in the production of spare parts. The Bet Shemesh Engines enterprise was similarly involved in the maintenance of Atar 9 engines. With such a foundation it was decided at the end of 1967 to try and build a local Mirage in Israel. The production possibilities were examined at the time of the basic overhaul of the Mirage aircraft which were heavily damaged during the Six Day War. At the same time, the engineers who took part in the development of the Mirage-5 in France were assembled.

It soon became clear that the main problem would be the instrumentation. The Israel Electronics Industry could not compete with the French industry in the variety of products and the quality of performance. Since time was of the essence, it was decided that the new aircraft would carry a minimal amount of attack instrumentation. In consideration of the fact that in the Middle East the weather is good most of the time, its interception instrumentation would depend on local production of French instrumentation and local development if it were possible to meet the timetable. At the same time, Bet Shemesh Engines was working on the possibilities of local production of an improved version of the Atar 9 engine.

The first aircraft in which locally-produced parts were tested was the two-seat Mirage-3B which was adapted as a test plane. Sophisticated measurement equipment was installed in place of the rear seat. This aircraft remained a test plane and was also the first tester of small wings. It was painted with the blue and white colors.

It was decided to call the Israeli aircraft the Neshar [Eagle]. In mid-September 1969 the prototype made its first flight. With this, it became the first aircraft made in Israel. (Although the 'Arava won this honor, its first flight was not until 29 December 1969.) The first models of the Neshar contained a mixture of existing items, some of which had been produced for other aircraft in service in Israel and some of which had been designed and produced in Israel especially for the Neshar.

The establishment of a production line began concurrently with the assembly of the prototype. It was clear that the aircraft had to succeed. Its designers did not take any unnecessary risks, and the plane was so designed that improvements could be made even after its completion. In this way, it will be possible to update it and also meet the strictest timetable of the air force.

Even though the development and production were conducted secretly, much information was leaked to the foreign press. Around these fragments of information there developed a wide array of speculations. It was evident to all those involved in military aviation that Israel was in a sad situation because of the French embargo. Since there was no information about any deal with a foreign country, it was easy to assume the Aircraft Industries would try to build a local aircraft. This is how stories began to sprout concerning the mystery plane called Barak by the foreign press. Along with leaks and hints about the plane itself, there were stories about spying and intrigues of Israeli attempts to obtain parts of the Mirage for the production of the Barak.

The first Neshar aircraft were turned over to the air force in early 1970. These aircraft had only partial instrumentation. Within 2 years all of the aircraft were equipped with modern and more effective instrumentation. This instrumentation, which included improved computers, was the fruit of local development and production in its entirety.

The Neshar is a one-seat fighter aircraft. Its external configuration is similar to that of the Mirage-5. Its engine is the Israeli version of the Atar 9C with a dry thrust of 4,280 kg and a wet thrust of 6,200 kg. At sea level, the

aircraft reaches Mach 1.1 and at 36,000 ft, Mach 2.15. Its empty weight is about 7,100 kg, and its maximum take-off weight is about 13,500 kg. The Neshers' measurements are similar to the Mirage-3/5. Its length is 15.55 m, its wing span is 8.22 m, its height is 4.25 m, and its delta wing area is 34.85 sq m.

Although its engine is primarily the Atar 9C, the burner nozzle is improved, and from the dual-wing nozzle a new and more sophisticated multi-wing nozzle has been produced. This nozzle was also installed in several Mirages.

The first Neshers were given to the Mirage squadrons in order to reinforce them and replace the losses through the years. At the same time, separate Neshers squadrons were also formed. According to the foreign press, the air force entered the Yom Kippur War with about 40 Neshers with the latest equipment. Although the Neshers had their baptism of fire even before the Yom Kippur War -- in an incident in the Golan Heights in which two Syrian planes were shot down by Neshers -- the aircraft attained its peak performance during the war.

The Neshers were among the first aircraft to be scrambled at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. On 6 October 1973 the Neshers in Refidim were scrambled in order to repel the first wave of attacks. Among the first casualties was President Sadat's brother who was shot down with his Sukhoi-7.

On 8 October the IDF overcame the first shock. The air force launched a systematic campaign to clear the skies and destroy the enemy force.

At 0900 six Sukhoi-7 aircraft try to attack Refidim. The Neshers are scrambled. K sees a Sukhoi-7 leave the bombing sortie at low altitude. He begins to pursue it. He soon begins to close on the Sukhoi and from 900 m fires a Shafrir missile. The missile misses and the Egyptian breaks off. K closes and from 700 m fires a second missile which hits and explodes the aircraft. At the same time, S continues the pursuit of another Egyptian and from a long distance fires a Shafrir. The plane is hit and falls. Another Sukhoi tries to break off and plows into the ground. A fourth Sukhoi is downed in a dogfight with cannon fire in its fuselage. The result: four Sukhois downed in less than 10 minutes.

From 8 October on, the air force began to take the initiative. Fighter planes patrolled into enemy territory while maintaining cover for attack aircraft. Many air battles developed between the attack aircraft and MiG-21's which went out to intercept our aircraft. The fighters, Mirages and Neshers alike, were everywhere, ready to engage the MiGs before they were able to disrupt the attack. At the same time, defense of the ground forces from enemy air attack continued. This is how a pair of Neshers engaged a pair of MiG-17's which tried to attack our aircraft in the [Golan] Heights. D writes: "We made another turn in our territory and discovered a couple of MiG-17's at medium speed and at a height of 1,000 ft. They saw us, opened up a burner, broke left, and immediately headed directly northeast. I fired a missile at the rear one -- 800 m. A direct hit -- the plane plunged straight into the ground. I went after the front one, the range was close. He began a series of slight breaks. I aimed and fired a burst. He was hit and fire flared out of the back part of the plane. The MiG stopped, continued to fly for another 20 seconds, lowered its nose violently, and plunged to earth."

The Neshers continued to score kills at a murderous rate until the last day of the war. On 24 October the last air battle of the war took place.

In the morning a quartet of Neshers is scrambled westward to the Third Army area. B leads. They are sent from there to Jabal Obed which is west of Little Bitter Lake. While still in the area, they discover attacking Phantoms and about eight MiG-21's coming to intercept them. The Neshers descend on the MiGs. In time, six more Israeli planes join the battle, and the number of MiGs also increases to about 20. When he enters the battle, B notices a failure in the aircraft. It is having problems in the movement of fuel. For this reason, he will have to fight with a dry engine only.

He arranges with Number Four to go after a MiG. They both fire missiles, and the MiG explodes. The battle began at medium height, and B seeks victims below him so that he will be able to take advantage of the altitude in place of the advantage of engine power. Without a burner, he is unable to develop pursuit, and so each kill must be made with only one short pass. He discovers a MiG-21 below him. He dives on it, and from a range of 200 m, he fires a short burst. No reaction. A second burst -- the MiG burns with an enormous flame. This battle was so fast to the point that B aimed according to the nose of the plane and not by the sight. When he straightens out from the dive, he discovers Number Three pursuing another MiG-21 while two MiGs are trying to position themselves on his tail. B tells Number Three that he will break off. When he sees that there is no reaction, he raises the nose and fires bursts toward the MiGs. He reaches zero speed, but he does not see any results from the firing. Number Three meanwhile grasps his situation, breaks off, makes a maneuver, and downs the MiG which was sitting on his tail.

In the meantime, B discovers another MiG below him. He dives on him. From a range of 500 m, he fires a single burst and the MiG is hit and falls. The battle develops. The MiGs become more aggressive and try to get behind the Israeli aircraft. B notices a plane in back of him. He breaks off and comes up behind the MiG. In passing by the nose of the MiG, he fires a wild burst but without results. [Text omitted] blindness of the MiG. He soon discovers another MiG several thousand feet below him. He dives and fires. The MiG is hit but continues to fly. This time also he is forced to break off contact because of an inability to develop pursuit.

B is at a very low altitude. His formation has already broken off contact because of a shortage of fuel. B remains in the area with new formations which joined the battle later. The shell gauge shows three shells in one cannon and two in the other. He dives on another MiG, presses the button, and one shell is fired. It misses. At this point, B is at an altitude of 2,000 ft and decides that the time has come to return home.

When he begins his flight eastward, a MiG-21 discovers him. The MiG dives on him. B descends even lower. The MiG descends, and from a range of 1,500 m, he begins to close at a convincing rate. The MiG soon closes to a range of 1,100 m, a suitable range for launching missiles. The MiG continues to close. B sees no reason to engage in combat since he has neither fuel nor armament. The MiG pilot

was apparently aware of this. At a range of 900 m B suddenly sees a missile come out. He breaks off sharply and the missile misses. The MiG went out and tried to turn back for another pass. At this point, another Nesher appeared in the area and positioned itself on the tail of the MiG. B shouts to him to hurry and shoot down the MiG. He turns back at low altitude. The MiG dives, moving out of missile range with the Nesher on his tail. When the MiG is 600 m from him, B breaks off at that time. Out of the corner of his eye he sees the flashes of the MiG's cannons. He sees the rounds hitting the ground below him. The MiG continues anew and remains behind him. The MiG tries to set up for a third pass. At this point, the Nesher pilot succeeded in positioning himself over the MiG, and he downs him when he is very close to B. B landed at Refidim with the last of those who took part in the battle. It was the last air battle of the war. In this battle, seven Egyptian MiG-21's were shot down, mostly by Neshers.

The achievements of the Nesher in this war are noteworthy. Neshers downed about one-fourth of the over 450 planes which the air force shot down in air battles. In comparison to its father, the Mirage-3, the Nesher is more reliable technically while being more modern. Also, lessons learned from the operation of the Mirage by the air force were applied in it. One of the most prominent advantages of the plane is the very fact that it was produced in accordance with the requirements and specifications of the air force. Nevertheless, the Nesher's performance does not match that of the Mirage, but the difference is negligible. Evidence of this are the skeletons of enemy aircraft scattered throughout the Middle East.

Although the Nesher has been downgraded through the years, knowledgeable persons stress repeatedly that without the experience which both the Aircraft Industries and the air force gained from the Nesher project, the Kfir would not have been produced. It is absolutely clear that it would not have the performance qualities it has today. And this is actually the greatest contribution of the Nesher to the air force.

5830

CSO: 4423/60

ISRAEL

MODIFICATIONS, USE OF GAZELLE HELICOPTER DISCUSSED

Tel Aviv BITA'ON HEYL HA'AVIR in Hebrew Oct 82 pp 12-14

[Article by Aharon Lapidot: "The Stolen Gazelle"]

[Text] "You can enter this helicopter with your eyes closed, and you immediately feel that you are in a French helicopter. Even its smell is a special one."

This is the impression that Maj N gets from the Gazelle helicopter, and there is a basis for his feeling. Maj N was the test pilot of the Syrian Gazelle helicopter which was captured by the IDF in Operation Peace for Galilee.

The story of the Gazelle's extrication, overhaul, and flight is astounding and unique. In it the complex system of the air force finds full expression at its best. Pilots and extricators, mechanics and engineers, electronics personnel, and engine technicians collaborated in order to do the virtually impossible.

The story began already on the second day of the war. Maj N, while carrying out a mission in southern Lebanon, noticed from the cockpit of the Yas'ur [literally, puffin; nickname for the Sikorsky CH-53 helicopter] a Syrian Gazelle helicopter which had been shot down by our forces. With a cursory glance from above it seemed to him that the helicopter was in rather good, if not perfect, condition. Surprisingly, he recognized the helicopter. It was to Maj N's benefit that he had 10-20 hours of flying time abroad in a civilian model of the Gazelle.

Maj N did not procrastinate and reported the location of the helicopter and its condition to air force headquarters. "I had a faint hope," he said afterward, "that perhaps I would have the opportunity to fly this helicopter again."

With the announcement of the first cease-fire, there began some "sniffing around" in the air force on the subject of the downed Gazelles. After a check, it became evident that some of the Gazelles dispersed in IDF-controlled territory in southern Lebanon were in more or less reasonably good condition. It was decided to extricate them and take them to Israel.

One helicopter was near Rashidiyah, and Maj R of the air force's air maintenance unit went out to extricate it.

It Even Had a Key

Maj R relates: "We went out to the area with the extrication unit. The helicopter had fallen into a small crater in a hilly area covered with shrubs and low vegetation. I have been in this business a long time so that it is difficult to say that I got excited when I saw the helicopter. It's not like meeting a friend whom you haven't seen for 20 years. Nevertheless, I made a small circle around the helicopter. It was lying on its right side on its missile rack, and I noticed immediately that its skid was broken and that the rotor was also damaged. But I had the feeling that this Gazelle could be repaired. It would take a great investment of effort, but it would not be too costly.

We folded the rotor blades backward, tied them to the fuselage, and transported it to Israel."

Maj N relates: "The helicopter that I extricated was actually structurally perfect. The doors were closed, and it even had a key! But the extrication was so routine and slow that I can say that the most extraordinary thing about this salvage task was the terrible boredom which gripped us."

A little less boring was the extrication of another Gazelle which had fallen no more than a few kilometers from the Syrian lines. Eventually, however, this extrication was also safely completed, and all the helicopters were taken after a cleaning to the hangars of the air force's air maintenance unit. It cannot be said that this was a particularly attractive sight. The junks were lying like wounded birds in the hangar. But not for long. In a few days the order came: One Gazelle was to be brought up to flying condition in only 17 days so that it could take part in a demonstration on Air Force Day!

The air force could not have given the assignment to a more suitable unit. The air maintenance unit has the knowledge and experience in all areas of the technological spectrum. It has a unique team of engineers and technicians and workshops capable of repairing or producing virtually every part of the various aircraft of the air force.

The Lights Burned All Night

"The main difficulty facing us," relates the unit commander, Col G, "was the complete lack of information on the Gazelle. And in regard to that [text omitted] we did not have the right manuals. We did not know how many hours this helicopter had, what kinds of problems it had -- in short, we knew nothing about it. However, since it was a French helicopter, and we have considerable experience with Super Prelons and Alouettes, we were helped by their manuals, and we began to check for similarities and differences."

Lt Col D, commander of the engineers unit, was appointed head of the repair project team. From the moment that he was given responsibility for the project, the lights in the unit were out for very short periods of time, even in the wee hours of the morning.

The team first selected a helicopter to be repaired and flown. After a survey of the damage, the helicopter extricated by Maj R was selected. Even this helicopter was not perfect. An entire side of the cockpit was replaced, the skids were soldered, and other parts were designed, repaired, or produced.

"We had a problem with the oil cups of the rotor," remembers Lt Col D. "These cups perform a lubrication function during the rotation, and we did not find them in any helicopter. The unit engineers designed the parts, the workshops produced them, and they worked outstandingly!"

The story of the repair of the Gazelle contains tens of examples of various kinds of improvisations. There was a problem of how to roll the helicopter outside, from the hangar to the runway. The project team found a way. A cart used for the Bell helicopters was modified for the Gazelle. The broken stabilizers were reconstructed and rebuilt. The helicopter's fluids -- oil and hydraulic fuel -- were taken from the standard stock of the air force.

For long hours the helicopter's systems until the last screw were studied, and the technical documents which were lacking for repairs were written during the work. Even the helicopter's system for emergency checks and pre-flight checks were written during the course of the work. Special tool kits were produced by the unit so that it would be possible to maintain the helicopter. The unit personnel in all specialties worked with extraordinary dedication and enthusiasm. "Today," smiles Lt Col D, "the Gazelle can be maintained like any other aircraft in the air force. Today we can make any modification to it that we think of."

Tests in the Amphitheatre

The most difficult problem was, of course, the engine. At first glance it appeared that the original engine was completely serviceable, and after repairs to the body and the systems were completed, the aircraft was rolled outside for its first operational test: the starting of the engine. "It was understandable that the test would generate much curiosity, and the entire base came to observe it," relates Maj N. "A kind of amphitheatre was created around the helicopter, and all that I had to do was to start it up to get the feeling if the aircraft was 'alive.' I pressed the starter and . . . nothing! The engine did not react. I felt a terrible disappointment. All the technicians swarmed over the helicopter, examined its guts, and found nothing. The group dispersed, and it was at that time that someone came up with the saving idea. 'Maybe the voltage is not right.' We pulled out an old battery cart, attached it to the helicopter, I pressed the button -- and the engine worked!"

Afterward, this was our experience the entire way. No test in front of a group worked, but as soon as the group dispersed, everything worked like a charm!"

Without Vibrations -- As in the Documents

Despite the fact that the engine was working, it did not sound good enough to the men of the unit. A second engine which appeared to be better was brought out immediately, and within 3 days, with our hearts pounding, it was installed in the helicopter.

Maj N and the Gazelle again left the hangar for another test. This time, if the engine worked, the rotor would be attached to the engine. The well-known amphitheatre formed again, and the test failed again. The engine did not make enough revolutions to activate the rotor. The engine was disconnected, repaired, and within 1 nervous day was again installed. This time, without the presence of a group, the engine and the rotor worked well. "It was a beautiful feeling," remembers Maj N. "Everything worked as in the manuals, the helicopter was steady, there were no vibrations -- just like it should be!"

The first test flight was set for the following morning.

Only 16 days after they received the assignment, 1 less day than allocated for it, the men of the unit, with looks of justifiable pride, accompanied the Gazelle which was to take off. With endless dedication, without documents, and at times working on the basis of intuition alone, they succeeded in converting a pile of junk into a flying helicopter.

It appeared that the Gazelle was even weaned from its "fear of a crowd" and took off despite the observers on the ground. "At no point was I worried that perhaps we wouldn't be able to accomplish the assignment," says Col G. "My only concern was the pressing timetable. What would happen if some part malfunctioned, and we were stuck because of a shortage of spare parts? Fortunately, this did not happen."

From this moment on, all the flights went smoothly, and Maj N was extremely happy. "Just as I said, this helicopter is French in all of its 248 screws. It is beautiful, still quiet, and flies smoothly. Although its rotor rotates inversely, it is agile and maneuvers excellently."

It is especially noteworthy that after a week of test flights and preparation for demonstration, the helicopter was 100 percent serviceable and did not experience even one problem! "In the beginning, I regarded the helicopter with a 'respect it and suspect it' attitude," says Maj L, "But the best sign that I was convinced that we would succeed was the fact that I went up and flew with it on the test flights."

It was no wonder, therefore, that the Gazelle was the top attraction of Air Force Day - 5742 [1982]!

Aerospatiale SA342L -- Gazelle

A light single-engine, 5-seat helicopter produced in France in collaboration with the British Westland Company. The prototype of the civilian version made its first flight in 1967. The first aircraft came off the production line in 1971. The Gazelle is the first modern helicopter with rotor blades made from compound materials.

In its military version, the Gazelle serves as an anti-tank helicopter and carries four or six Hot missiles.

Dimensions: length: 11.97m, width (with blades folded) 2.01m, height: 3.18m, weight: 975kg (empty), 1900kg (full).

Engine: Turbomeca Astazou H-XIV. Performance: Maximum speed: 310km/h (167 knots), Cruising speed: 264km/h (142 knots), Service ceiling: 4300m (14105 ft), Range: 755km (407 nautical miles).

PROBLEMS IN AGRICULTURE REVIEWED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 22 Jan 83 p 5

[Interview with Sa'id al-Ghazawi, President of the Board of the Farmers' Association by Ahmad 'Awad al-Nashash: "In an Interview with AL-DUSTUR Board President of Farmers' Association Reviews Concerns of Farming and Farmers in Jordan Valley; 'We Do not Have a Stable, Well-Considered Agricultural Policy;' Most Shares of New Marketing Firm Held by Farmers and Cooperative Organization"]

[Text] In the past 7 years farming in the Jordan Valley has undergone noticeable development, and progress in the means and methods of production has been observed. This progress was accompanied by an increase in production costs. After that farming became an area for making investments and an industry in every sense of the word.

The mere availability of land, however, does not make a person eligible for farming. Money is needed in farming so that fertilizers and seeds can be purchased and remedies [for ailing plants] provided. Workers are required in farming, and farmers must have enough money to pay the wages of those workers. When a farmer cultivates the land, the first think on his mind is to pay back his debts to the [cooperative] society, to the association or to the merchant. He thinks about his profit after that and does not rest until he pays back his debt. A farmer regards payment of a debt the most important thing about the farming process. The profit he obtains after that, no matter how small it is, is considered to be a big blessing.

The problem lies in the fact that farmers have no [organized] body to protect them and to keep them from losing money. The marketing process in the country is not regulated, and we do not have a farming policy. When the time is right for harvesting a crop, prices fall in a manner that makes farmers sometimes prefer not to harvest a crop so as not to lose the money they would have to pay to have it harvested and transported.

In addition to numerous other reasons, one of the reasons for establishing the Farmers' Association in the Jordan Valley was to have the association oversee the marketing process. The association was to take over the al-'Ardah Marketing Center from the Jordan Valley Authority and carry out this function.

Because the Farmers' Association in the Jordan Valley is at the present time the body that is supposed to represent farmers in the Jordan Valley, AL-DUSTUR took

farmers' concerns and problems regarding marketing and other matters and presented them to Mr Sa'id al-Ghazawi, president of the board of directors of the Farmers' Association in the Jordan Valley. The [following] interview took place:

The Problem of Marketing

[Question] Farmers in the Jordan Valley have a marketing problem. It's been noticed that there is an increase in the production of some crops. This entails sharp price reductions and losses for farmers. What are the reasons for this [situation]?

[Answer] One of the first reasons for the marketing problem in Jordan is the absence of a stable and a well-considered farming policy that addresses what and how much is produced. Accordingly, we do not have agricultural modes that are suitable to the nature of the soil and climate in the valley. If we had such modes that were suitable to the soil, it would have been possible to determine what crops would be cultivated in certain areas. The ultimate outcome of having such modes would be rewarding, and farmers would not feel that their efforts and the energy and money they spent in that process were wasted.

[Question] Do you believe that farmers in the Jordan Valley will comply if you were to determine certain crops for cultivation there?

[Answer] Farmers can comply with such an operation if the state guarantees a minimum price for production. In other words the state is to enter into an agreement with farmers to purchase their crop at a reasonable price. That price is to be based on the cost of production plus a rewarding profit for farmers.

Jordanian farmers have progressed and are producing more because they have introduced modern farming methods into their farms, such as sprinkler irrigation. They are using modern fertilizers and protected farming. These [innovations] cost farmers a lot of money. That is why production costs have risen [too], and farming has become a risky venture. If prices are good, farmers realize good profits, but if prices are low, farmers stand to sustain major losses.

The Role of the Association

[Question] Has the association taken any steps to solve the problem of marketing particularly with regard to the mode of farming?

[Answer] The association announced that it was prepared to provide farmers in the Jordan Valley with seeds for planting potatoes at reasonable prices without determining certain varieties. We set prices for buying the potatoes from farmers after the crop is harvested, and these prices are stable and known to farmers. We told them, "You are free: if you find that the prices set by the association are in line with market prices during the period of production, you can choose whether or not you will sell to the association. If the market price is higher than the association price, you have the right to sell in the market. The association is not seeking profits; it is trying to make farmers realize profits.

[Question] How did farmers respond to this project?

[Answer] There was little response this year because the quantity that was there was small. There were only 250 tons of seeds. If the quantity were larger, the response would have been greater. [Anyway], this is the first time we try this. There is no doubt that if more farmers plant potatoes, areas planted with other crops will be reduced. If the cultivation of potatoes becomes more widespread, the country would save large amounts of money, because at the present time we are importing potatoes.

[Question] What guarantee is there that the state will not import potatoes?

[Answer] The government is encouraging any project whose purpose is to limit vegetable imports from other countries. We are confident that the government is prepared to take all measures that are necessary to bring about the reduction of vegetable imports. It will prohibit imports as long as the quantities produced are enough for local consumption. If something like that were carried out, that in itself would set a precedent in farming.

The Cultivation of Beets

Mr al-Ghazawi had this to say about the project to cultivate sugar beets in the Jordan Valley. This is a project that was proposed by some farmers.

[Answer] Experiments have been conducted on sugar beets, which were planted in the farming stations of the Ministry of Agriculture. The results were encouraging: the percentage of sugar was good, and substances left over after processing could be used as animal feed. If the cultivation of beets were subsidized and encouraged, we would be in a position to export instead of import sugar.

New Markets

[Question] What is the present situation with regard to exporting agricultural products, now that the Gulf states are producing these materials which they used to import from Jordan?

[Answer] We have to look for new markets because our products can no longer compete in our traditional markets in the Gulf and Saudi Arabia where production costs are almost zero because the state there provides farmers with everything.

The European market is a large market, and prices there are attractive. We can go into this market which can then replace the markets that we lost. But the task of entering this market is one of the tasks of the state because it requires finding means of transportation and [dealing with] shipping measures and other such matters.

Why Didn't the Association Work?

[Question] Why has the association failed so far to pursue its right to become involved in the marketing process?

[Answer] So far the association has not been involved in marketing. On account of the law the government is managing the al-'Ardah Marketing Center and other

centers it had set up. The government will do so for 2 years and then the association will take over. Since there may be a loss and since the association's budget cannot withstand such a loss, the association has not yet taken over the marketing centers. We have asked that the association take over the al-'Ardah Marketing Center, the canning plant and the tomato plant, and the government complied with our request. But then a new project came up: a project to establish a company that would market agricultural products. The government thinks that all these establishments should be owned by the new company.

A New Company

[Answer] This new company is called the Agricultural Products Marketing Company. Contributions to its capital were made by the Agricultural Credit Corporation, the Retirement Fund, the Social Security Fund, the Farmers' Association and the Jordanian Cooperative Organization. Together, they own about 50 percent of the company's capital stock.

Merchants may buy no more than 15 percent of the company's stock. The remaining shares (35 percent) would be made available to the general public, and priority would be given to farmers [who wanted to buy this stock]. These ratios are still being considered, and they have not become law yet. In selecting these ratios, we wanted the ratio of farmers to be high and that of merchants to be low so that the company would not turn into a tool which merchants and exporters would use to control the marketing process. The ratio of merchants is enough to ensure that they will not be unfairly treated. This is because the company has to have people with experience and know-how in the fields of marketing and exporting.

The association's role in this company is to have a representative on the company's board of directors which determines the company's business policy. We hope that farmers will buy 35 percent of the company's stock so that the association, farmers and the Jordanian Cooperative Organization would constitute a majority in this company. Farmers would then be heard; their demands would be realized; and protection from exploitation and loss guaranteed.

The Company's Objectives

The company's objectives tend [to focus on] marketing and processing agricultural products; managing plants; managing wholesale markets and marketing centers; entering into agreements with farmers to produce certain varieties of agricultural products; offering farmers seeds, fertilizers and all requirements for farming; and providing farmers with technical guidance. In addition, the company wants to open new markets in the country and abroad, and it wants to buy [goods] from inside the country and from abroad. It may also set up its own offices inside the country and abroad.

If this company is formed with good support and guidance and sound management, it will help solve marketing problems. Farming will consequently advance and will provide good increments to the national revenue. Farming will become more attractive, and it will ensure that citizens have a good product at a reasonable price just as it ensures farmers reasonable profits and an honorable life. We are all hoping that this project will be implemented soon because many are hoping for that for the sake of agricultural development in Jordan.

Production Requirements

Mr al-Ghazawi had this to say about the role of the Farmers' Association in ensuring production requirements for farmers in the Jordan Valley.

[Answer] The association has made good progress in this regard. It is selling production requirements for 20 percent less than market price. This year we sold cucumber seeds, which are sold for 60 fils per seed, for 30 fils. This is a 50 percent drop in the price. The following figures indicate the progress achieved by the association in providing production requirements during the past years.

<u>The Year</u>	<u>The Loan Amounts</u>
1978	155,312 dinars
1979	236,256 dinars
1980	511,486 dinars
1981	361,960 dinars
1982 (till the end of October)	952,272 dinars

Thus we see that in only 5 years the figures grew almost 6 times [what they were]. The number of borrowers is still growing, and the association is still prepared to offer farmers all the support [they need].

We can say after this interview that Mr al-Ghazawi has become aware of the causes of the marketing problem. There is no doubt that the association can make a contribution to solving this problem if the proposed company is not formed. But we are hoping that the company will be formed and that it will work to serve farmers.

As we wait for this company to be founded, we pray God Almighty that the quantities and prices of this year's production will be good so that no new losses would be incurred and farmers would not have to leave their farms to look for jobs elsewhere to ensure food for their children. We pray God Almighty that the tragedy of migration from the Jordan Valley to cities will not recur.

8592

CSO: 4404/223

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN EXAMINED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 19 Jan 83 p 3

[Article by Tawfiq 'Abid: "A Study of the Industrial Plan Recommends Promotion of Exports by Marketing Association; Spread of Economic and Social Development in All Regions Is Necessary; Salaries of Skilled Workers, Technicians, Qualified Cadres To Be Raised and Employment of Foreigners Regulated"]

[Text] Because the study of the industrial plan, which was prepared by authorized agencies is an important document, we are continuing to publish its content along with observations, suggestions and recommendations made by the National Planning Council in this regard.

Marketing Association

The study finds it necessary that efforts be made by a marketing association to promote exports. This association would include small, non-competitive, complementary groups from the companies that produce the goods and services. The study finds it necessary that a council for promoting exports be established; that industry be developed; that marketing units for various industries be formed; that financial loans tailored for [the needs of] exporting be provided; that tax incentives and tax benefits for export industries be provided; and that those export industries be diversified instead of concentrating on limited industries and relying on traditional markets in marketing industrial products.

Areas for Industrial Centers

The study emphasizes the importance of spreading economic and social development in all regions of the kingdom by directing industries to settle in those regions. The study concludes that it is necessary to create headquarters and centers for development. The study proposes [the establishment of a] multi-level regional planning system as follows: Amman is to be kept the principal headquarters for development; Irbid and al-'Aqabah are to become development centers; and development sites are to be created in al-Mafraq, Ma'an and al-Karak, with the possibility that they may be turned into development centers in the future.

The study proposes regulatory measures among which is a measure for changing current investment incentives and making policies that are made in the context of comprehensive development aim to serve regional development.

Manpower and Training

Costs borne by the national economy to provide trained and qualified workers are high. Therefore, the problem which needs to be treated in the employment market is that of the unavailability of workers who are trained for certain professions in particular and for middle management as well. [Other problems] also are the increasing number of unskilled foreign workers and the low rate of women's participation in the work force.

The study recommends that salaries for skilled workers, technicians and qualified cadres must be raised. Employment of foreign workers is to be regulated, and more training opportunities for the work force are to be provided. Training opportunities must be provided for women who must be steered toward supporting production sectors instead of service sectors.

The study also recommends that companies be encouraged to increase their efforts in the area of training. Companies are to be granted tax exemptions, and these are to be linked with the company's activities in this regard.

Subsidizing Energy Costs

The study mentioned that with the exception of telecommunications infrastructures on the national level were so far satisfactory. However, there is fear that congestion may occur in the future if infrastructure developments do not parallel expansions in production sectors. Recommendations in this regard may be summarized as follows:

The infrastructure is to be developed in the light of expected economic developments and within a framework that takes regional implications into account. Developing industrial zones and parks is to be emphasized, and an effective tariff is to be adopted according to the priorities of need and importance with regard to water use. This is to be consistent with the adoption of one of three strategies.

Energy costs are to be subsidized at the rate of return on capital to the Jordanian Power Authority is to be reduced. Since energy costs in Jordan are high compared with those costs in neighboring countries, efficient use of electricity is to be encouraged, or rates are to be restructured with preferential rates given to those who have priority.

Attention is to be paid to road traffic in the city of al-'Aqabah. Traffic congestion [there] is to be eliminated. The study recommends that one government corporation be established to attend to water affairs nation-wide.

An Independent Corporation

One of the most important results reached by the study is that there are numerous agencies interested in industrial planning and implementation. The study concluded that we do not have a strong policy to support exports and investments. Because the growth of the industrial and mining sector depends on establishing competitive export industries, the study gives this subject high priority. In that light we think it would be proper that an independent corporation be established. This corporation would be called the Industrial Development Authority of Jordan and it would plan, design and implement industrial development programs. That includes promoting investments and industrial exports.

Recommendations in this regard may be summarized as follows:

The Industrial Development Authority of Jordan is to be established, and a council for promoting exports is to be established also to work with the authority. An industrial association would play a role in the exchange of expertise and information, and it would cooperate [with the authority] in implementing and operating projects and marketing products. A marketing association is to be established, and it would include small, complementary and non-competitive groups from the companies that produce the goods and services. Industry licensing regulations are to be reconsidered so that the principal objective of licensing an industry would be to obtain basic information about the industries that are being established and not to impose restrictions on industrial development.

Among the matters that the study approves of is a measure to combine the forms and procedures for licensing companies. The study approves of granting companies exemptions to encourage investment; of establishing a fund to insure exports against dangers; and of coordinating efforts among the organizations that manage free zones and industrial parks.

Protecting Industry

The study holds the opinion that imposing customs fees is the best way to regulate trade. It is not a way that would be used to encourage investments. The study mentions that the investment support system in Jordan is based on tax and customs exemptions only. It does not include monetary grants to investors. Therefore, the study proposes the introduction of a system that would provide such monetary grants. These would take into account the nature of the project and its contribution to the added value, to Jordanian exports and to regional balance in the kingdom.

Some of the suggestions that were made on the subject of protecting industry and that of customs fees may be summarized as follows:

1. Jordan must try to replace customs protection which is currently in effect and which was previously described as a uniform, standard tariff that applies to all goods. This would cut down on administrative restrictions, and it would make the manufacturing and exporting processes less difficult. Support for industry is not to be confined to customs policies. [These customs policies] must rather be accompanied by offers of grants for investment. Customs protection for developing industries is to be provided by imposing fees or by restricting imports.

The study also calls attention to the need to deal with the policy of flooding the market with goods, especially those that are imported from the Far East. Among the methods that may be adopted here are those of setting down and applying rigorous standards and specifications for these imported goods.

The study recommends that the tax exemption period be extended so it would begin the first year the company realizes a profit. Investors are to be exempted from taxes on production requirements that enter into the production of industrial exports. Tax exemptions are to be granted to exporting companies, and customs fees on equipment and devices are to be reduced. The study approves of

simplifying import and tax regulations; continuing the free trade policy; looking into the possibility of Jordan becoming a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]; and setting customs fees according to the international classification [of goods].

The Development Authority of Jordan

The multiplicity of agencies that are responsible for industrial development in Jordan; the fact that their authorities overlap; and the lengthy and complicated measures required by licensing regulations, temporary entry [of goods] and exemptions require that the existing framework be reconsidered for the purpose of simplifying measures, increasing efficiency and reducing steps. An adviser approved of the establishment of a Jordanian development authority whose functions would cover all the activities of the industrial sector. However, establishment of such an organization with such powers may not be suitable.

As far as this matter is concerned, the council proposed that industry licensing requirements be made easier with regard to providing studies on private sector investments and foreign investments. The necessity of providing meticulous and detailed studies on the investments of public organizations must be stressed. Company registration measures are to be combined with measures for receiving investment encouragement benefits. The present complicated system of licensing imports is to be replaced, and taxes are to be imposed and exemptions granted according to a simplified system that would set uniform taxes with no exemptions. Measures for the temporary entry [of goods] and for importing raw materials and spare parts are to be simplified.

It is necessary for Jordan to encourage exports, to open new markets and to increase exports so it can reduce its reliance on foreign assistance. This requires that a competent staff be placed in positions to promote exports. This would include becoming acquainted with the markets, steering local industries toward exports and offering exporters technical experience.

Foreign investments that ensure the transfer of suitable modern technology and settling it in Jordan should receive more support. In this regard [the study] suggests that the Industrial Development Bank be charged with the task of adopting a plan to promote exports and encourage foreign investments. This plan is to include studying the markets, composing the necessary export publications, preparing the necessary agencies to monitor investments, promoting foreign investments and devising a media program that would include bulletins and advertisements on this matter to appear in newspapers.

This plan is being financed by sources other than those of the Industrial Development Bank, such as commercial banks, the Finance Corporation, chambers of industry and commerce, the state's budget and the Central Bank.

Export Incentives

To achieve the increase in exports that is being hoped for income tax benefits are to be granted on exported goods. This is to be linked with the ratio of exports to the nominal capacity of the exporter and with opening new, non-traditional markets for export.

An export assurance fund is to be established; it is to be managed by the Industrial Development Bank or by a corporation that would be established for that purpose. This fund would be financed by the government and by private sector agencies.

Effective and favorable credit terms are to be made available to enable exporters to refinance proceeds from their exports and [purchase] the primary materials that pertain to these exports at interest rates that would be tailored to them. This would be done by devising an integrated, easy to apply program that would be suitable for refinancing by the Central Bank without lengthy complications.

Encouraging Investments

The present law that encourages investments grants satisfactory benefits to investors. However, it is necessary to reconsider some points that have to do with investments and investment policies. In this regard the following is deemed fitting:

Better benefits are to be granted to engineering and capital industries and to industries that produce intermediary materials used in pre-processing and post-processing operations so that the reliance of local industries on primary and imported materials, on spare parts and on simple capital goods can be reduced. The need for these materials is growing since there is doubt about the industrialization movement in Jordan reducing the deficit in the balance of payments.

Exemption from taxes must go into effect on the day a company realizes profits from its operations or a net profit, and not on the day it begins its commercial business. This is because a company may need to operate for several years after beginning production before it realizes a profit.

Benefits that are given for project expansions are to be reconsidered so that these would be the same as those benefits given to new projects. Investments that are necessary to effect project expansion involve almost the same risks and problems that apply to new projects.

Encouraging Investments and Currency Transfers by Jordanians Working Abroad and Funding

There is an urgent need to provide more resources for development. This includes bringing about an increase in the real value of currency transfers made by Jordanians working abroad. It is essential that [certain] policies be adopted. [The following] are among them:

The resources of working corporations and companies are to be developed by increasing the reserves that may be allocated [for operations] without a tax. The process of turning reserves into capital is to be made easier, and faster depreciation rates are to be allowed.

A flexible policy on interest rates is to be adopted; it would guarantee a real, effective return to savers after inflation rates are taken into consideration. In past years interest rates on savings accounts in Jordan were lower than the rate of inflation. Certain kinds of long-term government bonds that yield a high rate of interest and are sold only to savers may be issued.

The role of the Industrial Development Bank must be strengthened. It is necessary to provide additional sources of financing for it, and this must be accompanied by making lending conditions at that bank easier. The bank's activities must also be expanded so that its services would include technical and accounting services to its clients, project evaluation services and experts. Small industrialists are to be encouraged to borrow from this bank by providing them with special terms that are consistent with their needs.

The Industrial Development Bank and specialized lending institutions are to give more attention and funding to working capital since specialized banking operations tend to favor funding capital operations.

More investment loans are to be made available in the industrial and mining sector. These investment loans are to be publicized and promoted. This will increase national exemptions in general, and it will increase the funds transferred by Jordanians working abroad. These funds would be channeled into investments in production sectors instead of channeling them into financial [sectors], real estate and services.

Specialized investment funds are to be established and managed by established investment organizations such as the Retirement Fund and the Industrial Development Bank. These funds would give Jordanians working abroad favorable conditions and a minimum income. They would attract the savings of Jordanians working abroad, provided the state offers the necessary guarantees that are required...by the establishment of such funds.

The Planning Committee of the Ministry of Industry and Trade is to discuss this study and the council's recommendations at its next meeting.

8592

CSO: 4404/224

POTASH PRODUCTION ACTIVITY REVIEWED

Amman AL-FAJR AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 129, 20-26 Oct 82 pp 6-9

[Article by Salamah al-Muhasinah: "Potash: Mainstay of Jordanian Economy"]

[Text] On the southeastern edge of the Dead Sea, the Potash Company is creating a huge complex with all of its installations, with all of its power, and with all its charity and generosity.

Mr 'Ali al-Khasawanah is Director General of the Arab Potash Company. He holds a master's degree in that very specialty, and he worked most recently as Director General for the Kuwaiti Oil Tankers, until he returned from there in 1975 to work as Director General of the Arab Potash Company.

The man insisted that the magazine AL-FAJR, with its cameras, head for the site on which the company's projects are being built. The distance between it and Amman is about 200 km, and AL-FAJR actually had to make this trip, during which this conversation took place.

In his office there the talk began when he said: "The Potash Company is the first joint Arab company in contemporary Arab history, since it was founded in 1956 by a decision of the Arab Economic Unity Council. Its capital at that time was 4.5 million Jordanian dinars. As for the founding Arab nations, they were a group of Arab nations which were members of what was then called the League of Arab Nations. They were: Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Purchase of stock was open to Arab citizens, so many Arab citizens participated, and some financial institutions also participated, such as banks, and so on."

[Question] Which of its goals did the company realize at that time?

[Answer] In the period between '56 and '76 the company was not able to realize any of its goals, for two main reasons:

1. At that time, the board of directors consisted of ambassadors from the founding Arab nations to the company, which caused all inter-Arab disputes to be reflected back upon the project and defeat it.

2. The political events which occurred in this period and encompassed the region; though the board was capable of dealing with them, these political factors did not have the important influence.

Twenty years passed in the life of the company and nothing was done. However, in 1976, the company began to activate the work. At that time the board, along with the government, felt that, in order to guarantee the continuity of the work in pushing the project forward, to raise its efficiency and to prevent it from turning into the same problems as before, the Jordanian government should own 51 per cent of the company's share capital, thus ensuring control over the progress of the work along with making certain that the company's president and general director would be Jordanians.

I began to manage the company in December, 1975. Until that time the company was returning to the old shareholders the price of their shares, even those which amounted to thousands of shares.

Production Rate

[Question] How was the decreed production rate for the company in the previous period?

[Answer] At first the production rate was supposed to be 100,000 tons annually, but when the company was re-established, as I said, in '75-'76, after study the idea was based on production being 1,200,000 tons annually. This productivity will be raised by virtue of the nature of the project, which is helping to increase production to 1.5 million tons annually in the near future.

Concerning the company's capital growth, Mr al-Khasawanah said:

"The company's capital grew from 4.5 million Jordanian dinars to 63 million dinars. The company remained 'joint Arab' in character, because all of the share capital was based on participation by the Arab governments, amounting to 49 percent of the company's total capital.

[Question] Profitability is absolutely necessary to set up any project, and studying it constitutes an important element. What did you do in this regard?

[Answer] I studied the project's profitability since '56. The study was funded by the Jordanian government, the World Bank, and the American Development Foundation with \$10 million. However, the picture has been different recently, since we have been carrying out some parts of the project simultaneously with the study of this profitability, because of our prior satisfaction that the project has excellent profitability. Had we left the matter to debate, there would be no project here. Thus, we actually began to build while we were studying the profitability. We set up work at the project's land, on which we based the actual design of the project. Through this we were able to set up the project in its completed

form in the time specified and planned for it, and even a little less. We are the only ones in the Middle East who have completed their project in time as calculated by the clock. I would like to point out here that the potash project was completely accomplished at full capacity and with all of its equipment brought to the production stage in just 24 months; this is a model time.

[Question] What about the level of technology used in this project?

[Answer] We have here some activities and aspects in which the most modern types of technology in the world were applied. This is noticeable in everything an expert or specialist in such matters could see. I would like to mention here, as well, that we are the only ones who are producing potash from the water, since other countries produce it out of the ground. There is no potash project in all of Asia or Africa except in our area. The source, as everyone knows, is the Dead Sea. We saved effort and time, as I said, by study, application and hard work.

Concerning the project and the production priorities, Mr al-Khasawanah said:

"The project is set up basically on what are called salt works, which are 70 square kilometers in area. We have linked these salt works with 11-kilometer long canals coming from the sea. Where they begin, these canals are connected to a station which pumps from the sea into pipes with a capacity of 12 cubic meters per second. They pump into the canal to feed the salt works.

"From the beginning we have not waited for the project to take its natural course. We constructed a pipeline manufactured in Jordan 120 cm in diameter and 19 km long. We pumped seawater through it in order to generate the salts needed for the potash industry. This work is what brought the period of production close to at least three years [sic]."

Technical Problems

[Question] Did some technical problems beset you in setting up the project?

[Answer] The soil here is very much subject to seepage. If the water were to seep into the salt works, or from the salt works to the outside, then the operation of generating the salts needed for the industry would be ruined for us. Therefore, we set up a plastic barrier in the ground at a depth of 7 meters over a distance of 17 km. This protected us from the threat of seepage and probable or certain leakage under or through the dams, and it solved the problem. Only two companies in the world have used and comprehended this technical operation, other than us, and they are the ones which carried out the project. We had conducted more than 200,000 tests and analyses before we reached the correct design concept, applied it, and proved its success and usefulness in practice.

[Question] Did several companies participate in carrying out the operation?

[Answer] We divided the project into four main phases and parts: Building the housing, building the beds and dams, setting up electricity, and building the factories. Each company took its portion of these projects. We have thoroughly qualified these companies and have always taken the best. This is one of the reasons for our success. His August Majesty King Hussein crowned this project by sponsoring the opening celebration on March 18 this year when the project was completed and waiting to produce.

Concerning the completed project, Mr al-Khasawanah said: "The surface area of the whole project is now 600 square km: 40 km long and 15 km wide. Most of it is an expanse of ground from which the Dead Sea has pulled back and which can never be used for any other purpose, because it was covered with water just ten years ago. There we built the salt works, the factories, the water pumping stations, and other necessary facilities."

He added: "We need ten million cubic meters of fresh water pe year, because this industry is based primarily on water. Therefore, we dug wells nearby and connected them to a collection point to feed the factories as required."

Potash Company Accomplishments--in Numbers

Concerning the harvesters required for the potash industry, he said: "We have a group of machines which are called potash harvesters. They operate by the most modern of methods, or laser beams, and they are unprecedented anywhere in the world. Their function lies in pumping the water containing the salts from the salt works to the factory after several technical matters which are necessary for this operation.

"However, with respect to chemical experiments and the like, they are present in their characteristic form, serving all of the project's activities. We also have a fleet of trucks which carry the product from the project to the port of 'Aqabah for export."

Production Volume

Al-FAJR asked Mr 'Ali al-Khasawanah about the subject of production, and he replied: "Our production now and for the next three years, as planned and decreed, will be 1,200,000 tons annually with a value of \$200 million. For the year 2001, our calculation is that the average value will be \$300 million annually.

"Because of this, I can say that the potash project is capable of covering the costs of its construction in full after five years of production, at most.

"With respect to the profits, I want to assure the shareholders that they amount to 27 to 30 percent of the capital.

"I want to say that, so far, we are ahead of our decreed production plan, since we are now producing 40,000 tons by the end of this year. Production in 1983 will be 450,000 tons, and from the beginning of 1984, production will be 1,200,000 tons annually."

Concerning the importing nations, Mr al-Khasawanah said: "The entire world is a market for our product, but we are selling our product for the next five years before delivery in 'Aqabah at concurrent world prices to a number of countries in the following manner:

1. The region east of the Suez Canal (Japan, China, India, etc., over to Australia) will be sold half of the production.
2. A fourth of the production will be sold to Europe and Africa.
3. The remaining fourth of the production will be sold to North and South America.

"We are selling or have sold the potash to contractors. We take payment immediately after it is loaded. They are required to take all of our production, but we are not required to give them the amounts they ask for as it pleases them."

[Question] Every industry has wastes. Does potash have such wastes, and can they be used?

[Answer] More than fifty industries can be based on the resources of the Dead Sea, with fifty products, all of them different and all resulting from the original potash project. We have finished studying four [sic] projects which are very economically profitable, all of them emanating from potash: Magnesium, animal feed, soda, bromine, and potassium sulphate.

Because of this, we can take advantage of other industries besides potash. All of them yield excellent profit and income in support of the Jordanian economy.

Mainstay of Jordanian Economy

[Question] What do potash and the Dead Sea offer the local economy?

[Answer] The Dead Sea is the primary mainstay of the Jordanian economy. With the industries which can be set up from it, the economy will be established on a flexible base, bringing it close to the level of self-reliance. Phosphates and potash chemical fertilizers are the first and basic mainstay of this economy; everything else, with respect to the resources which are expended in Jordan, is secondary, except for the development of agriculture in the depressions where water is available and building the agricultural industries necessary for agriculture itself.

[Question] What facilities did you have to build in support of the project?

[Answer] 1. Housing: This came out of our concern for our manpower, without which we would not be able to accomplish anything. Thus, we built housing for these effective, productive people, so that all conditions would be available there for a very comfortable life. We now have 400 residential units for 400 families. There is also a residence for unmarried personnel, with service available there around the clock.

2. Health care aspect: We have continuous medical service now. We will build a complete hospital. The work on it will be finished within two months and then we will have no need to make use of any other medical center.

3. Schools: From nursery school through the secondary level.

4. Commercial market: Everything there that the resident needs.

5. Mosque: Currently being built, it will also be an Islamic center for the area, containing a cultural library to fulfill its mission in the required manner.

6. Gymnasium: With all kinds of games and a swimming pool.

7. A branch of the settlement bank.

8. Governmental post office.

9. Standard means of communication are now available to us, built especially for us. They facilitate direct communication.

In one way or another, all of the requirements of a comfortable life are available in this model city.

Finally, I want to say that our mission is also to teach the residents of the area of all of the jobs they can do here at the project, because a part of our task is to develop the surrounding area from the human standpoint. This goes hand in hand with our potash production. Thus, we are developing Jordanian expertise which will eventually replace foreign expertise. We have made good progress in this area, because of the hundreds of foreigners who started with us, only thirty remain; the rest are Jordanians.

Two-Seas Canal

[Question] What is the effect of the Two-Seas Canal which Israel says it intends to dig from the Mediterranean Sea to the Red Sea, and will it affect this project of ours?

[Answer] We are safeguarding the economic structure first and last, and in spite of circumstances. Thus, we are making the projects a fence for our nation, fortified with the citizens of this country in order to form the

proper meaning of growth. My philosophy is that the defense of land on which our economic well being is based will be more profound than if it were barren and yielded no benefit. As a businessman, I am not concerned with what the other party does; instead, I have to respond to him with more than he does or says. I leave the other aspects to the competent parties.

I would also state that our enemies are building their projects directly opposite us; their projects are likely to be exposed to anything to which our projects are likely to be exposed. We guarantee that world opinion will stand at our side if any aggression occurs, God forbid, against our installations, because the industrial structure is very important and always strengthens the nation's standing. The more we build up the territory near our enemies, the greater its value, the more we are affiliated with it, and the more we are willing to die in its defense.

9605

CSO: 4404/136

EXCESSIVE SPENDING ON LUXURY ITEMS CRITICIZED

. Man AL-FAJR AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 130, 27 Oct--7 Nov 82 p 32

[Editorial by Muhammad Ibrahim Daud: "Uncontrolled Consumption"]

[Text] Perhaps the most dangerous negative phenomenon in Jordanian society is the outbreak of consumption without controls or real need. It is a situation which is on the verge of threatening to hinder real development and the continuing increase in the rates of growth in various sectors of production.

We are approaching consumption with amazing avarice and incomparable greed without taking the future into account or taking the necessary precautions to face the economic reversals and relapses which are suffocating many of the progressive and industrial nations, and the financial tremors and threatening complications which accompany political and social developments. These cannot be ignored, nor their effects avoided, whether they are regional or international.

In spite of the fact that Jordan follows a free economy, this does not mean giving free rein to individual desires or inclinations to create economic chaos. It also does not mean letting individuals squander their money and waste their capabilities in a manner which affects the general economic situation.

If we take an intense interest in acquiring cars, for example, we find a great imbalance between the individual's freedom to buy the car and the effect this has on energy consumption and raising the price that the country pays in the face of this freedom.

In all countries of the world, the car is for taking care of needs, and buying it has become an economic and operational necessity. At the same time, buying a car in Jordan has become a sort of social luxury and affectation among relatives, neighbors and people with wealth and an abundance of money. Whoever goes to the Jordanian University or one of the society colleges is struck with dismay at the multitude of personal cars belonging to the students and not to the faculty.

Perhaps it would be beneficial to point out that the lack of governmental intervention in this area is responsible, to a large extent, for the wasting of vast sums of money in purchasing magnificent automobiles, out of which additional expenses are derived and are borne by the national treasury in providing fuel and repairing roads and streets.

In Japan, which is an automobile exporting nation, there is governmental intervention to control individual car purchasing activity. The responsible agencies determine the amount of the down payment and make it high, and they raise the amount of the subsequent installments in order to limit the individual's purchasing power and compel him to save.

If we go beyond the economic dangers deriving from avaricious consumption and look at the social results, we find that the devotion to spending has had a share in creating opulent and pampered generation, a generation which lacks the strength to bear responsibility and which flees from serious thinking or is incapable of originality and creativity.

This phenomenon has become clear. It does not reduce the danger from the economic negatives which derive from the frenzy for spending and consumption.

9605

CSO: 4404/136

ROAD PROJECTS LISTED

Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 12 Jan 83 p 2

[Article: "Minister of Public Works Says 19.6 Million Dinars Appropriated for Road Construction and Improvements in the Kingdom; Priorities on Rural Roads That Will Be Implemented This Year Defined and Approved"]

[Text] Engineer 'Awni al-Misri, minister of public works stated that the sum of 9,635,000 dinars has been appropriated in this year's budget for a variety of road construction projects and improvements [including] surfacing roads. Of this sum 2.5 million dinars [are earmarked] for opening and widening rural roads.

In addition, the sum of 887,000 dinars has been provided for bids on rural and agricultural roads that were approved in 1982 and are still being implemented.

Mr al-Misri expressed the ministry's sentiments about the importance of rural and agricultural roads. [He said] these roads need to be maintained and upgraded so they can serve residential communities and agricultural areas.

The minister added, "Appropriations necessary for that purpose are being allocated in the light of financial capabilities. The progress of villages, the development of agriculture, increased traffic and the growing pressure on these roads have made many of them in need of improvement. These roads need to be widened; water drainage on these roads needs to be improved; and the roads need to be maintained and surfaced."

The sum of 300,000 dinars has been earmarked for rural roads. The priorities of these roads will be determined jointly with the Ministry of Agriculture, which is the agency that has the information on farming. Public works departments will be technically responsible for implementing the projects without exceeding appropriations. The purpose of building these roads is to ensure that agricultural areas can be reached throughout the days of the year. This means that priority [in carrying out road improvements] is to be given to water drainage installations and potholes. These roads are to be built in stages [and are to conform to] standards of low-cost roads.

The priorities of rural roads that the Ministry of Public Works will implement this year were determined late last year in a meeting that was held especially for that purpose.

That meeting was attended by the ministers and deputy ministers of the interior; of municipal, rural and environmental affairs; and of public works. Administrators and public works directors in the governorates and districts participated in that meeting. The names of these roads follow:

The Capital Governorate [Amman]: Improvements

The al-Zarqa'-Bayrayn-al-'Aluk Road; al-Dalil-al-Halabat Road; Lub-Makawir; Madba-Natal-Umm Qasir-Ziziya; Wadi al-Sayr-'Araq al-Amir.

Construction

Khashafiyah/al-Dabaybah-Abu al-Hayan Road; Sarut-Hawd al-Makman; al-Jizah-al-Qunaytirah; al-'Amiriyah; Abu Naqlah.

Al-Balqa' Governorate: Improvements

Zayy/Umm Jawzah/al-Ramimayn Road; al-Baq'ah; Muntazah Zayy Road; al-Za'tari Road; al-Ramimayn.

Construction

Mubas/Umm Za'rurah Road; al-Hadib/Ra's al-Jundi; al-Surw/'Ayn al-Basha; 'Aqabah al-Salatiyah; Humrah al-Sahn/al-'Aridah; Kafr Hawda/al-Safih.

Irbid Governorate: Improvements

The Public Road/Tabanah; Hakama/Maru/'Al'al; Kafr Yuba/Natifah/Jahfiyah; al-Majdal al-Jazazah/Barama; Yabla/al-Rafid; Samad/al-Mazar; the Public Road/-Rasun/Mahanna.

Construction

Kafr Asad/al-Mansurah; Qal'ah al-Rabd/al-Suwan; al-Jazi/al-Maramih/'Unaybah.

Al-Mafriq District: Improvements

Dayr al-Kahf/al-Jabiyah.

Construction

Dayr al-Kahf/Tall al-Rimah; al-Kawm al-Ahmar/al-Hisan; the Public Road/Buwaydah al-'Alayat; al-Ba'ij/al-Mashraf; Arhab; al-Ma'mariyah; Hamamah al-'Alaymat Road; Khatlah/al-Sahari.

Al-Karak Governorate: Improvements

Al-Mazar/Majra/al-Taybah; al-Qasr/Faqu'/Amra'/Sarfa; al-Husayniyah/Dhat Ra's.

Construction

Al-Rabbah/Dimnah; al-Salhiyah; al-Shihabiyah; Batir/Aghwir; al-'Aziziyah/-al-Thalajah.

The Governorate of Ma'an: Improvements

Al-Mansurah/al-Maqari'ah/Abu Makhtub; Muthalath Adhrah/al-Qa'/Bastah; al-Faddan al-Zira'i/Farifrah.

Construction

Muthalath al-Shubak/al-Madaris; Shamakh/al-Hadadah; Hayy al-'Usayfat/Hawalah

Al-Tafilah District: Improvements

'Aymah/Daba'ah/Arhaba; al-Majmu'.

Construction

Al-Namatah/al-'Ayn al-Bayda'/al-Habis; 'Afra/Arhaba.

8592

CSO: 4404/223

PAPERS DISCUSS SHARON RESIGNATION, WITHDRAWALS

NC130800 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 0530 GMT 13 Feb 83

[Press review]

[Excerpts] This morning's papers highlight the discussions which U.S. Presidential Envoy Philip Habib has held with Lebanese officials within the framework of his new mission to accelerate the negotiations and secure the withdrawal of the foreign forces from Lebanon. They refer to the change in the Israeli Government and expect the Defense Ministry portfolio to be withdrawn from Ari'el Sharon and entrusted to Moshe Arens at today's cabinet meeting. [passage omitted]

Writing in AL-ANWAR under the title "The Difficult Passages to the Settlement," Rafiq Al-Khuri says: General Sharon's departure from the Defense Ministry has opened many doors in Israel and abroad including the door of the reconsideration of the theory of minority alliances in the Middle East.

In Israel, there is more than one interpretation of the political earthquake which the Kahan Report has caused. However, the most outstanding interpretation is that which says that the theory of minority alliances is on its way to downfall together with Sharon. It is no secret that the United States is against this theory. It considers peace through the Reagan plan. It refuses to change the map of the area and give interpretations of the change. All the United States wants is to keep the states in the area the way they are and perhaps keep the regimes as well while adding a new entity--the Palestinian entity associated with Jordan. It, naturally, also wants reconciliation and peace among these states within the framework of the U.S. security system in the Middle East.

The problem of Lebanon and its settlement is the testing ground and the area of the conflict between the Israeli outlook and the U.S. outlook towards the map of the area and real peace. Lebanon is continuing with the salvation adventure trying to explore the difficult and camouflaged passageways to cross them toward the salvation. The first passageway is the thin thread dividing the U.S.-Soviet conflict and a U.S.-Soviet understanding. The second passageway is the threat dividing the U.S.-Israeli disagreement and a U.S.-Israeli strategic alliance. The third passageway is the threat dividing the Soviet-Israeli estrangement and similar Soviet-Israeli interests. The

fourth is the threat dividing the Arab-Israeli conflict and an implicit Arab-Israeli understanding.

However, Lebanon, which believes in itself, believes also that there is a final opportunity for the appearance of Philip Habib's miracles.

Writing in AL-NAHAR under the caption "The Fears of Lebanon and the Fears of the Arabs" Michel Jawdah says: King Husayn is watching the situation in Lebanon. In other words, he is following up the fate of Ambassador Habib's mission in Lebanon to be reassured about the fate of President Reagan's peace initiative in the area. The invitation to the Jordanian monarch to participate in the negotiations is not new. The previous U.S. administration invited him to participate in these negotiations. The Israeli prime minister has recently repeated the invitation demanding negotiations with no preconditions and on the basis of the Camp David Accords.

The reasons why the Jordanian king has not joined the negotiations are clear and known. He does not want to assume the role of the Palestinians or speak on their behalf. He does not want to go to Camp David. The Arab wisemen have learned from Egypt's experience in President as-Sadat's era.

What is new as far as the Jordanian monarch is concerned is President Reagan's initiative. However, the Jordanian king has previously heard U.S. promises and plans which saw light but were soon frozen and disintegrated. In the light of these facts Lebanon and most of the Arab moderates consider Habib's mission as a main test of Reagan's initiative. How would it be possible to convince King Husayn that the U.S. administration can get Israel out of the West Bank and Gaza Sector if it fails to get Israel out of Lebanon and achieve the other withdrawals? For these reasons, Lebanon's desire coincides with the Arab moderates' desire to bring about the success of Habib's mission so the Reagan initiative may not be confined to the limits of his envoy's mission and so the envoy's mission may not fail together with the U.S. initiative. [passage omitted]

Writing editorially under the title "The U.S. Creditability After Sharon," AL-LIWA' says: Washington has linked the difficulties in the withdrawal negotiations with outgoing Israeli Defense Minister Ari'el Sharon. It considered his resignation as a factor contributing to the establishment of quiet on the Lebanese arena. It also considered the resignation as an abandonment of conditions which he laid to obstruct the withdrawal negotiations. This linkage is not a coincidence or a mere comment on the resignation or what the political storm in Israel is causing in shaking Menahem Begin's government on the situation as a whole. It is a clear reference to working toward pushing the negotiations along a path from the obstacles and hurdles obstructing progress. What Lebanon wants now is that Washington should prove the creditability of its pledges after having considered Ari'el Sharon as the only obstacle precluding quick progress in the withdrawal negotiations.

REPERCUSSIONS OF INVASION ON DIFFERENT ECONOMIC SECTORS OUTLINED

Beirut SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH in Arabic Nos 132-133, Nov-Dec 82 pp 59-66

[Article by Fu'ad 'Alamah: "Dangers of the Israeli Invasion on the Lebanese Economy"]

[Text] Lebanon, which is now facing a widespread military occupation of its territory, is at the same time facing a peaceful invasion of its commercial markets. Israel has been able to attract a large number of Lebanese merchants to do business with Israeli firms. They have been voluntarily attracted to the campaign of economic normalization by the prospects of easy profits, which the cheapness of the Israeli goods, compared to their locally-produced counterparts, provides. This is being done without those merchants weighing the future dangers to the Lebanese economy, especially the agricultural and industrial sectors, described by the Lebanese as the two ailing sectors.

If the military occupation has stopped at specific points, the economic invasion has reached into all Lebanese areas, where the sight of Israeli products openly displayed has become commonplace.

I. The Facts of Economic Normalization

It is well known that economic dealings with Israel are nothing new. They began in 1976, when the gates of the "good wall" were opened, as a result of the movement of armed militias into the area of the border strip which, later, led to establishing the so-called "Free State of Lebanon" in 1978. Although these dealings remained limited until the outbreak of the war on 4 June, a specific pattern has now emerged, whose effects we are currently seeing everywhere.

Early in the beginning of the war, Radio Israel announced that "scores of Lebanese businessmen were calling on the branch office in the town of al-Metullah to obtain the specifications of hundreds of Israeli products."¹ Later, Gideon Patt, the Israeli minister of industry, stated that the size of the commercial exchange with Lebanon, during the first 3 months of the war, exceeded the size of the commercial exchange with Egypt for a full year. He made it clear that "economic normalization between Israel and Lebanon would precede peaceful relations, which is the reverse of what happened in Egypt."²

Despite the Lebanese authorities taking some preventive measures such as, refusing to price the Israeli "shekel," which is eroded by inflation compared to

the Lebanese pound, withdrawing the legal licenses from the travel offices, which were established to do business with Israel and confiscating banking sureties, in addition to the government announcing its resolve to strip citizenship from every Lebanese who enters Israel for the purpose of tourism or business, and to apply article 285 of the penal code with regard to this, indications of a diminishing commercial exchange have not appeared so far. This is what impelled Deputy Munir Abu Fadhil to address a letter/question to the government, in which he inquired about the impediments to the economic invasion and the confiscation of Israeli goods from those markets which fall under the legal authority.

Undoubtedly, the commercial exchange with Israel is not based on a balanced exchange. On the contrary, the absolute reverse has occurred, since the local market is subjected to a campaign of serious flooding of goods. The goods imported from Israel carry prices which are about 35 percent below comparable Lebanese goods. Israel has been able to penetrate the financial blockade, earn exporting value for its currency, and do business with Lebanon as its domestic market. Consequently, markets in all areas have become saturated with imported goods, such as clothes, candy, oils, glass, cement, etc., "without any control or accountability, and the port of Haifa has become a rival, in the highest degree, with the Lebanese ports, not because it is also located on the shores of the Mediterranean, but rather, because through it passes goods imported from all over, free of customs and other duties. Moreover, persons cross over the common border with Israel, without any opposition either coming or going. All the doors are open."³

In this regard, Fu'ad Abu Salih, president of the Industrialists Association, says that "because of the anarchy through which it has lived for the past 8 years, and which reached its apogee during the last 2 years, Lebanon was on its way to losing its foreign markets. However now, after the Israeli invasion, it has begun to lose even its domestic markets."⁴

In the information distributed by the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, it was stated that "economic dealings with Israel threaten Lebanese markets with the most serious consequences, since these dealings take the form of illegal competition with domestic production, which is in the most severe need of support. The results of this have begun to be reflected in a slump and unemployment. Moreover, importing through the port of Haifa is a severe blow to the treasury's resources and to the Lebanese economy. In addition to that, Israel's repeated attempts to infiltrate into African markets through Lebanese businessmen is a matter that contains serious dangers which ought to be faced now."⁵

The negative effects stemming from the Israeli invasion, with its military and economic aspects, may threaten in the following ways:

A. General damages: As a result of the Israeli invasion, large segments of coastal cities, such as Beirut, Sidon, Tyre and al-Nabbatiyah were destroyed, not to mention the scores of villages in the Biqa', the Jebel and the South. This has led to a paralysis of public utilities, for a period of not less than 4 months, and has idled traffic, relatively speaking, on the international

roads, especially the Damascus-Beirut road, which is considered the main road for exporting goods to the Arab nations. The closure of the airport and the harbor has resulted in the stoppage of foreign trade and the decline in transportation of people and mail from the capital of Beirut to and from the outside world. The direct destruction included a number of commercial, industrial and trade organizations, as well as private property, and so long as the destruction lasted, the theivery lasted, since the Israeli occupation forces plundered the stocks of some factories, especially in al-Shuwayfat and al-Na'imah, on the pretext that their owners were not Lebanese. The Lebanese government estimates the total losses that the country suffered as a result of the Israeli invasion as about \$12 billion. Even if this figure is exaggerated, the government's assumption is that this amount is required in order to rebuild the infrastructure of the Lebanese economy (electrical networks, waterworks, repair of roads, development of means of communications, and the like).

According to sources in the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Beirut, the losses of the services sector, which is the backbone of the Lebanese economy, amounted according to initial estimates to more than \$2 billion, stemming from the closure of international outlets, in addition to the damage suffered by a number of commercial, hotel and tourist organizations.

B. The industrial sector: The Lebanese industry suffered direct damage from the war, which caused the burning of many Lebanese factories. Another large number of them suffered indirect damage, stemming either from the complete stoppage of production, due to the interruption of electrical current, the breakdown of telephone and radio communications, the closure of the roads and the increase in the cost of transportation, and the inability of workers to get to their jobs, or from the decline of production for two reasons:

1. The competition of Israeli goods to the goods of the basic Lebanese industries, such as oil, sugar, candy, pastries, etc. Production from Lebanese factories used to be sufficient to satisfy domestic needs, with the surplus being exported to foreign markets.
2. The importation of several foreign commodities, such as salt, alcoholic beverages and cigarettes through the port of Haifa, after their being exempted from custom duties and other expenses, except for those which accrue from transportation. This is what has hindered the sale of industrial products, because of the lower prices of the imported goods.⁷

It should be mentioned that Lebanese industry has, for a long time, suffered from major difficulties, which has led to the closure of a number of factories, especially textile plants. This is due to a lack of customs protection, and the entry of foreign merchandise through the illegal ports, and the rise in the cost of the Lebanese work force, due to escalating inflation rates in Lebanon and the migration of many workers, in search of better opportunities in the Arab Gulf countries.

C. The agricultural sector: Lebanese agriculture has been subjected to multiple disasters, stemming first from the direct destruction suffered by irrigation installations, drainage canals, fruit trees, poultry and cattle farms

and fisheries. Secondly, they have stemmed from the influx of Israeli agricultural products, which compete with the local products through lowering their prices which, in some cases, amount to less than the cost of producing the items locally.

Perhaps the best way to understand the depth of the crisis in the agricultural sector is to recount the grave facts that appear in the statements issued daily by the union organizations to the local press. The following are some highlights:

The agricultural Federation of the South, on 31 October 1982, issued a statement reporting that the farmers of the South "were shocked by the arrival of the steamship Rasis, entering the port of Beirut, loaded with 1000 tons of bananas, imported at the behest of merchants who have become well-known to the authorities. Note that the Agricultural Almanac prohibits the entry of foreign bananas into Lebanon after 31 August of each year, aside from the fact that these merchants are the ones who flood the local markets with Israeli bananas and other Israeli products."

The Horticultural Workers Union, on 16 October 1982, issued a statement in which it made clear the damages suffered by the agricultural sector because of the Israeli invasion. For example, the destruction of water canals of the Litani River, eroding of vast areas of arable land, and inundating the markets with Israeli agricultural products, which has led to a slump of local crops and the farmers being heavily burdened with debt.

Jamal Sufi al-Din, representative of the citrus growers in Lebanon, submitted a memorandum to the Office of the Presidency dated 28 October 1982, in which he demanded a ban on the entry of citrus goods into Lebanese markets, lest that cause a slump with regard to local crops.

It is well known that the annual citrus production in Lebanon is estimated at 450,000 tons, i.e., the equivalent of 800 million pounds. The sale of this production is distributed under the following percentages: Lebanese market, 25 percent; Syrian market, 45 percent; Gulf markets, 30 percent.

In its statement addressed to the people of the Jebel, the National Movement in al-Kurah warned about the negative consequences of the Israeli economic invasion, since "not insignificant amounts of salt, oils and other Israeli products have been introduced into northern Lebanon, which will most certainly result in a slump for local production."

The policy of economic normalization, which Israel is using as a spearhead for the full normalization of relations with Lebanon, perhaps in the near future, makes us wonder about the gaps existing in the components of the Lebanese economy, through which Israel has easily been able to penetrate Lebanese markets. It also makes us wonder about the dangers of possible peaceful relations on the Lebanese economy. It is self-evident that any thorough examination of the future of the Lebanese economy, in light of the changing political conditions in the area, which have an indisputedly peaceful goal, forces a review of the past, as an introduction to an understanding of the current developments that formed the recent events in Lebanon, including the basic impetus.

II. Components of the Lebanese Economy

Prior to independence, the Lebanese economy chiefly depended on agriculture and trades. Industry accomplished relative growth during World War II, in order to satisfy the country's consumer requirements, which were impossible to import due to the circumstances of the war. The period following independence was marked by rapid economic growth, as a result of the expansion of the services sector, "which became one of the most important production sectors after the adoption of a group of measures. The most important were: freedom of foreign currency, 1948; banking secrecy, 1956; joint account, 1961."⁸ However, the basic causes for this change were mostly abroad; some propitious, regional conditions prevailed. The most important were: "The Palestinian disaster in 1948, and the ensuing breakdowns in terms of the human element, capital and a cheap work force, the switching of Arab commerce from the port of Jaffa to the port of Beirut, the influx of oil revenues into Lebanon from the Arab Gulf countries, the migration of capital, as a result of political and economic changes in certain Arab countries, and finally, the presence of a liberal system, which does not limit the movement of funds, nor harm them with high taxes."⁹ Thus Lebanon's role was established as intermediary between the western capitalist market and the internal Arab market. The most important principal components were defined as follows: "A free economy based on individual initiative, in which the private sector leads the public sector. In fact, the services sector controls two-thirds of the national income."¹⁰ "This direction has remained firm since World War II, since the services sector is based on banking, trade, tourism, seeking cures, education and the activities of foreign firms in Lebanon."¹¹ However, this rapid economic growth carried in its wake the seeds of its weakness. The services sector's profits subject to decisions adopted abroad, and not the result of decisions made internally. This has led to the exposure of the Lebanese economy and an increased shortfall in its trade balance, as a result of its dependence on foreign demand. There was an overwhelming sensitivity to domestic and foreign developments and, accordingly, it was subjected to a series of crises, of which the Interbank crisis in the middle 60's was the most dangerous.

Despite the fact that the supports of the Lebanese economy, which were prevalent before the recent civil war, have continued after the war, it is undeniable that the war has left deep scars on the Lebanese economic role within the economies of the Arab countries. Lebanon was incapable of effective participation in Arab financial investment, due to the provocative correlation between the timing of the outbreak of the civil war and the influx of Arab cash surpluses ready for investment. Lebanon "at the beginning of 1975, was the one Arab country more qualified than any other to effectively and directly participate in managing the huge Arab funds resulting from the oil profits. However, the war broke out at the time when the financial surpluses began to enter the treasuries of the oil states in a rapidly escalating fashion, that is to say, approximately a year after the measurable rise in oil prices. Therefore, we believe that there is a provocatively suspicious, time correlation between the timing of the war in Lebanon and the beginning of the escalation in the size of cash profits in the Arab oil states."¹²

Using approximately the same words, Dr Muhammad 'Attullah says: "The onset of the Lebanese incidents coincided with the huge rise in oil prices after the 1973 war. Therefore, Lebanese skills migrated to the oil nations, who used their surplus funds for investment projects in their countries. The migration was not restricted to individuals, but rather, included organizations, especially in the area of contractors, engineering and studies."¹³ How did Lebanon maintain its economic balance in light of the bloody events?

The majority of economic experts agree that there were two main factors behind the steadfastness of the Lebanese economy during the past 8 years:

1. The financial remittances of the Lebanese emigrants.

2. The funds being sent from abroad to finance the Lebanese war. The Lebanese balance of payments recorded a surplus that covered the shortfall in the trade balance, since emigres' remittances constitute a basic prop for the national income. Emigrants remitted at least a third of their savings to Lebanon, but this does not mean that Lebanon maintained the economic activity that it had in the period preceding the Lebanese incidents. The annual report of the Bank of Lebanon, which is almost the only official document to be issued after the incidents, and which contains the most accurate information about the economic situation, acknowledges this fact. It reported that the economic developments, during the past several years, could be described as slow growth, with increasing intensity of inflation and unemployment. "In light of the security tensions and disruptions of the political climate that are unsuited for growth, the Lebanese economy has been unable even today to regain the level of activity that it had in 1975."¹⁴ From this brief review of the components of the Lebanese economy, it is easy to clarify the downfall of the phrase "special position" for Lebanon within the Arab group. This phrase, which was aimed at keeping Lebanon clear of unpopular regional disputes, went head over heels during the civil war, so that Lebanon was far from the Arab economic developments at a time when its soil became an arena for the Arab-Israeli dispute. It also becomes clear that the Lebanese economy is principally dependent on the Arab states. They are the primary importers of Lebanese agriculture, industrial and consumer products, which are indispensable for our services and the basic source of capital. A study of the foreign markets for Lebanese exports makes it clear to us that two-thirds of these exports are sent to the Arab nations. The Lebanese trade balance suffers a shortfall with all the nations of the world, with the exception of the Arab states.

III. The Dangers of Peaceful Relations

Any defect in relations with the Arab states, especially from the type that might result from Lebanon's signing any form of peaceful relations with Israel, would have disastrous results on the economic situation in Lebanon. The Israeli market would not be a substitute for the Arab markets because of a very basic reason, which is that Israel itself is looking for foreign markets for its industrial and agricultural products. On the contrary, Israel is eager and has the necessary qualifications, to steal Lebanon's position of offering services to the Arab world. What is to prevent the port of Haifa from re-playing the role that it had in the 40's, as the commercial port for the Arab East on

the Mediterranean Sea? It has already been partially restored during the peace or capitulation that is occurring in this area.

Dr Ilyas Saba believes that, with regard to Lebanon's Arab economic role, "the most important indicator is the kind of political settlement of the Middle East problem and the economic meaning of this settlement." Saba believes that "the worst thing that could happen to Lebanon's economic role in the Arab group would be that the settlement of the Middle East crisis include normal trade relations between the Arab states and Israel. I have previously said publicly, in the middle 70's, that the interests of Lebanon and the Arab states, were without doubt, concealed in rejecting economic conciliation with Israel, no matter what the elements of political settlement with it."*

There is a certain danger in the long run, represented in the economic role that Israel is striving for in the area. It is the role of a competitor, naturally, with the traditional role that Lebanon has assumed up until now. It is well known that Lebanon has benefitted economically from the establishment of the state of Israel. The books of Michel Shayha, during the 40's and 50's, have reflected the depth of the Lebanese bourgeoisie fear regarding the establishment of conditions that would permit Israel a prominent economic role in this area of the world. If Lebanese bourgeois circles expressed their satisfaction, initially, with the Israeli aggression, believing that the Israeli army would retrace its steps as soon as they were saved from the "foreigners," the following days would prove, in all probability, that these considerations were inappropriate. The Lebanese bourgeoisie would lose a part of their economic role in Lebanon and in the area.¹⁵

If, in the past, Lebanon has benefited from the state of Arab-Israeli aggression, then perhaps it will be the biggest loser from any peace between the Arabs and Israel.

*On 18 March 1975, Dr Ilyas Saba delivered a lecture in Kuwait, at the headquarters of the Graduates Association, under the title "Economic Aspects of the Peaceful Settlement." The text of the lecture was published in the magazine ARAB STUDIES, issue No 2, 1975. This lecture still retains its current importance. As proof of its importance, we refer to the fact that it is the source of a group of press articles; for example, Emil Khouiri's article: From Political Conciliation to Economic Conciliation, AL-NAHAR AL-'ARABI WA AL-DUWALI, 23 April 1979, and the article, Israel Plans to Take Over Arab Markets, AL-TALI'AH, Kuwait, 28 April, 1982, without signature.

FOOTNOTES

1. AL-SAFIR 8/7/1982
2. Same Source, 11/12/1982
3. From "Hasad Al-Ayam," AL-'AMAL, 2/11/1982
4. "Economic Organizations Sound the Bell of Danger," AL-KAFAH AL-'ARABI, 10/25/1982

5. AL-NAHAR, 8/10/1982
6. Zahi al-Hindi, "Economic Normalization" BEIRUT AL-MASA', 11/6/1982
7. Lebanese Industry report, AL-SAFIR, 11/7/1982
8. Hisham al-Bisat, "Inflation, and the Economic Effects," AL-NAHAR, 2/19/1979
9. Yusef 'Abdullah Sayagh and Muhammad 'Attullah, "Fixed Theory Regarding the Lebanese Economy," Beirut, Dar al-Tali'yah, 1966
10. Hisham al-Bisat, op. cit.
11. Interview with Muhammad 'Attullah, chairman of the Redevelopment Council, AL-LIWA', 5/17/1982
12. Interview with Dr. Ilyas Saba, AL-USBU' AL-'ARABI, 3/27/1978
13. Interview with Muhammad 'Attullah, op. cit.
14. Annual Report of the Bank of Lebanon, published by AL-NAHAR and AL-SAFIR, 1/1/1982
15. Kamal Hamadan, "Economic Dimensions of the Israeli Invasion," AL-SAFIR, 9/8/1982

7005

CSO: 4404/194

EGYPT'S GHALI TALKS TO JOURNALISTS IN B'ABDA

NC101420 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1215 GMT 10 Feb 83

[Text] In the Presidential Palace, President Shaykh Amin al-Jumayyil has received Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs Dr Butrus Ghali and Usamah al-Baz, who were accompanied by Salah Zaki.

The two Egyptian envoys conveyed a message from President Mubarak to President al-Jumayyil. They then discussed for over 1 hour matters affecting Lebanon and the area.

President al-Jumayyil gave Ghali and Al-Baz a reply message for the Egyptian president.

Egyptian minister Dr Ghali spoke to the journalists in B'abda Palace after a peripheral meeting with the coordinator of political operations in the negotiations, Ghassan Tuwayni, Dr Ghali said:

[Begin recording] In fact, President Husni Mubarak had charged me with conveying a message to President Amin al-Jumayyil. The message contains an analysis of the tour which President Husni Mubarak made to the United States, Canada, Britain and France where he defended the legitimate rights of the Lebanese people, the independence of Lebanon, the need for the territorial integrity of Lebanon and the need for the withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanon immediately.

[Question] Mr Minister. It is observed that the first statement President Husni Mubarak made after his meeting with President Reagan was related to Lebanon. It was reiterated in political and press circles that the Egyptian president's tour was--if we can use the expression--a Lebanese tour. What are the most important results of the tour which we can present to Lebanon public opinion?

[Dr Ghali] In fact, the most important results of the visit or tour is more contacts with the U.S. side so that it will move as a full partner to find a speedy solution to the Lebanese issue and to achieve complete withdrawal of all the foreign forces from Lebanese territory.

[Question] Since Egypt is aware of the whole situation in Lebanon and in the area, when does it expect the foreign forces to withdraw from all of Lebanese territory?

[Dr Ghali] We hope that the withdrawal will take place as soon as possible.

[Question] Mr Minister: What role can be expected that Egypt will play to have the foreign forces withdrawn from Lebanon?

[Dr Ghali] Contacts and consultations with the Lebanese side are continuous. Through diplomatic contacts, we hope to help on the diplomatic level in achieving this aim.

[Question] Has President al-Jumayyil given you a message for President Mubarak?

[Dr Ghali] Yes. He has given me a message for President Mubarak.

[Question] Can you (?divulge) the contents of this message?

[Dr Ghali] I cannot divulge the contents of the message before I present it to the addressee. [end recording]

It is worth noting that foreign minister Dr Elie Salim, accompanied by the Iraqi charge d'affaires, went to the airport to receive Dr Ghali and Al-Baz but they immediately proceeded to the Republican Palace in B'abda as soon as they alighted from the plane. However, they were received by Protocol Director Hikmat 'Awwad and Egyptian Charge D'affaires Salah Zaki.

From the Republican Palace, Ghali and Al-Baz proceeded to the government house where they met with Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and briefed him on Egyptian President Mubarak's discussions during his American and European tour. Ghali and Al-Baz then left for the Foreign Ministry, accompanied by Salah Zaki. There they met with Minister Salim, who later held a banquet in their honor.

CSO: 4400/198

AL-BAZ ON BEIRUT MEETINGS, DEPARTURE FOR CAIRO

NC101848 Beirut Voice of Lebanon in Arabic 1715 GMT 10 Feb 83

[Excerpts] President Amin al-Jumayyil gave Dr Butrus Ghali, the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs and Usamah al-Baz, the advisor to the Egyptian president on political affairs, a reply message for President Husni Mubarak. Minister Ghali declined to disclose its contents. [passage omitted]

Dr Ghali and Al-Baz also visited [former] Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam. They had a general discussion.

The two envoys left Beirut for Cairo via Amman at 1900 [1700 GMT] tonight.

Proir to their departure, Usamah al-Baz told the Central News Agency that the time factor is important in achieving the withdrawals and that absolute priority must be given to finding a settlement of the Lebanese crisis. Al-Baz added: The pressure which the United States is exercising in connection with Lebanon is a test of the U.S. ability to solve the problems in the area.

Al-Baz pointed out that there are three urgent problems. The first is the Israeli occupation of Lebanon and its negative implications. The second is the resumption of the negotiations to solve the Middle East problem in its entirety. The third is the Iraqi-Iranian war now that it has turned into a war of attrition. He explained that time is a vital factor in the area, that the United States has only weeks to find a solution alone and that the world society cannot give Washington indefinite time to find a settlement alone. However, he added that the United States understands the conditions and that the United States has a big potential to exert pressure on Israel.

Al-Baz went on: In its current negotiations with Lebanon, Israel is trying to obtain a solution most suitable to itself through laying down impossible conditions. This is a method of negotiations aimed at influencing the Lebanese and American sides.

CSO: 4400/198

SPEAKER AL-AS'AD ADDRESSES MOROCCO CONFERENCE

NC092057 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1701 GMT 9 Feb 83

[Excerpts] The Arab Parliamentary Union Council resumed its work this morning in the Conference Hall of the Rabat Hilton Hotel. The session was held at 1030 local time. The council heard the speeches that were made by the heads of delegations. [passage omitted]

His excellency speaker Kamil al-As'ad, head of the Lebanese Parliamentary Delegation, then made a speech. He began saying: Mr Chairman, Esteemed Colleagues: The truth, and doing justice to this truth, first of all behooves us to note with admiration and pride the constructive and efficacious role that the Kingdom of Morocco is performing in this phase to support the Arab cause and Arab rights and to achieve a just peace under the leadership of its king, His Majesty King Hussan II--and we pin great hope on the initiatives that he makes and on the stances that he takes in this respect. [passage omitted]

Mr Chairman, Venerable Colleagues: I thank those colleagues who have spoken before me for having expressed good sentiments--one way or another--when they paused at Lebanon's ordeal. I believe that this subject deserves more concentrated and analysis to achieve the requisite serious stand. The reason is that in view of the way the Lebanese issue has developed following the present Israeli invasion, this issue now imposes itself--from a purely pan-Arab premise--as the one that takes precedence over all other issues. This fact would still hold true, even if the Lebanese issue is forwarded to your conference or not. In keeping with realism, the Lebanese issue is the fulcrum of the Arab cause and of the challenge that is being posed to all the Arabs. Furthermore, the whole Arab destiny, and that of every Arab state individually, depends--through Lebanon's fate--on the correct confrontation of this challenge for the following reasons:

1. The Zionist design, which is aimed at imposing hegemony on the Arab world through the implantation of contradicting and conflicting entities throughout the Arab world, has used Lebanon as a bridge to cross to the fulfillment of these objectives. This design relies on Arab strife in the land of Lebanon, seeks to fan the fire of this strife and wants to use it in creating internal and intrinsic dissessions.

2. The fall of the formula of the one and unified Lebanon through expansionism and final occupation, through internal fragmentation or through both, is the basic and possibly the only way to dismember the Arab area through the creation of semisectarian entities in it. This state of affairs would guarantee Israel absolute and permanent domination of the whole Arab area. Furthermore, at the same time this state of affairs would constitute the means to undermine in a final manner a just solution for the Middle East conflict. From this premise, support for the fateful Arab causes and for the Palestinian issue itself--as the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict--dictates the inadmissability of sidestepping the Lebanese issue. On the contrary, support for these causes makes it imperative to face this Lebanese issue as the sole and inevitable means for saving the whole Arab destiny. [passage omitted]

At this point, I cannot but refer to the response that has been shown by this Arab Parliamentary Union to our responsible forwarding of the [Lebanese] issue. [passage omitted]

Gentlemen: It is our duty to inform you that what is now taking place in the land of Lebanon and that what Israel is implementing in the hinterland is going beyond the occupation of land, to prove beyond any argument that Israel continues to fulfill its objective of shattering and dismembering Lebanon, if not liquidating Lebanon. [passage omitted] This is a coercive normalization and, in the present situation, the Lebanese authority [does not] wield any means for warding off and precluding this normalization.

Through these facts, produced by the sequence of events, we declare that Lebanon is now locked in a close and dangerous race with time. The reason is that continuing to turn in the present exhaustive whirlpool endangers the Lebanese entity and all its pillars and its very existence. If any pan-Arab awakening is to come about, then it must come about immediately, before it is too late. This is in addition to the fact that since the time factor serves Israel's objectives on the ground, this time factor also puts a trump card into Israel's hand on the international arena. To the time factor can also be added the expected changes on which Israel is wagering. Furthermore, while waiting for these changes to occur, Israel continues to disavow and to challenge the UN resolutions.

Esteemed Colleagues: On behalf of my colleagues--the members of the Lebanese delegation who represent the various areas, sects, groups and trends in Lebanon--and on my own behalf, I declare that the Lebanese people are aware of the dimensions of the conspiracy and that they are determined to confront it. I also declare that the government, which has emanated from the Lebanese people's will and which now expresses their aspirations, adheres to this stand. In Lebanon, we are working with all our power and potential to end the nightmare of the occupation and to bring about the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 508 and 509--and both resolutions call for the withdrawal of all the non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon. While we work and seek to ensure implementation of these resolutions, we keep in sight two basic and consistent objectives: The first objective is to refuse to accept blackmail and bargaining over the achievement of any partial withdrawal of

the enemy, regardless of the pressure being exerted and of the intensity of the tragedy. This is because the Lebanese stand insists on laying down a timetable for a simultaneous and comprehensive withdrawal from Lebanon--down to the very last inch of the homeland's soil. The reason is that we realize that acceptance of the separation and division of withdrawals--in a manner far removed from a comprehensive and prior timetable--will lead to falling into the Israeli trap that is aimed at slicing off the territory and water of the south--and this is Israel's chronic expansionist aim. This in turn would turn southern Lebanon into a usurped land to be added to Palestine and to the other Arab territories that were occupied in 1967. Needless to say that Lebanon--in its spiritual formula and with its demographic structure and in contrast to all the other Arab states--cannot survive, taking identity and entity into account, if any part of its territory is sliced off.

When it comes to the second goal, it is one of absolute adherence to comprehensive national sovereignty at any cost.

This is an act of faith stemming from our national conviction and emanating from our adherence to national dignity away from any formula deriving from the stand of this or that party. In view of these national and pan-Arab realities, Lebanon addresses itself to the Arabs demanding that they support and back Lebanon by taking a unified and responsible stand. Such a stand would be one of intensifying efforts and using all potentials at the various levels to induce Israel to withdraw from all Lebanese territory and to achieve the imposition of Lebanese legitimacy on all Lebanese territory--not one of hamstringing Lebanon or paralyzing its capabilities, regardless of premises, positions and gains. [passage omitted]

CSO: 4400/198

KHURI CONFERS WITH NETHERLANDS FOREIGN MINISTER

NC112136 Beirut Domestic Service in Arabic 1900 GMT 11 Feb 83

[Text] National Defense Minister 'Isam Khuri received at 1530 [1330 GMT] Netherlands Foreign Minister Van Den Broek. The meeting took place at the Lebanese defense minister's office in the Defense Ministry and was attended by the Netherlands ambassador in Lebanon, some of the accompanying delegation members and Col Emile Lahhud, chief of the military room in the National Defense Ministry.

The discussion concentrated on the role of the emergency forces in the south, since Netherlands participates in these forces, and the possibility of giving these forces more powers and expanding their area of deployment. The meeting touched as well upon the connection between the Lebanese-Israeli-U.S. negotiations and the position of the peacekeeping force in the south.

Minister Khuri affirmed on his part that it is not necessary to bind the future of the emergency forces in the south to the negotiations. He added that Lebanon is trying to restore its unique role in the area and in the world and that the Lebanese unanimously insist on restoring their sovereignty over all their territories. He pointed out that the Lebanese army has achieved much progress in rebuilding and strengthening itself in terms of personnel and equipment.

The Netherlands foreign minister expressed his government's readiness to work under the UN flag in south Lebanon. He said his government is ready to support Lebanon, first, in its independent capacity, secondly, in its capacity as a member of the United Nations, and thirdly, in its capacity as a participant in the international emergency forces in the south.

He affirmed that his government is ready to accept the principle of giving the international forces in the south a more effective role in coordination with the countries participating in these forces.

CSO: 4400/198

DEPUTIES FAVOR TREATY WITH UNITED STATES

NC112052 Beirut AS-SAFIR in Arabic 9 Feb 83 p 2

[Text] The U.S. stance at the Lebanese-U.S.-Israeli negotiations and the "possibility of concluding a treaty with Washington" were the subject of comments by several deputies yesterday as follows:

Deputy Pierre Hilu welcomes the conclusion of a security treaty with the United States "which is the only hope Lebanon has of reaching a political solution in this critical phase through which the homeland is passing."

Deputy 'Abd al-Latif Baydun says: "I am among those favoring cooperation with the United States to deliver ourselves from the tragedies and occupations in which we are fumbling."

Deputy Rashid al-Khuri believes "that the United States wants to please Israel and the Arabs at the same time and that it is difficult for it to accept what we ask for without the approval of the quarters concerned. Therefore I believe that it is difficult to achieve this, but it is not impossible."

Deputy Yusuf Hammud says: After years of destruction, evacuation and ruin, we are entitled to live in this peaceful country and bring up our children under its clear skies in freedom, security and stability.

CSO: 4400/198

CURRENT LABOR MARKET CONDITIONS AFFECTING REBUILDING

Beirut AL-IQTISAD WA AL-A'MAL in Arabic No 44, 10 Feb 83 pp 58-60

[Interview with Fu'ad al-Khazin, Head of the Contractors' Association, and Ahmad Satitiyah, Head of the al-Shuwayfat Industrial Group; date and place not specified]

[Text] One of the most worrisome issues to both officials and businessmen is the serious shortfall in the labor market which, if it continues could obstruct the process of rebuilding and economic development in general. Events have created gaps in the labor market that will be difficult to remedy and the Israeli invasion added a number of other negative factors which further complicated the situation. There are people who assert that the labor market will again gradually become normal over 3 years while others feel that it will take time, possibly as long as 5 years, for it to regain its normal course.

Whether or not it quickly becomes normal again, there is a question being asked now: Is the labor market in its present state qualified for the reconstruction phase?

A number of specific factors can be summed up to portray the situation:

The labor market in Lebanon is not consolidated because of the difficulties of movement from area to area and because of the psychological barriers created by the last 8 years while the market is unified with Arab labor markets, supplying them with their needs for labor. The Arab markets are expected to continue to absorb Lebanese labor and the new generations of workers since they are quite often assured of better working conditions and training.

The construction sector, which is directly concerned with reconstruction, is facing a major shortage of all types of labor, trained or untrained, because the Syrian workforce has returned home, it having been the primary workforce in the construction sector, and it will be difficult to replace over the short term. The construction sector depended on Syrian labor and a number of industries depended on the same workforce, partially or entirely or some of both, and so the absence of Syrian workers has had an impact on industry as well.

The agricultural sector is suffering a severe shortage prompting some landowners to give up farming their land.

Lebanon is suffering from a shortage of trained administrators and top management personnel in general in various fields because the Gulf countries have attracted them.

Lebanese labor has concentrated on specific technical work requiring skilled or semi-skilled labor or expertise and half the trained workforce, about 100,000 people, is now working abroad, particularly in the Gulf. Unless they return, new firms and foreign companies returning to Beirut will encounter difficulties in finding suitable local personnel.

New generations of Lebanese who annually enter the labor market will encounter difficulties in getting trained in technical jobs requiring skills because of the lack of training institutions and the migration abroad of the cream of the Lebanese workforce, the segment which used to train new entries in the labor market, estimated at 25,000 persons a year, most of whom prefer to move abroad for training and employment and refuse to fill the shortfall in the Lebanese labor market, either because of the lack of training, because of what they view as "menial jobs," or because of the security situation.

To illustrate the gaps in the labor market, some estimate the number of workers who have emigrated abroad during the years from 1975 to 1980 at about 300,000 persons, according to statistics of the Ministry of Labor, that is, about 60,000 a year or more than twice the number of new workers absorbed by the market during the same period.

These are the main factors. Here are two interviews with businessmen which will shed more light on some aspects of the market:

[Eng Fu'ad al-Khazin, head of the Contractors' Association]

[Question] How has the labor market been during the past 8 years?

[Answer] Suffice it to say that events of the past 8 years have led to a drain of skills abroad. It may be self evident to state that economic activity in Lebanon depends on human resources, not on oil, raw materials, etc. Possibly the loss of a major portion of these resources has been a body blow to Lebanon during these events.

Over and above that, the events, which caused the drain, the difficulty of movement, the transfer of firms from one area to another, the complete destruction of firms and homes, etc., created a psychological situation on the part of the Lebanese workforce which reduced its productivity and creativity and which caused it to live in a state of constant fear. It is perhaps the number two problem created by the 8 years of turmoil. However, this state will disappear for good and quickly when everyone is sure that the time of war has ended, not to return. In any case, the migration of the workforce abroad was not totally bad. There are persons who have emigrated and been trained abroad to be successful and skilled administrators and workers. I'll give you an example: The contractors who emigrated abroad were tremendously successful there, particularly in Saudi Arabia. They were able to realize their dreams by getting involved in huge projects not present here. They acquired expertise and absorbed

modern technology in the field of construction. Even more, they formed contracting firms which were they to come to Lebanon--and they will in any event--would render a major service to the job of reconstruction. Their emigration afforded them opportunities not available here to achieve their ambitions and it is clear that it afforded similar opportunities to the Lebanese workforce.

[Question] Do you believe that given its present status the Lebanese workforce is now qualified for the process of reconstruction?

[Answer] I believe that it is to a certain degree. I can say that the task of reconstruction will not begin on a broad scale until the Lebanese state extends its sovereignty over every inch of Lebanese territory. Then all factors which have created crises in the labor market will disappear and new generations of young people will find jobs on various levels in the task of rebuilding and the labor market will increase vigorously. Also security will permit the departed workforce to return and to participate in the rebuilding process.

I would like to say that peace and security will give the labor market a chance to restabilize in the desired fashion. However, at the same time, I feel that the Lebanese firms and workforce might not alone be qualified to carry out major projects. In my opinion, international companies will have to be used to make the necessary technical and economic studies and to work with local companies in carrying out the projects, participation which is quite essential for proper implementation. I would stress the need for cooperation between Lebanese companies and firms and international companies which are distinguished for their broad expertise in the fields of modern construction, for their specialities and for their international reputation which will inspire trust and reassure sources of financing that the loans and aid will be properly paid. In return, the Lebanese companies will give the international companies local knowhow and their creative capabilities for solving problems and quick work. This cooperation between the Lebanese and foreign contracting companies will not only make the knowhow and administrative affairs of each complement the other but will also provide a complete workforce.

[Question] Do you think that the Lebanese workforce which has emigrated during the events will resettle where it is or will return to its country when peace settles over all parts of Lebanon?

[Answer] I have no doubt that the return of peace to Lebanon will encourage a large number of expatriate Lebanese to return to their homeland. Employers and owners of companies who were forced to emigrate and to set up offices and centers in Cyprus, Geneva and other cities of Europe encountered many difficulties and burdens and have not so far found a better city than Beirut providing them with services, communications and all working conditions at a reasonable cost and with the necessary speed. This applies to the foreign companies which use to operate in Lebanon and which had to leave because of the events. With regard to the expatriate managers and workers, they will certainly return. If they left because of the breakdown of security, security has been or almost has been restored. If the reason was the high pay abroad, the pay of managers, professionals and skilled workers, and even unskilled workers, in Lebanon is

considered high and good. However, the return of the expatriate workforce might not be enough. It is assumed that a broad and national labor policy will be laid out providing the workforce on all levels--managers, technicians and skilled and semi-skilled workers--according to the requirements of various sectors by the establishment of vocational schools and the setting up of training programs directing students toward the thirsty sectors.

The graduation of new batches of labor does not depend on the state alone but on the companies and institutions to play their role as well, particularly in organizing field training courses and missions abroad as part of a plan and in accordance with the will and determination to improve methods of work and to increase production.

With regard to foreign labor, particularly in the field of contracting, most were from Syria. The contractors brought in Egyptian and Indian workers during the events to work on projects. In the future, if the Syrian workers cannot return, Asian workers can be brought in, in addition to the Egyptians and others. It must be pointed out that there are few Lebanese workers, they being from the south and 'Akar.

[Question] Do you think that the recent security measures will have the needed effect in stopping the flow of Arab and foreign labor?

[Answer] The authorities have not less nor no more interest in the security situation than the interest of any country of the world in their security situations, particularly with regard to regulating the entry of foreign labor. On this level, our situation is no different from that of any country from the standpoint of applying measures, starting with visas from embassies abroad, confirming identities, making examinations and selecting nationalities from those creating no sensitivity in connection with the security situation.

[Question] What do you expect with regard to the labor market in Lebanon?

[Answer] I am optimistic that the labor market will overcome its present difficulties and at an early date return to its earlier normal condition. However, the country's need for reconstruction could increase the burden on the labor market given the need of a large number of sectors for labor of various types. The vacuum can be filled by foreign labor of various Asian and Arab nationalities. However, the important thing is to lay out a 5-year plan for projects of the public sector. This will enable all sectors to draft operative plans, including plans for providing labor, both from local and outside sources, which is suitable for the requirements of the 5-year projects. It is important for businessmen to have a clear perspective so as to prepare themselves well for the next phase, getting rid of the element of surprise and replacing it with the element of sound planning by the institution. It is no longer permissible for the state, as had been the case before, to use an ad lib approach in projects; the time has come for 5-years plans.

[Ahmad Satitiyah, Head of the al-Shuwayfat Industrial Group]

[Question] How has the labor market stood up during the years of the events?

[Answer] After the events erupted in 1975, serious changes took place in the labor market in Lebanon, changes which can be summarized as follows:

1. A large number of technicians, skilled workers and managing engineers and a large part of the upper segment of the workforce emigrated abroad, whether to look for new work after their jobs came to an end or out of fear of the deteriorating security situation.
2. Lebanese labor migrated or was forced to migrate from area to area causing a shortage in one area and a surplus of workers in another.
3. The war and the migration created a difficult psychological state which made labor unproductive and this caused great harm to economic activity and development.
4. This gap brought economic crises in several fields prompting some establishments to close their doors or to cut production and this generally increased economic recession. It should be noted that there were leaps in economic activity during periods of relative calm followed by slumps because of renewed incidents, as happened in 1978, 1981 and 1982.

[Question] Do you think that the Israeli invasion and its results had a negative or positive effect on the market?

[Answer] The Israeli invasion added new negative factors to those created by the events of the past 8 years. The industrial and construction had depended on Syrian workers to a well known extent. Now Syrian workers do not dare return to Lebanon. The problem is that replacement foreign labor is not as skilled as the Syrian workers nor as productive. This has raised pay in the construction sector two or three times.

[Question] Do you think then that labor market is unprepared for the reconstruction process?

[Answer] If you can find only with great difficulty and for high wages a worker to repair a house holed by a missile, how can you find huge numbers of workers to reconstruct the commercial downtown area for example.

[Question] What solutions do you propose for the labor market crisis?

[Answer] Quick solutions must be found which are consistent with the policy of returning legitimate authority to all Lebanese territory and restoring stability and security. There should also be efforts to provide the following prerequisites:

1. Reconsolidation of the labor market. In my opinion, this goal will take at least 3 years after establishment of legitimate authority over all areas. It is not easy to overcome the psychological barriers.
2. Establishing a labor policy aimed at attracting Lebanese professionals and skilled workers working abroad. In my opinion, their return can only be

accomplished after authority is established and it is confirmed that the causes of the Lebanese crisis have been eliminated. I believe that for Lebanon to recover its skilled personnel is an operation that will take 3 to 5 years.

3. Facilitating the return of non-Lebanese workers, particularly Syrian, is a fundamental and vital question because those workers are not now able to return. Many sectors are living in a state of partial paralysis while the construction sector is living in a state of almost total paralysis. Therefore, there must be efforts to regain this labor but as part of realistic regulations, not making the cost of a work permit, for example, 7,000 pounds, nor including the bond system for workers.

8389

CSO: 4404/216

BEIRUT'S ROLE AS 'OFFSHORE' FINANCIAL CENTER DISCUSSED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 305, 25 Dec 82 p 35

[Article: "Beirut Considers the 'Offshore' Option"]

[Text] The signs of relaxation in Lebanon have caused renewed attention to be given to Beirut by many in the Arab World and abroad. Lebanon now seems to be in demand again, as does Beirut, as a regional financial center, as evidenced by new and increasing concern in Arab and international circles with the progress of the Lebanese crisis and efforts to find a solution for it. Businessmen and financiers have been closely following the Lebanese market and the trend of some recent Saudi and Kuwaiti investments in banking and hotel projects. Negotiations are also underway for similar deals.

The Lebanese government as well as the Lebanese banking community feel that Lebanon must make the same continual effort to ensure the military withdrawals and establish true stability. Thinking about the methods that will allow it to play the role that is expected of it is now being done aloud. There is a strong basis for this role, according to informed individuals. In fact, by virtue of the events and the Lebanese banking experience abroad, it has become stronger than before, but it still lacks a complete legal framework and organizational machinery capable of absorbing the changes of the last eight years. Lebanon has to a great extent experienced these changes only marginally, and it has not benefited much from them and has not reacted to them as it must.

The most important question currently being discussed in financial and banking circles in Lebanon, the reverberations of which have reached the government itself, is: Will Beirut introduce an "offshore" banking region similar to those in Bahrain and Singapore as a condition for assuming the role of a regional financial center, or are conditions still not ripe for this development?

The general tendency seems to be clearly inclined toward adopting the idea of foreign banking units. This became apparent during a recent ceremony by the Lebanese Banking Association in honor of the minister of finance, Dr 'Adil Humayyah. The speeches given by the minister and the chairman of the association, Dr As'ad Suwayya, showed that there is mutual understanding between the banks and the government on the idea of an "offshore"

system and on the necessity for amending the commercial legislation to authorize and regulate the establishment of holding companies in Lebanon. It is understood that the introduction of these developments is currently possible with draft legislation in light of the emergency powers given to the government by Parliament for legislation in various areas, including banking and finance.

It should be noted that the "offshore" idea was and still is a subject of debate in Lebanese banking circles. However, it has gained some disreputability recently as a result of pressure by existing banks, particularly the Lebanese banks which strengthened their positions during the war. These banks did not like the idea of opening the door to new banks, which, in their view, would cause the market to become even more overcrowded than it already is, would cause sharply increased competition among the banks and would cause a severe shortage of qualified administrative personnel who the banks would be competing to attract with various reasonable and unreasonable incentives.

According to these circles introducing the "offshore" system will strengthen Lebanon's position and attract new banks without creating competition between them and the existing banks since the offshore banks will be forbidden by law to operate in the local market by receiving deposits, granting loans or carrying out other banking operations.

Nevertheless, there are those in the banking circles who feel that it is necessary to proceed slowly and study every aspect of the subject, particularly the pressure the "offshore" system would put on the banking labor market in Lebanon. Among those who recommend going slowly is Dr Salim al-Huss, the former prime minister, who introduced the idea of the free banking zone system which was authorized by law and became effective in 1977. Dr al-Huss believes that it is preferable to give the free banking zone system an opportunity to be applied under normal circumstances before any thought is given to developing it or broadening its scope since the purpose of the free banking zone system is to attract deposits by non-residents by exempting them from all taxes. The law made no provision for authorizing foreign banking units.

In any case, whether Beirut chooses to establish foreign banking units like Bahrain, or begins to apply the free banking zone or some other idea, Lebanon's banks now seem confident that the time has in fact come to reassert their important role in the region. The Lebanese want to emphasize that this reappearance will not be at the expense of Bahrain or anyone else, because the field is big enough for everyone, and because Bahrain will continue to have its own unique advantages and Beirut will have its own unique advantages.

9123

CSO: 4404/183

LEBANESE BANKING ASSOCIATION ELECTIONS VIEWED

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic No 305, 25 Dec 82 p 43

[Article: "A Trend Toward 'Lebanization' Is Seen in Lebanese Banking Association Elections"]

[Text] The Lebanese Banking Association [LBA] elections were marked by competition, Lebanonization and a role for new banks. Observers are looking to June when election of the association's president will be held.

The subsidiary elections held by the LBA on 9 December 1982 contained new indications which call for analysis. They revealed some trends which had been hidden, the dimensions of which, as a direct result of the elections, might be overlooked. The following banks won in the election: the Saudi-Lebanese Amalgamated Bank (Mu'man Murad); Bank di Roma (Franco Moriti); the Lebanese-French Bank (Farid Rufayil); Capital Trust (Antoine Shadir); First City Bank (Leonard Mayster); Al-Biqa' Bank (Elie Fakhuri). The only one that lost in the elections was the Lebanese-Barzilian Bank (Leon Biloni).

The elections were a surprise to most observers for two reasons: first, because the association has followed the practice of rubber stamping everyone since 1977, and secondly because the battle is not worth competition. There were seven candidates for six seats. It was suggested that Mr Elie Fakhuri withdraw in favor of Biloni and Shadir on the basis that it has been the association's long-standing custom to have representation by the banking groups from America, Europe, France and the Arab countries.

Soon after the direct results of the elections one can pause at the following basic observations:

1. Ambition. The recent elections revealed that despite the traditional and customary lack of freedom in the electoral battles the bankers wanted competition. The tradition of rubber stamp approval which prevailed during the last five years seems to have been ended. This had been imposed by security considerations which do not permit banking personnel to engage in electoral battles. No sooner had security stabilized and a normal situation returned than a hidden desire to jump into battle emerged.

This is seen in the fact that all efforts failed to prevent one of the candidates from continuing because his withdrawal would ensure the rubber stamp approval for the six members whose terms extend to June 1984.

In the past, joint efforts by the banks used to overcome more complicated problems, and could remove more than one nomination. Recently, however, these efforts were unable to avoid an electoral battle which occurred contrary to all expectations.

2. Lebanization. Perhaps the most prominent trend to appear from the election was the inclination of the bankers to Lebanize the board of directors, not entirely, but to the greatest possible extent. If this trend is not apparent or obvious in view of its sensitive nature, indications of it did appear, and the shispered rumors which circulated shortly before the elections revealed the ideas that have begun to ripen in people's minds.

Shortly before the elections began some bankers inquired about the conditions for representation on the board of directors. The legal advisor explained that the distribution of the seats on the board according to groups was not stipulated by law but by custom and tradition that have been followed in the association for years.

Some thought that the banks' votes would perpetuate this distribution, and that as a result, competition would be confined to the three Lebanese candidates. However, the reality proved to be different. Several ballots bore the names of all the Lebanese banks and had the names of the foreign banks crossed off. In addition, some ballots bore fewer names than the number of candidates.

The fact is that there are signs that this trend is finding a favorable response in the banking community inasmuch as it has been seen openly for several years during elections for the board of directors. This trend toward Lebanization of the board of directors conicides with the growing call for the continued Lebanization of the banking sector. This view gained prominence during the events inasmuch as the Lebanese banks began to attract the greater share of deposits, assumed a large share of loans and have taken on a large percentage of employees.

However, a group of Lebanese bankers advises against going overboard in the Lebanization of the LBA's board of directors. In their opinion there is no justification for creating such distinctions lest sensibilities be offended leading to disruptions.

3. New banks. The elections produced another notable phenomenon. The blow which removed as members two important Lebanese bankers (representatives of the Lebanese Commercial Bank and the Byblos Bank, which are among the top 12 banks) was dealt by 2 small Lebanese banks, one of them quite new, having begun operations in late 1980.

Perhaps what this phenomenon reveals is that the new banks which were founded after 1977 in a climate filled with professional and various other challenges desire to assert their presence in some way on the banks' board of directors, taking away the monopoly on board seats held by the big banks.

The abstention of the big banks from their own candidacy for the recent elections may not be due to self-effacement, but is probably based on the conviction that these elections are not decisive because they will not alter the association's chairmanship or its vice-chairmanship in any way. They believe that the right time to jump into the electoral battle is next June when the membership of the six other banks--which includes four seats held by Lebanese banks--is scheduled to expire.

In any event, observers of the recent elections noticed that during the election eyes were turned toward next June when the battle for the association's chairmanship will be held. Some hold the view that the prominence of certain candidacies was related to the chairmanship of the association.

4. The entrance of the al-Biqa' Bank onto the banks' board of directors is the first instance of such representation by a purely local bank with no offices in the capital or its suburbs. The al-Biqa' Bank is one of very few banks whose activities are still limited to their original locality and have not gone on to establish a branch in Beirut. The regional representation on the association's board of directors has a special significance even if this distinction is not important in the banking world.

Of all these observations and considerations concerning the election losers, whoever they are, the most important one is the role that the LBA should play at this stage. The important thing is to determine the requirements and demands of this role, particularly after the LBA's chairman defined the scope of this role in a speech he gave at the luncheon banquet following the elections.

Perhaps the primary requirement is the need to reinforce the association's secretariat general with capable and trained personnel who will be able to prepare the necessary field studies.

9123

CSO: 4404/183

BRIEFS

STATE OF EMERGENCY ASSESSED--Brother Ibrahim Qulaylat, head of the independent Nasirite Movement-Al-Murabitun has warned the Lebanese Government about resorting to a state of emergency in the country, particularly under conditions of the current security imbalance between the two parts of the capital. Brother Qulaylat added that since the invasion, laws are being applied in the western part of the capital without a state of emergency being declared and that legitimacy is being spread in it by emergency measures, which by their harshness have exceeded the emergency laws. Characteristic of these measures have been detentions, sequestrations and arrest warrants. These are being applied to the inhabitants of Western Beirut and to a political group the majority of which is Muslim. [Text] [NC122105 (Clandestine) Voice of Arab Lebanon in Arabic 1730 GMT 12 Feb 83]

QULAYLAT, AL-WAZZAN DISCUSSIONS--A lengthy telephone conversation took place today between Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan and [leader of the independent Nasirite Movement-Al-Murabitun] Brother Ibrahim Qulaylat. They discussed the current situation in the Lebanese arena, the security plan for greater Beirut and the emergency laws which have been announced. In his contact with Al-Wazzan, Brother Qulaylat stressed the movement's stance on and understanding of this security plan, which is considered a security liberation plan which has no new immediate or future geographic, administrative or demographic effects. Brother Qulaylat informed the prime minister of his full confidence that the application of the security measures in greater Beirut as they were and are still being applied in the western part of the capital obviates the need for a formal declaration of a state of emergency, as was intended. [Text] [NC121603 (Clandestine) Voice of Arab Lebanon in Arabic 1330 GMT 12 Feb 83]

CSO: 4400/198

PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

'ARAFAT WANTS EGYPT TO REAFFIRM PRINCIPLES ON PALESTINIAN ISSUE

Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-IQTISADI in Arabic No 731, 17 Jan 83 pp 31-36

[Interview With PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat by Dr Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim; "With Yasir 'Arafat: Organization Must not Oust Egypt and Egypt Must not Oust Organization"]

[Text] This was the first time we saw him since the Lebanese war and the blockade of Beirut. Three months have passed since the man departed with his fighters from Beirut. On the way to meet him, thoughts were churning in my mind: Will I find Abu 'Ammar a wreck? Will I find him in despair and squeezed by bitterness after all that has happened to him? Will I find him many years older as a result of the horror of what he has seen and experienced?

I had seen a number of fighters on the 2 preceding days and remembered that similar thoughts had occurred to me while on my way to meet them. I also remembered how they had dispersed many of those thoughts and gave me a totally different impression and how, because of their extreme self-confidence and their optimism regarding the future, they made me somewhat doubt their sanity.

This time I am going to meet their supreme commander and their established leader. Abu 'Ammar could not be like the ordinary fighters who don't know what goes on around them beyond the circle of the rifle and the battle. Abu 'Ammar could not be as rash as they are in his self-confidence or in his optimism over the future. He must be more sensible than this. He must be aware of the size of the catastrophe, the dimensions of the tribulation and the depth of the defeat.

Meeting With Embraces and Tears

Abu 'Ammar received us with embraces and kisses and one of the Egyptian friends broke down and started crying upon seeing Abu 'Ammar in person with his headgear, his beard, his smile and his bright eyes. He could not control the river of tears flowing with his emotions. Abu 'Ammar squeezes our hands once more.

They started questioning the man who had just arrived in Tunis from Amman. It was around 2200 and he kept on talking to us until 0300 of the following morning.

Our questions were spontaneous, unrehearsed, and numerous. We wanted to know everything and wanted to know it deeply.

Abu 'Ammar was spontaneous in his answers, generous in his explanations, frank in his criticism of himself and of the others and fair in his evaluation of the revolution, of the Arab regimes and of the enemies.

We did not ask with the purpose of embarrassment or out of curiosity and he did not answer with the purpose of propaganda or justification. The conversation was a contact between his soul, his mind and his feelings and our souls, minds and feelings. There were no barriers on our part or on his part. The quietness of the late hours of the night and the tranquility of the early hours of the morning strengthened the Sufist nature of the meeting and the rationality of the dialogue between us and Abu 'Ammar.

How does Abu 'Ammar view what has happened?

In response to this question, and to many of our other questions, Abu 'Ammar brought out his daily diary, which is very much like the record book of a small village grocer, and turned its pages over until he reached the page of his daily memories following the Fez Arab summit of November 1981. The summit failed to resolve 2 main issues, namely: Prince Fahd's plan for a settlement to the Middle East conflict and the question of Egypt's return to the Arab ranks. The conference broke up after one day, rather after a single working session. The steadfastness and confrontation states (Syria, Libya and the PDRY) were extremely negative vis-a-vis the 2 issues. Abu 'Ammar read the words he had written to reflect his thoughts on the Fez summit failure.

The first thought was that the Arab world would witness further tribulation in the following months.

The second thought was that the Palestinian revolution, Palestinian resistance and Palestinian people would pay an exorbitant price for the failure of the Fez summit.

The third thought was that Israel and the United States would utilize the opportunity of the Arab division and chaos to completely wipe out the Palestinian resistance. 'Arafat had expected an Israeli invasion of Lebanon to take place and expected the resistance to be pursued and blockaded in Beirut for the purpose.

Abu 'Ammar had predicted all this 8 months prior to the Israeli invasion and had acquainted all levels of the Palestinian revolution leaderships and cadres with his expectations. Some of them were present at the interview and Abu 'Ammar gave them the look of a man asking for a confirmation or a denial. All of them nodded their heads. One of those present volunteered

to repeat verbatim some of what Abu 'Ammar had said upon his return from the first Fez summit: "Brothers and beloved ones, expect a horrible year. We will pay the price for the failure of the Fez summit. All will hold us responsible for the sins of their division. We are about to enter a long and dark tunnel filled with ghosts, snakes and wolves."

So what happened last summer was no surprise for Abu 'Ammar or for the Palestinian resistance. What Israel did was no surprise at all. The U.S. collusion with Israel in preparing for and planning the invasion from its onset and until the present has been no surprise at all.

The surprise or surprises came from the Arab reactions, from within Lebanon and from those on the Arab arena whom the Palestinian resistance had considered friends and allies.

"The alliance between Israel and the Lebanese Phalanges has been known to us for some time. But one half the surprise in this alliance was in its being declared and open and in its being translated into military plans and joint operations carried out openly against the Palestinian resistance and against the Lebanese National Movement.

"The alliance between Israel and the United States has been known to us. The U.S. surprise is in seeing the biggest force in history renege on its promises to us. One of the conditions for our departure from Beirut was for the multi-national (U.S., French and Italian) forces to protect the civilian Palestinian refugees in the camps after the departure of the fighters. But a few days after our departure, these forces withdrew with suspicious speed and left the Palestinian refugee camps unprotected and under the mercy of those who have no mercy: The Israeli army, the Phalangist Party forces, and Sa'd Haddid. This infernal fascist trio pounced on our women, old men and children and perpetrated the Sabra and Shatila massacre in which more than 3,000 unarmed civilians were killed. The United States did nothing, failing to uphold its pledge or to protect its honor. It has not punished those who have smeared its reputation with the blood of children or women. No, we have no illusions regarding the hostility of the United States toward us. But we thought that even between enemies, there is an inviolability of covenants and there are laws for human dealings in times of wars. The Palestinian resistance protected the U.S. civilians and diplomats during the (1975-76) Lebanese civil war, even though the United States is our enemy."

[Question] What about the other surprises?

[Answer] The arrival of the Israeli forces to the outskirts of Beirut in the fifth day of the invasion was something we had not expected. Those forces were not able to advance beyond al-Damur, which is nearly 30 kilometers south of Beirut, along the coastal road. All the attempts for advance by land and for the sea landing of the Israeli forces were crushed. For example, they tried to advance near Khaldah 8 times and every time we wiped out their forces. We had not expected them to outflank us through the

more difficult and rugged road, namely the mountain road which passes through al-Shuf heights. We had no Palestinian forces in al-Shuf area. There were Syrian forces and the forces of one of our allies in the Lebanese National Movement, namely Walid Junblat, considering that this area is a Druze stronghold. We were certain that it was impossible for Israel to penetrate that rugged area. A single battalion armed with light and medium weapons is enough to stop the advance of a full Israeli division. It is enough to block the narrow mountain passages with a number of burnt vehicles. It is enough to damage one or 2 tanks on every road to obstruct the advance of whatever Israeli forces are behind them. What made me cry was the quick withdrawal of the Syrian forces without any fighting in al-Shuf area. Walid Junblat's forces also refrained from resisting. Had Syria and Walid Junblat notified me in advance, I would have sent some Palestinian fighters to that area and the Israeli advance toward Beirut would have taken several weeks instead of several days.

This is one surprise.

The second surprise was our ability as Palestinian resistance, with our light and medium weapons and with our numbers which did not exceed 10,000 fighters, to stand fast in Beirut when the Israeli forces had struck a tight land, sea and air blockade around us and when they had cut off food, water and electricity from us. The Israeli blockade went on for 88 days and Israel hit us with all the firepower it possesses. Do you know that what fell on us in Beirut during 3 months is equal to what fell on Hanoi throughout 10 years of the Vietnam war? In one day, 230 bombers attacked us and the Israeli artillery shelled us from B'abda, just above Beirut, and the Israeli navy boats hit us for 16 uninterrupted hours. During that day, the Israeli armors tried to advance, feeling certain that this enormous firepower support from 3 directions will enable them to storm our lines. But after bitter fighting and hand-to-hand combat, they advanced no more than a few meters. What is more, they were not able to advance a single meter in certain positions. Some of our children have called this battle-al-Shantah [briefcase or bookbag] battle. Yes, we stood fast and we could have continued to stand fast for at least 3 more months.

We had enough munitions and weapons.

We had enough food supplies to last 6 months.

We drilled 19 water wells during the blockade to make up for the water which the Israelis and their allies, the Phalanges, had cut off from West Beirut.

We opened numerous bakeries and distributed bread to the inhabitants free of charge.

What is more important than all this is that the fighters had a high morale and were determined to continue to fight. They saw that Israel at the peak

of its power was still unable to advance more than a few meters for which it incurred enormous human losses. In other words, they also saw Israel in its weakest condition.

We shot down 22 Israeli Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft and helicopters whereas Syrian was able to shoot down no more than one aircraft.

[Question] Abu 'Ammar, if this is true, then why did you decide to depart from Beirut?

[Answer] This is the question, and I don't know if the decision of my departure is correct historically and in the long run or not. But let me tell you that we took the decision democratically and in the light of 3 important factors:

First, the fearful rise in the number of Lebanese and Palestinian civilian victims as a result of the indiscriminate and intense shelling and bombing of Beirut. The percentage of fighters killed was less than three percent of the total number of the victims who fell in West Beirut daily.

Second, the dimensions of the severe destruction which had been inflicted on West Beirut and which was still expanding. Don't forget that West Beirut is not a Palestinian city but a Lebanese city and that, ultimately, we were guests among its residents who have endured heavily for our sake.

Third, and this is connected with the second factor, all the factions of the Lebanese National Movement agreed unanimously after 2 months of resistance that it was necessary that we depart from their city to preserve the lives and property of the Lebanese. Believe me, had one Lebanese faction asked us to stay, we would have stayed. We had all the means to stay put and to stand fast.

[Question] Was the decision to leave Beirut easy?

[Answer] No, it was not easy. Beirut, and the Lebanese arena generally, represented our free will and a base from which to proceed against our Zionist enemy. It was our window to the world. The Palestinian revolution bolstered itself in it throughout the 12 years following our departure from Jordan. We have built in it many of our establishments: the PLO headquarters, the Palestinian Red Crescent, the Palestinian Research Center and all our specialized educational, social and economic councils. Our departure from Beirut meant leaving all this behind and starting anew. No, the decision was not easy. But since our people started their armed resistance march, they have never faced an easy decision. All our decisions have been difficult and all filled with blood and tears and scorched with fire, martyrs and victims. This is our fate and God's and history's will. We have been required to fight for our Palestinian cause and for the dignity of our Arab nation. Believe me, these are not mere words and slogans. We have experienced them with all our hearts, minds and souls. When I say this, I am not saying it from one of the Arab royal thrones or presidential palaces. I and others say these words after having experienced them in Beirut's trenches. We say

them after having seen death in front of us, around us and above us several times a day throughout 3 months. No, the decision to depart from Beirut was not easy, as the decision to depart from Jordan had not been easy. The decision to oppose 'Abd al-Nasir, my leader and supreme ideal, when he agreed to the Rogers initiative had not been easy, just as the decision to oppose the State of Egypt when it signed the Camp David accords had not been easy. No, brother, the decision to depart from Beirut was not easy.

[Question] How does Abu 'Ammar view the present?

[Answer] Our forces are now divided among several Arab countries: Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the YAR, the PDRY, Iraq, Sudan, Algeria and Tunisia. This poses numerous problems to us in communication, coordination, in maintaining the fighters' morale, in continuing their training and their combat readiness, in providing them with services, in reuniting their families, in providing housing to the married among them and schools for their children and in resuming the activities of the PLO establishments. All this is but one aspect of our problems since our departure from Beirut.

There are the problems of our people who live in the refugee camps in Lebanon. Women, widows, old men and children are living in fear of new massacres that may be perpetrated by Israel and the Phalanges. The homes of most of those who have remained in the camps have been demolished, and these people have also lost their supporters, who were either martyred in the Beirut battles, killed in the Sabra and Shatila massacre, departed Beirut as fighters for remote countries, captured and put in Israeli jails or been arrested by the Phalanges and the Lebanese army. As an organization, we must provide as much care as we can for our people in the refugee camps.

There are the problems of our people who have been living since 1967 under the shadow of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza. The Israeli enemy is tightening his grip on our people there, is intensifying his acts of oppression and persecution against them and is seizing their land and their property. Our departure from Beirut has made the enemy more ferocious.

But all these problems are new challenges to us. Within weeks of our departure from Beirut, we have succeeded in confronting these challenges. We have succeeded in securing residence, housing and schools and in reuniting 80 percent of the fighters' families and are in the process of reuniting the remaining 20 percent. It has been an enormously difficult task. But we have accomplished most of it. We have also succeeded in reorganizing our forces in Lebanon and in the other 8 Arab countries. These forces are now engaged in more serious training than that preceding the Lebanese war. I attended a few days ago the graduation of the first batch of the Palestinian air force pilots who staged an aerial display in the skies of one of the Arab countries, flying sophisticated Mig and Mirage aircraft. Our forces in Lebanon are staging daily operations against the Israeli occupation forces. We have escalated our operations inside Israel itself, and whoever keeps up with the Israeli and world press will notice this. Moreover, most of the PLO establishments have resumed their work with greater vigor than before the Lebanese War. WAFA, the Palestinian News Agency, has not stopped

operating for a single moment and has moved its main office to Damascus, the magazine FILASTIN AL-THAWRAH has resumed publishing from Cyprus, the magazine SHU'UN FILASTINIYAH and the Palestinian Planning Center, as well as the Palestinian Red Crescent, have resumed their activities in Beirut. Our radio continues broadcasting from Baghdad. All the Palestinian councils, including the Military Council, were convened last month (November). Our delegations did not stop going to the international conferences during the Lebanese war and the blockade of Beirut. We have succeeded in establishing channels to provide aid to the families of the Palestinian and allied Lebanese victims, martyrs and prisoners, with a lump sum of 3,000 Lebanese pounds for every family and continued monthly pensions to the families of the martyrs and prisoners and a monthly aid amounting to 300 Lebanese pounds for every family and continued monthly pensions to the families of the martyrs and prisoners and a monthly aid amounting to 300 Lebanese pounds for every family in the refugee camps. Through all this, we are sending our Palestinian people, our Arab nation and the entire world the message that our revolution has not died and that our struggle has not ended.

[Question] Abu 'Ammar, this is a rosy picture that is difficult to believe. Don't you have problems that you have not overcome?

[Answer] Yes, we do. We have many problems. I have been talking about the Palestinian front and the problems and accomplishments on one front only, namely our people's and revolution's front. I want to assure the world that what Israel, the United States and some Arab collaborators considered as having ended in Beirut has reappeared with greater vigor inside Lebanon and throughout the Arab homeland. Do you know that we have carried out more than 360 military operations against Israel in Sidon, Tyre, al-Biq'a' and Israel itself during the 3 months following our departure from Beirut and that the Israeli official sources themselves have acknowledged the death or wounding of nearly 340 Israeli military men in these operations? What I want to say here is that in the wake of [the departure from] Beirut, we have attacked on all fronts. Our resistance in Beirut was a strategic victory and our departure a tactical defeat. What we are doing now is to complete the strategic victory with numerous tactical accomplishments that compensate us for the tactical defeat of the departure.

[Question] What about the other negative aspects in the present situation?

[Answer] The negative aspects and the defeats are not on the Palestinian front but on the Arab and international front.

Within 2 months, there will be nearly 30,000 troops of the multi-national forces in Lebanon, i.e., more than the multi-national forces in the Sinai. If we add the Israeli occupation forces in Lebanon, then this means that the Arab homeland is witnessing a new military occupation. What is painful is that the return of the western imperialism in the form of military occupation is taking place this time with our approval and, at times, even with the insistence of the Arab regimes that are jumping from the Israeli frying pan into the western fire.

An imbalance detrimental to our interests as an Arab nation and to the interests of the Soviet Union has developed in the Eastern Mediterranean. I told the new Soviet leadership this when I took part in Brezhnev's funeral.

At the Arab level, there is a quick and alarming retreat in the face of the Israeli invasion which is so far more of a psychological than a military invasion. The Arab retreat is tantamount to a surrender. Most of the Arab regimes have dropped the military option, either frankly or tacitly. This is the most dangerous negative aspect.

At the Palestinian level, we have a problem with the Arab regimes. Some of them are disturbed by the fact that the resistance departed with a high head after putting up an honorable fight in Beirut. Our fighting was tantamount to a daily embarrassment to these regimes. Like Israel and the United States, these regimes wanted all of us either to die in Beirut or surrender with our faces rubbed in the mud. Some of these regimes claim to be progressive and revolutionary. At least one of them withheld the strategic weapons that the Soviet Union and Algeria had sent us during the fighting. These weapons are still impounded or confiscated even though our forces in al-Biqa' need the weapons should large-scale battle erupt with Israel, and this is something expected at any moment. Some of the Arab regimes try to divide our ranks, to impose their custodianship on us and to obstruct our political and diplomatic movement, especially movement for coordination with Jordan and Egypt. Our problem with some Arab regimes is no less ferocious than our problem with Israel and the United States. The Arab rulers have become very much like sectarian kings fighting each other or fighting their people and ignoring the main Israeli danger that is about to destroy all of them.

[Question] The urgent question is: What about the future?

I repeated this question several times but Abu 'Ammar wanted to talk about the recent past, about the Beirut blockade. It was obvious that he considers the days of the blockade one of the peaks of the Palestinian glory. What a strange thing! We, the Arabs outside Beirut and outside Lebanon, considered those days a tribulation beyond all tribulations and a catastrophe beyond all catastrophes.

[Answers] Our war with Israel in Lebanon has been longer than all the other Arab wars with Israel put together. 'Abd al-Nasir, may God's mercy be upon him, used to tell me: Abu 'Ammar, I will be grateful and happy if, in the case of war, the Palestinian resistance can preoccupy a single Israeli brigade. How I wish 'Abd al-Nasir were alive to see the resistance stand fast and bloody 8 Israeli divisions (130,000 troops), along with air and naval forces (40,000 more). Our numbers, along with our allies, did not exceed 10,000 fighters. But we stood fast in the face of 170,000 Israelis and their Phalangist allies. Oh, were 'Abd al-Nasir alive. I was thinking of him and of Egypt all the time. I was thinking of 'Abd al-Nasir's Egypt. What would it have possibly done? Those were my glorious days. I was like a child conversing with his father's soul. I was conversing with

'Abd al-Nasir's soul and saying: O father and leader, I wish you could be resurrected to see your brothers, sons and followers defend the nation's honor. I wish you could be resurrected to see how we have killed or wounded 20,000 of them, how Israel's army has seen for the first time in its history the desertion of more than 4,000 troops, more than 1,000 cases of rebellion and of refusal to go to the front and nearly 750 cases of hysteria and nervous breakdown. These are Israeli figures, not Arab exaggerations.

[Question] What about the future, Abu 'Ammar?

[Answer] I saw the future under the blockade in Beirut. I saw it on the black Sunday when they tried to annihilate me and all the Palestinian leaderships with endless raids targeted against the buildings I used to visit or sleep in. I saw it on that day when they used (vacuum) bombs and missiles that penetrate the earth to a depth of 50 meters to demolish buildings from their foundations without giving any occupant the chance to escape death. I saw the future in Beirut in the most violent Israeli offensive staged on 4 August 1982: 465 aircraft attack the city with bombs and missiles in more than 1,200 sorties and with more than 30,000 troops and officers trying to storm West Beirut with tanks and armors in the Museum area. On that day, we lost 600 Palestinian and Lebanese civilians. I felt that my death was approaching while leading my forces in a constant fight for 12 hours and while feeling at the zenith of my happiness. We lost 40 fighters that day and the enemy advanced 10 meters.

[Question] What about the future, Abu 'Ammar?

[Answer] That was the future. My faith in my people and in the justness of my cause was strengthened manyfold on 1 and 4 August 1982. I realized then why my people have stood fast all these years and from the time they were uprooted from their land in 1948. I realized why the Palestinian revolution will live until victory. I was reborn on 1 and 4 August 1982. A people with this firmness is what made me depart from Beirut with a confident smile on my face. My smile was not one of obstinacy or a smile for the cameras and the foreign media. It was a smile of contentment and of confidence that a people of this mettle will never be defeated. What happened a few days later in Sabra and Shatila was a cowardly Israeli revenge for what had taken place during the Beirut battle. Sharon and his generals were perfectly aware of the humiliation they had suffered at our hands in Beirut. Therefore, they had to take revenge on the unarmed civilians. They had to kill and massacre our women who produce an endless line of heroes. But what Sharon has forgotten is that there are more Palestinian mothers and that the flow of fighters will not stop and the river of martyrs will not dry up. Sharon will go insane sooner or later. He had everything--weapons, men, money and provisions--above and beyond what we had. We were in the trap. Yet he failed to destroy us. Rather, he lost more fighters than we did. We escaped the trap and he knows that we will face him again. This is the future.

[Question] Abu 'Ammar, these are general, fiery and emotional words and they are still about the past. How do you view your future and how do you view the future of the Arab-Israeli conflict?

[Answer] Our future, we the Palestinians, is more sacrifices, more tears, more blood and more homelessness and uprooting. Yet, our future is more determination and more steadfastness. We have nothing to lose other than the shackles and the abasement whereas the rest of the Arab homeland has a lot that may be lost if the sectarian kings continue to rule, dominate, fight with each other and kill the time. The immediate Arab future is an extremely dark future without Egypt.

[Question] What about Egypt and how can the Arabs regain Egypt?

[Answer] (Abu 'Ammar again digressed to talk about the Beirut blockade and about the recent past).

I was leading the Beirut battle with my ear turned to Egypt, with my mind thinking of Egypt and with my heart beating to Egypt's pulse. Deep inside, I felt that the Egyptian people were with me with their hearts and minds.

[Question] What about Egypt after the departure from Beirut? What do you hope for from Egypt in the future?

[Answer] As to hopes, I hope for a lot from Egypt. What I hope for is not pre-conditions, as some people have tried to depict the matter to President Mubarak. What I hope for from Egypt is for it to re-assume its prominent place in the Arab nation and to remount the steed leading the lines. Without Egypt, nobody has been able to lead and without Egypt, nobody will be able to lead. Egypt, with its harmonious people, its deep-rooted establishments and firm traditions, with its historical sense and its demographic and strategic weight, is the one that can lead. Egypt, with its limited resources, is more generous than the dwarfs with their over-abundant resources. Egypt, with its poverty, is more hospitable than all the rich of our Arab nation.

[Question] These are, Abu 'Ammar, magnificent words that make me, as an Egyptian, feel proud and humble. But the words are still loose. What specifically, about the future? What is to be done?

[Answer] Oh, you want me to talk of a program, of a strategy. Of course, I think of this every moment. Okay. The urgent objective is to stop the Arab deterioration and retreat in facing the defiant Israeli invasion. How do we do this? Egypt, the PLO, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq can turn the equation in favor of the Arab nation. They will turn it psychologically at the outset. The mere consensus of Egypt and the organization, supported by the others, and their moral solidarity will restore confidence in the Arab spirit. It is not necessary now or in the near future to launch war on Israel. What is necessary is that we stand together in a single defensive trench. It is only necessary that the other Arabs regain hope, optimism and the spirit of resistance. This in itself will be a great accomplishment. The mere return of Egypt to the Arabs and of the Arabs to Egypt will plant the hope anew. We do not want to embroil Egypt. Whoever asks Egypt to abrogate Camp David [accords] and the strategic balance between itself and Israel--while the balance is so terribly tipped in favor of Israel--is asking

for another catastrophe for the Arab nation. No, this is not what we want from Mubarak. All we want from him and from Egypt is that they take hold of the reigns of leadership and act with the spirit of pan-Arab responsibility, the spirit of the immortal Egypt.

[Answer] I ask Egypt not to disavow its principles and not to cede its leadership of the Arab nation. I want Egypt to issue a declaration of principles on the Palestinian issue reaffirming our people's right to determine their future and to establish their state and reaffirming that the PLO is our people's legitimate representative. These are principles which Egypt declared in past years under the canopy of 'Abd al-Nasir and of al-Sadat. All I want is for President Mubarak to reaffirm them. I have not other conditions. As soon as Mubarak declares his reaffirmation of these principles, I will put my hand in his and will march with him to the furthest limit in exhausting all the alternatives in order to settle the conflict peacefully.

As I am eager not to embarrass Egypt and ask it to abrogate Camp David, I also ask President Mubarak not to embarrass me and ask me to recognize Israel unilaterally. Even the West European countries have not asked me to do so. I want Egypt to protect my back from the Zionist wolves and from the Arab dogs. For Egypt to protect my back in this phase does not require more than a declaration of principles.

I ask Egypt to return to the leadership seat which all the pretenders have failed to fill. Egypt's return will not embarrass it with the United States but will rather strengthen its negotiating position. It will not embarrass it with Israel but will rather bolster its pressure capability. Egypt's return will not affect the economic aid Egypt is getting from abroad. If this aid drops by one dollar, then let President Mubarak rest assured that he will get 4 dollars instead. Whoever is paying Syria 2 billion annually will pay Egypt 4 billion annually.

Let President Mubarak know that the visit of Butrus Ghali and Usamah al-Baz to Beirut a few weeks ago has boosted the Lebanese national street enormously. You can imagine the boost in the entire Arab street if Egypt takes a single step toward us. If Amin al-Jumayyil has gotten an Egyptian step, then don't the Palestinian people deserve a similar step? Don't those who have fought, have been martyred and have been made homeless for defending themselves and the Arab nation's honor deserve to be embraced by Egypt?

Yes, yes, Abu 'Ammar, they deserve a thousand steps from Egypt in their direction. They deserve more than just being embraced.

8494
CSO: 4404/209

LIFE IN TUNISIAN CAMP FOR REFUGEES DESCRIBED ; CAMP COMMANDER INTERVIEWED

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic No 1368, 21 Jan 83 pp 66-69

[Article by Zaki Shihab: "Those Who Left Beirut Battle the Cold in Tunisia"]

[Text] Today we are focusing our attention on benefiting from the experience we had in the summer.
It is our fate to move around from one country to another.
Our relations with Tunisians are free from problems.

The Palestinians are not an army; they are people. Palestinians are not individual fighters; they are families. The Palestinians are not seeking refuge with anyone; they were forced to leave their homeland.

It is the view of Palestinians as an army, as individuals seeking refuge that has always been the cause for the failure of international and Arab dealings with them. Dealing incorrectly with the Palestinians constitutes double jeopardy: it wrongs the Palestinians and those who are dealing with them at the same time. It creates two problems: a problem for the host country and a problem for the misunderstood people.

In 'Ayn al-Hulwah, al-Yarmuk, al-Wihdat, Nahr al-Barid or in Wadi al-Zarqa' the host is the same and the Palestinian is the same. Dialogue is always difficult and almost impossible, particularly in Wadi al-Zarqa' which is 80 kilometers from the Tunisian capital. [That camp] has an additional problem: it is a camp not an encampment, and its residents are fighters, not civilians.

When I entered the camp, I was the first journalist to do so in the history of Wadi al-Zarqa'. I felt I had walked into a new world that had its new issues, its needs and its demands which made it a special homeland different from all other Palestinian "homelands." The Palestinians have as many "homelands" as they have had encampments, residential communities and camps throughout the greater Arab homeland.

I entered the Wadi al-Zarqa' camp the usual way: no one goes through the gate without permission. Those who live in the camp enter and leave the camp with a card. Journalists, however, are not accustomed to entry permits or cards.

Hence I was professionally overjoyed with an assignment that was no more than an attempt to find out what was taking place behind the fence in the Wadi al-Zarqa' Camp.

Everything is routine in the home of Palestinian soldiers. A 5-year old child, Ghayth Farid, who lives with his father in the camp summarized for me one of the features of this routine when he answered a question by saying, "We eat; we drink; and we sleep."

Abu al-Fawakhir, the authorized political official in the camp, told AL-HAWADITH, "The troops' experience in the camps has been splendid, but it has not been easy. Our suffering began with the change that occurred in the revolutionary and psychological climate of the Palestinian fighter or the Palestinian Revolution's fighter. We were able in stages to give form to the notion of national unity among the fighters. We come from several organizations with different ideologies and ideas. However, we have the same objective: the liberation of Palestine.

"As forces we have been living in tents every day. Despite the suffering and what each one of us is enduring--those who had to leave their relatives and their families or those who lost loved ones or friends--the attachment to the cause was there. None of us has been discussing his leave permit, but all of us have been talking about how we are to achieve national unity.

"At first we faced difficulties, but the matter is different now. Things are now beginning to assume a military character. All revolutions will ultimately, that is, before victory or at certain stages of the struggle, achieve this kind [of situation] or what is called militarization. Hence we had to apply the notion of military unity, in the context of an army in particular. In the camp we were able to form a political authorization council that present daily programs to be broadcast inside the camp. We formed a cultural committee to attend to the fighters' different activities and [to offer them] what they like. [We formed another] committee to look after social affairs; this committee looks after the form that belongs to every fighter in the camp. It is not enough to listen to a fighter's complaints in the camp; we must also follow up with a fighter wherever he is: in the hospital, at home and in camp.

"We also formed a Palestinian drama and folklore committee so that fighters who have [artistic] energy would have an outlet for it. There is also another committee for different sports.

"We are now fighting the weather. Violent storms blew away the tents. We are now building new quarters, and we have assumed the responsibility for completing them in a matter of days. After we finish the quarters, we will build a clubhouse and a resthouse at the campsite.

"We are suffering from two important things. First, there is the matter of provisions. We are working with our brothers in military command to solve that [problem] and set up 'a revolutionary restaurant' in the camp.

"The second matter is that of passports. Fighters are preoccupied with the matter of borders. They long for the cause just as much as they long for their wives and their children. Therefore, we are asking for a solution to this crisis so that fighters can see their relatives. They would come back to camp, emotionally satisfied after seeing their relatives, and they can then give [of themselves to the cause].

"The matter of transportation has been settled; we brought three small buses and two cars for the campsite.

"The cold climate in Wadi al-Zarqa' is very harsh. We were able to get heaters for the forces' quarters, but we did not get enough of them. We've made considerable progress in this camp in making national unity a concrete fact. I can say that national unity will be launched from here."

Regarding the camp's relationship with its surroundings, the political authorization official said, "We are trying to work with troop leaders in the camp to benefit from the Beirut experience. Everyone has learned that the forces of the Palestinian Revolution are in Wadi al-Zarqa'. The Tunisian (Wali Bajah) visited us, and we and [our] military leaders visited him. He held a reception for us that was attended by the municipality's principal figures, by school students and by popular committees. The meeting was so splendid, he flew the Palestinian flag alongside the Tunisian flag. We are starting out with a specific notion: not to overlook artistic, social or [other] specific gatherings to explain the cause so that in the future we can guard against those matters that everyone knows about. We hope these things will not happen. The feelings expressed by people in the vicinity of the camp when storms blew the tents away were enough to make up for what befell us. In addition, we received letters from students in six schools."

[Question] How much did you learn from the Beirut experience?

[Answer] From the Beirut experience [I would say we learned that] the conspiracy was greater than we had imagined. We realized this, and so did the general commander when he said, "So that a third Arab country would not fall into the clutches of Israel," which is what happened.

Some people are finding fault with the conduct of some of their colleagues, and they are trying to dwell on that. But this is normal. We are not denying some of the things that used to occur. Although they are not all that serious, they were the cause.

The cause is obvious; it is political.

I emphasize that conduct is the foundation, [nay], it is almost the essence [of our cause]. It is on the basis of our conduct that we set a good example from our present positions. In the camp we apply the principle of punishment and reward.

[Question] How do you spend your days in the camp?

[Answer] [The day] begins in the morning with the morning military lineup, which consists of military instruction. This is followed by daily inspection, which is intended to establish a sort of commitment and a dynamic quality. After the lineup and inspection the battalions break up into teams for physical exercises on the courts. After this is done, everyone eats breakfast, and after breakfast the political indoctrination program begins. This program goes on till lunch time when everyone eats lunch.

After lunch fighters rest, and in the evening tent visits begin. We inquire into the conditions of young men without making them feel that these are official visits. The purpose of these visits is to understand the young men's problems and the daily worries of their lives.

[Question] What is your program for the next stage?

Answer] As authorized agents or as troops?

[Question] As troops.

Answer. To tell you the truth, we do not engage in predictions as much as we do in analysis. Don't forget that we adhere to the decision of [our] political leaders in whom we believe. The general commander said, "We are in the last quarter of the dark tunnel." There is no doubt that matters are going [in the direction of] certain victory. There is no place for despair in our ranks.

Sa'id Tha'ir is a fighter. He had this to say about the presence of Palestinian forces in Wadi al-Zarqa': "This place is to be utilized for retraining. We are to prepare [ourselves], organize our ranks and curb the chaos that came close to impeding the course of the Palestinian Revolution. Our presence [here] is temporary until political leaders decide to go back to locations closer to Palestine, places where more contact with the enemy would be involved.

"Here we are almost isolated from our masses. We know about events only through newspapers and magazines. In Beirut we were living with our families and our people, and we exercised greater influence on our people in the West Bank and Gaza. We used to have some clout, but now we don't have enough to give our people what they need] and do for them [what needs to be done]."

Sa'id who was getting ready to leave the camp on his way to the home he had rented in the nearby town of Majaz al-Bab after bringing his wife and three children there added, "The people here get along well with fighters and their wives, and they give them moral support. They like us. They are good, excellent people. The man who owns the store near our house considers us his children. He tells us, 'You, the Palestinians, don't know how much affection we have for you!' "

Abu al-Futuh Ghazzah is a fighter. He interrupted his colleague Sa'id and said, "It is our destiny to have our bags packed and to move around from one country to another.

"My wife and children came recently from Beirut. My wife escaped the massacre miraculously. She hid for a long time with several families from Shatila camp in a banana warehouse."

Abu al-Futuh had this to say about the atmosphere in the camp: "The cold here is bitter, and the tents have been blown away by the wind. We want health insurance and physicians to treat our families. We are paying our own rent, and, as I said, it is our destiny to move around from one country to another and to set ourselves up in a new house every day."

Farid Khalil is the father of the 5-year old child, Ghayth. He told me that his wife died in the Beirut war and that he had to keep his son with him.

Farid said that his problem was that he did not have a [valid] passport. The one he had expired, and the country which had issued him that passport refused to renew it.

Farid added this about socializing with the natives: "We do not socialize with the natives; we have the camp and that's all."

Abu Satif is an aide. He said, "The daily atmosphere [around the camp] is almost routine. Military and political information is reviewed daily in the camp on all levels so that each one of us can complete the course. After the shocks that we had, we have to be revitalized."

[Question] In what ways did these shocks manifest themselves?

[Answer] In the facts about the Arab world after the Beirut war. It was a strong blow from those who had talked about supporting the revolution. However, the war exposed the falsehood of their statements and allegations. From now on we are to depend only on fighters.

[Question] What about the atmosphere in your midst, particularly since you are from different factions?

[Answer] Our experience in the camp has been a successful one. The process of unity and unification has been moving forward at full speed, and its success has been splendid. There is unanimous agreement that unity will be achieved.

[Question] What are the difficulties that are standing in the way of the unification process?

[Answer] We cannot enter into political alliances. We are soldiers, and we have to carry out the military duties that are assigned to us.

Muhammad 'Abd-al-Razzaq Abu Musa, a university student and a fighter said, "I studied in the Arab University of Beirut for 3 years, and I have been waiting for 3 months for approval of my application for admission to the University of Alexandria."

Abu Musa had this to say about the war experience in Beirut: "It has its bad points and its good points. One of its good points has been the legendary steadfastness that the fighters forged and the valiant opposition they put up to recurrent troop deployments and advancement.

"The bad aspect of the war which I used to think about is why didn't our forces intensify their operations across the Biqa' where thousands of fighters had gathered. They could have created a new pressure [factor] with which Zionist soldiers could be confronted."

AL-HAWADITH met Lt Col 'Abd-al-Fattah al-Ja'idi, commander of the 'Ayn al-Hulwah forces or the Wadi al-Zarqa' camp at the end of its tour of the camp and conducted the following interview with him.

[Question] What is the nature of the force that is in the camp?

[Answer] The camp, or the 'Ayn al-Hulwah forces, includes a group of fighters who took part in the defense of Beirut. They make up two battalions. As I mentioned all the young men were originally in one bunker, and the unity of the struggle was evident in the relationship they had with each other.

[Question] Have difficulties been experienced in having a unified command for these forces?

Answer] We had no difficulties commanding the obedience of fighters, wherever they came from. They were under one command called the 'Ayn al-Hulwah forces.

Palestine is the goal of all fighters here. Although opinions and methods differ, the goal, the destiny and the suffering are the same.

Question] It's been said that more than half the fighters have left the camp and gone to other countries. Is this true?

Answer] Those who leave the camp and travel have legal permits to do so. We must not forget that the fighters have families they left in Syria, Jordan or Egypt.

Everyone who leaves this camp has a legal permit signed by the leaders of the camp. With such a permit a fighter may travel to the country where his family lives, and he may spend his vacation there. Then he would return once again to camp.

Question] Then the rumors are not true, are they?

Answer] Of course they're not true.

Question] What difficulties do fighters face in general?

Answer] We are trying to solve [their] personal problems one by one, but there are problems that are beyond our control.

Question] Like what, for example?

Answer] The question of permits for fighters so they can travel to the countries where their families live. The difficulty [here] manifests itself in the fact that one Arab country limits the number of these permits while another country sets a condition for granting such a permit: the fighter's wife and children have to be living in that country. [That is], if a fighter's father [and not his wife and children] were in that country, he would not be allowed to visit that country.

Question] After your departure from Beirut the problem of wives who wanted to join their husbands emerged. What facilities or assistance are you offering the fighters to ensure the requirements [of this situation]?

Answer] We have a foreign relations organization in the camp that is overseen by an officer. When a fighter wants to bring his wife from one or another Arab country, he takes his passport to that division, and the division takes care of booking her transportation and then letting her know when she can travel.

Furthermore, to make the stay of our married colleagues easier we made an agreement with the mayor of the town of Majaz al-Bab, which is near this camp, about providing housing for these families. There are now 15 families living at these locations.

Question] Some people have spoken about a problem the fighters' children are facing with their education. What is the nature of this problem?

Answer] To tell you the truth, this is not a problem at all, or to put it differently, there is no problem so far. Most of the fighters' children are still too young to be affected by the language factor since French in Tunisia is taught as early as the 4th Grade [in elementary school].

Question] What about the fighters' interaction with their surroundings?

[Answer] Quite honestly--and this is the truth--the relationship between the fighters and our Tunisian brothers in nearby villages and towns is a fraternal one. Young men go to these villages and towns to do their shopping, and so far there have been no problems to speak of between the fighters and the native people.

Furthermore, if any problems do occur, they can be solved easily. All those who violate the laws that are in effect are called to account for their actions.

[Question] What about leaves [for fighters]?

Answer] There are two kinds of leaves: internal and external. External leaves are those which fighters get to visit their relatives in one of the Arab countries. Camp rules allow each fighter to visit his relatives for 1 month every 3 months. Internal leaves are permits for 24 hours of leave every week. Fighters usually spend an internal leave in one of Tunisia's cities.

[Question] What are the most prominent of your objectives in the camp?

Answer] At this stage our principal objective is to reorganize, to train [our] fighters and to concentrate on discipline.

[Question] How many individuals are there in the force that is now in the camp?

[Answer] There are two battalions.

Question] Resistance centers, wherever they are found, have continued to be a target for Israel. Have you taken precautions to prevent your center from becoming the subject of an Israeli military action?

Answer] We laid out the necessary plan ever since we first started living here. This plan would protect the camp from any aggression that Israel may carry out.

Lt Col 'Abd-al-Fattah smiled and invited me to eat with him. We chatted about general conditions with those who were present [at the table].

A man over 50 years old, known as Abu Harb and a member of the political authorization council broke into the conversation and said, "There are things here that actually deserve to be examined and looked into carefully. We have been in one stage, and we are now in a new stage. We are demanding that the right man be appointed to the right position. Many things are happening, and these things are irritating the fighters and making them dissatisfied in the camps."

Question] In what way?

Answer] Take interaction, for example. There are people whose constitution is

all wrong. Such a constitution should not be allowed to go on. We need to look into our negative attitudes more than we need to look into our positive attitudes.

Abu Harb stopped talking.

I bid the young men farewell. The sun began to set and it became bitterly cold. Speaking of the cold I recalled what a fighter had written to describe the cold weather of Wadi al-Zarqa'.

"Quite simply a fighter in Wadi al-Zarqa' can say about the cold weather what 'Ali ibn Abu Talib said about poverty: 'If the cold weather were a man, I would slay him.' "

Every day between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. the fighters are sleepless, afraid of being overcome by the cold in their sleep. They use dry brush to build a fire, and they tell themselves, "It is better to die of smoke inhalation than to freeze to death."

I rode the car on my way back to Tunis, the capital. I stopped at the entrance to the camp, and the Tunisian soldier who stood guard there gave me my press card which he had taken from me when I entered the camp.

8592

CSO: 4404/212

PETROLINE SYSTEM OVERVIEWED

East Burnham ARABIA in English No 17, Jan 83 p 57

[Text] The Petroline system, initiated in 1977 and completed in 1981, has enabled Saudi Arabia to exploit a shorter route through the Strait of Hormuz, where some 8,000 tankers ship 1,000ln tonnes of oil every year. Last July loading also started at a tanker terminal on the Red Sea. Before this, Ras Tanura in the Arabian Gulf was the only outlet for Arabian light crude; the alternative passage will considerably reduce tanker traffic in the Gulf.

Petroline is the largest capacity crude oil pipeline in the world. Its initial capacity of 1.85 mbd can be added to with a looping system to give a 3.7 mbd capacity. Throughput at present is about 1 mbd.

The \$1.6bn pipeline, built by the General Petroleum and Mineral Organisation (Petromin), was fully financed by the government. Eleven major companies participated in the engineering, design, construction and fabrication work. Hydrostatically tested 48-inch steel pipeline was laid by the American-Lebanese joint venture Cat Coustan from the western side and by Saipem of Italy from the eastern side.

Seven of the 11 pumping stations were constructed by Foster Wheeler of the US. The rest were completed by Hyundai of Korea. At present, five pumping stations are functioning and the others are expected to start operating early this year. The pumping stations are built 72 to 130km apart.

The stations house massive 27,000 horsepower turbines which can be run on natural gas, natural gas liquid, diesel fuel, or crude oil. Two of the three turbines in each pumping station are fed with natural gas made available from the 1,160km-long Natural Gas Liquids Line, which runs parallel to the east-west pipeline.

The crude is stored in 11 one million barrel tanks constructed by Al Saada, a Saudi company, and Arabian Chicago Bridge and Iron. These 21-metre high tanks can store six days' Petroline production. The offshore terminal was built by Mitsubishi, while the 1.7km causeway leading to the terminal was constructed by General Agencies.

Mobile Oil, through its subsidiary Mobil Overseas Pipeline Company (MOPCI), participated in the engineering and management of Petroline project during construction. In addition, MOPCI is assisting Petroline in the initial training of Saudi engineers and technicians.

The Petroline system is an integral part of Petromin's wide range of activities in three major sectors--petroleum, petrochemicals and minerals, and mineral industries. The participation of Saudi personnel is in the main confined to executive positions.

CSO: 4400/196

NUMEROUS NEW RAILWAY PROJECTS PLANNED

Jiddah AL-MADINAH in Arabic 4 Dec 82 p 15

[Interview with Faysal Muhammad Al-Shahil, general head of the General Department for Railways of the Government of Saudi Arabia, on the kingdom's new railway projects, by Awad Al-Qahtani; place and date unspecified]

[Text] Numerous Projects to Develop Railway Service in the Kingdom
Raysal Al-Shahil to AL-MADINAH: A New Line Will Be Layed Out Between
Riyad And Dammam Which Will Be Shorter Than The Current Line

The General Department of Railways of the Government of Saudi Arabia is witnessing great development aimed at increasing reliance on railways as an effective mode of transportation and freight shipping. Among the most prominent features of this development is the project to establish a new line between Riyadh and Dammam which would be shorter than the current rail line and pass through many stations. AL-MADINAH met with Mr. Raysal Muhammad Al-Shahil, general head of the Department, and held this dialogue with him concerning rail service and the developmental projects the field is witnessing.

The New Framework

[Question] What can you tell us about the railway's new framework?

[Answer] After the various expansions of the railway, which in turn require new skills and qualifications as well as numerous responsibilities, the new framework emerged, bringing with it a great number of reforms. I believe that the Superior Administrative Reform Committee studies the topic together with the Employees Council and the Preparatory Committee. For example, there was previously only one deputy for the general head of the department, and now he has two deputies. Moreover, some authority has been delegated. All these organizational matters are intended to give impetus to our work, since the amount of work in the railway is different from what it was two or three years ago. The amount of train transport has increased, especially after the opening of the customs area, so that now 2500 containers are transported in a month. We expect that, if God wills, this number will surpass 3000 containers. There are

now four freight trains per day, and it is expected that their number will increase in the future. All this makes expansion in the administrative and technical areas necessary. Therefore, the new framework has focused on the technical aspects and on insuring that facilities and the departments associated with them are sufficient, an example being the maintenance and hiring departments, which have recently been expanded and so supported more than previously.

A New Line

[Question] What are the department's most prominent projects?

[Answer] The most important project we have is the creation of a new line between Dammam and Riyadh which will be shorter than the old line, which is longer than the new by 120 kilometers, since the old line isn't laid out stragith between Dammam and Riyadh. It begins in Dammam, passing through Al-Hufuf, Al-Hirs and AlOKharj on its way to Riyadh. Its total length is 565 kilometers. As for the new line, it is 450 kilometers long and contains three new stations, the old stations having been built more than thirty years ago as temporary stations when the rail line was founded. What with the kingdom's development plans, it has become necessary to expand rail service. The old line will be restored with new rails in addition to the creation of the new, direct line and the three stations which I mentioned. If God wills, the Fourth Five Year Plan will see the construction of other stations after these three. I would like to mention the vocational training center the railway used to have, which was closed. It has resumed its work and more than 200 trainees have graduated from it. We are continuously striving to develop the skills of the railway's employees. We have a plan at the same time to attract students to the vocational training center.

A Joint Hotel

And in view of the importance and necessity of the railway having sources of income other than those relating to passenger transport and freight, the department will undertake to move the present Dammam station to another location outside the city. In this way, the department will be able to make use of the station's excellent location and the area of ground it currently occupies. The department has agreed with the hotel company on building a large cultural center and a first-class hotel. This is an integrated project which does not belong either to the railway or the hotel company alone, but rather is a joint venture between the two parties with each being responsible for 50%. The studies will be completed, if God wills, four or five months from now, and implementation will then begin.

In another area, new trains have been contracted for. There are 40 new passenger cars on order, 20 from France and 20 from Germany. A year from now, if God wills, these cars shall have arrived, and during this period or a couple of months later work on the new line will have been completed as well. The distance will be shorter and the time the train will take to cover it will be shorter as a result.

Increasing the Amount of Freight

The plan for the line to Riyadh has been finalized, and as far as train engines are concerned, 17 have been purchased. According to the plan, their number must reach 30, and if God wills, before the end of the current Third Five Year Plan, we shall have acquired all the cars, including around 588 freight cars, the bidding for which has been completed as well.

There are many factors which can help increase the amount of freight, among them the Saudi-Bahraini cement factory. We have laid out a line to service this factory at a cost of 50 million riyals. There are other lines we have built to transport freight shipments for the National Guard from Riyadh to the guard's warehouses and to some facilities in Khashm Al-'An that are about 20 kilometers long.

Varied Investments

There is a local Saudi company dealing in liquid cement which transports the cement from Dammam to Riyadh. The railway has let it rent land, and the company is shipping all its liquid cement imports by the railway. Income from this is about 7 million riyals a year. There are numerous other investments, such as the cultural center project. We are trying to see to it that the railway has some income other than what the state gives it in its budget. Naturally, the passengers are the most important thing as far as the railroad is concerned, despite the losses passenger transport entails, because the goal of the government is to serve the citizenry. I would like to make it clear that the riders pay 30 riyals in first class and 20 in second. These fares amount to about one quarter of the cost of transporting the passengers. We ran a statistical survey two years ago and found that each rider costs us 100 riyals. However, the government does not charge the citizens the true amount, but rather sacrifices large sums for the sake of the citizens' comfort.

Economic Return

[Question] Don't you think the time it takes to travel or ship goods by train is long, despite the lowness of the charge?

[Answer] Up until now, travel time between Dammam and Riyadh has been seven and one-half hours, and with the improvement of the line, the time could go down to six hours or five and a half. After the new line is built, if God wills, travel time could be four or four and a half hours.

As concerns the fare, in my opinion, there must be coordination between the railway and all the other modes of transportation, whether ground or air, so as to set fares for the three sectors. Afterwards, it will be possible for the fare to rise or stay the same for passengers or freight. I believe that the railway has been of service with regard to freight transport and to the economy, even if in an indirect way. Before the creation of the customs area in Riyadh, a load used to be transported from

King 'Abd Al-Aziz port to Riyadh for 2500 riyals. After the area was set up, we became able to transport a load, and I mean all the costs involved, from the port to the trader's warehouse for 1500 riyals. Thus, we lowered the price by 1000 riyals. If the trucks lower their rates, too, this will be good for the traders and so for the consumer himself, since if the various modes of transport are competing with each other, there will be no opportunity for a particular faction to engage in monopoly.

In addition, the railroad achieves an indirect economic return, since it is possible for a single train to transport thousands of tons. If we were to say that the railroad daily transports seven thousand tons, including containers, fuel, cement and iron, we would have to note that it would take 200 trucks and 200 drivers to transport the same quantity of goods, considering that a truck cannot transport more than 40 tons. As for train-borne freight, it takes only one driver and two or three assistants to do the same work, which means you can do without all those trucks and drivers. The economic return which I would like to point out is tied to the cost of conservation and employment and those costs engendered by road accidents.

Better Services

[Question] What plan to provide better services to the passengers do you have? What services do you provide for your employees?

[Answer] There are many means of providing better services, such as the introduction of computers. We will start benefiting from the services of the computer in the warehouses. We have had 15 or 20 warehouses for 30 years which contain thousands of spare parts. Therefore, we will introduce the computer into our warehouses first of all, and afterwards we will expand our utilization of it. We are cooperating with the University of Petroleum and Minerals in this regard. In addition, we have been using microfilm to preserve small files. Moreover, we provide railway employees with many services, such as recreational services, housing, and the fact that university graduates who join the railway are provided with suitable family housing after one year, something we do to attract the educated to railway work.

[Question] What about linking the regions of the kingdom with the railroad?

[Answer] Studies are being carried out to determine the extent to which it would be possible to link the regions of the kingdom by new lines. These studies are being undertaken by the Ministry of Transportation in cooperation with the Ministry of Planning and the Railroad. The studies contain a comparison of freight services by rail with freight services by air. After these studies are complete, we will see the benefit to be gained by building new lines. It is my belief that this would be beneficial, if God wills. In addition, the study will consider the possibility and benefit of linking the kingdom with the neighboring states by rail.

Linking the Central and Western Regions

[Question] Are you thinking about building a line between the central and western regions?

[Answer] The idea is being considered; however, it must rest on economic foundations and studies which clarify the extent of the gain to be realized from that. There is another matter connected with the route the line would take. It might be useful for this line to pass through one region only. What is for certain is that the central region must be linked with the western. By what route and in what direction is a matter we leave to the studies.

The Hijaz Railway

[Question] What about the Hijaz railway?

[Answer] We as a railroad have no connection with a topic like that, because the Superior Hijaz Railway Commission, which is composed of three ministers from the kingdom, Jordan and Syria, decides and delimits everything connected with this line. As far as I know, the project is proceeding as well as could be desired.

Telephone inside the Train

[Question] How do you imagine train travel will be after the new line is opened?

[Answer] After the completing of the special project for completing the line, the train will be faster, reaching about 150 kilometers an hour at the most. The train will be like modern trains, which is to say it will be airconditioned and have a television circuit which you will be able to watch video movies on, in addition to Saudi television, the goal here being to entertain and relax the passengers. Even if the travel time falls to four hours, there must still be some means of entertainment. The really new thing will be the telephone inside the train, by means of which it will be possible to contact all the stations. In addition, there will be new crossing signs.

The Old and New Trains

[Question] What is the difference between the old and the new trains?

[Answer] Trains have a limited lifespan, and the old trains, which are now more than 30 years old, are still in use, but they are not in good condition like the new ones. We run the old trains on the stretch between Dammam and Al-Ahsa, since large numbers of passengers spend the weekend in these two cities. Therefore, we run a train on Wednesday and another on Friday to take care of them. In the future, we will run three or four trains each day in each direction, if we see the riders accepting that. I imagine that if the speed were increased and the distance made

shorter, the number of riders would increase. God be praised, we have means of encouraging people to take the train. It is possible for a rider to ship his car on the train while riding the train himself. When he reaches the station, he takes his car and goes.

Shipping Cars

[Question] What is the charge for shipping cars?

[Answer] Up till now, we have not set a charge for shipping cars, but the cost of shipping one is determined according to the size. We rent a freight car for 690 riyals. On the basis of this, the cost of car-shipping is determined by the number of automobiles in the freight car. We have special two-decker freight cars for shipping automobiles. Renting such a car does not cost more than 1200 riyals, and each one holds ten regular automobiles or 8 large ones. In this case, the cost of shipping an automobile does not exceed 150 riyals.

Training and the Sending Employees Abroad

[Question] What about training and sending railway employees abroad?

[Answer] It will be essential to train railway employees when we buy new trains. At that time, the division chief or his assistant or other employees who must be trained and already know English will be sent to be instructed in using and maintaining these trains. As for sending employees abroad, this will be done according to the civil service system. If the candidate meets the conditions set by the Ministry of Information of the Ministry of Higher Education, he will be sent. There is a committee set up to deal with this matters, and we agree on organizational matters. For instance, the chief of accounting here with us already had his BA degree in accounting. After he had met the administrative requirements, we decided to let him go get his masters, and he is now studying in America and will return afterwards to his work in the railway.

Our Services Are Limited

[Question] Why don't you adopt a reservation system like that used by Saudi Airlines?

[Answer] Saudi Airlines is an airline and has offices in all parts of the kingdom. As for us, our services are limited to two cities. If God wills, they will be expanded soon. Despite this, our services will remain limited next to those of Saudi Airlines. For instance, we cannot refund a passenger's ticket after he has purchased it, unless he returns it before departure time. If he returns it at the last moment, this is incorrect, since there is a known number of passengers from Dammam and we leave some places for passengers from Al-Ahsa, Al-Khafji and other stations. Therefore, it is difficult to refund tickets after we have reserved the places. As for reserving ahead of time, this requires having offices in each station, and these offices represent large financial

burdens. When the magnitude of passenger transport calls for something of the sort, it will be appropriate to look into it. However, the number is limited right now, since the number of passengers on each trip does not exceed 400. On the weekend, we get 1100 or 1200 passengers, and I do not believe that this number is large enough to call for the opening of reservation offices.

A Car for Families

[Question] Why are not additional cars set aside for the use of families, as well as a restaurant car?

[Answer] Only families go into the family car, and such a car is available each trip. As for a restaurant car, we aren't able to divide it into two parts, but there is a curtain which separates the family tables from the tables of the other passengers. In addition, the family car we have now is enough, and there is no need for additional cars to go and come empty of passengers.

Ready Meals

[Question] Why are no ready meals presented to the passengers at their seats?

[Answer] We tried that, but the passengers refused these meals. They want rice, meat and the kind of foods they are used to, and bringing food to the passengers in their sexta demands a larger number of workers. Another reason is that the train passengers can eat as they desire, since we do not add the cost of a meal to the ticket price.

For the Workers and the Citizens

[Question] Do you have something to say to the workers and citizens?

[Answer] I hope I can make it clear to the two groups, the railway workers and the citizens, that our only goal is to improve our service. As for the workers, I implore them to continue their fruitful and good efforts and to exert even more effort, because we are in these positions in order to serve the citizens. We cannot, however, do without the directions and observations of the citizens. We have worked to implement a number of their suggestions, but some things are difficult to accomplish.

12224

CSO: 4404/203

REASONS FOR PROLONGATION OF WAR EXAMINED

Paris EST ET OUEST in French No 660, Jan 83 pp 19-22

[Article by André Tong]

[Text] Afghanistan's war of resistance against the Soviet invasion has moved into its 4th year. The fighting goes on all over Afghanistan. Despite the thousands of troops and weapons fielded by the Soviet Union (100,000 men, tanks, aircraft, artillery, poison gas), the Soviet-Afghan forces have yet to beat the guerrillas. At the diplomatic level, efforts are under way to find a "political solution," but one may well wonder if that can be achieved in the current international context, given the Soviet Union's scorn for resolutions adopted by the international bodies.

The Political Solution

The Soviet invasion on 27 December 1979 was denounced by the leaders of the free world, by the majority of the non-aligned nations, and by the Islamic countries. Repeatedly the representatives of the UN member nations have voted overwhelmingly for resolutions calling for the immediate withdrawal of "foreign forces" from Afghanistan before devising a political solution.

In June 1982, conversations took place behind closed doors in Geneva under the auspices of the United Nations about a hypothetical political settlement for the Afghan problem. However, those talks were doomed to failure, inasmuch as nobody attended them except Pakistan and the communist government of Kabul. Iran had declined to attend, inasmuch as it does not recognize the Babrak Karmal regime, and the resistance forces were not invited.

The 13th conference of Islamic foreign affairs ministers, meeting at Niamey from 22 to 27 August 1982, had invited a delegation from the Afghan resistance, consisting of Prof Sebghatolla Modjaddedi, president of the Afghanistan Islamic Alliance, and two members of the executive committee of that alliance, the Mawlawi Muhammad Nabi Mohammadi, and Sayyed Ahmad Gaylani. In its closing statement, the conference reiterated its demand for immediate and complete withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. It also

It also insisted that emergency measures be taken to protect the unalienable national rights of the Afghan people, and that people's right freely to choose its own political, economic, and social system without any outside interference whatsoever.

From where it was sitting in Geneva the United Nations Subcommittee on Human Rights on 8 September 1982 passed a resolution solemnly reaffirming that "the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan is an essential condition for the restoration of human rights in that country." That resolution passed by 15 votes to 3 (USSR, Syria, and Ethiopia), with two abstentions (Iraq and India).

Lastly, the UN General Assembly came out on 29 November 1982 in favor of a resolution calling for immediate withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, a solution based on its independence and non-alignment, and continuation of United Nations mediation. The resolution passed by 114 votes to 21, with 13 abstentions.

Mr Diego Cordovez, special representative of the UN General Secretary, who had already presided over the Geneva talks in June 1982, was then sent to Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran in January 1983, a few weeks away from the non-aligned summit meeting in New Delhi.

Last October, Pakistan's president, Gen Zia-Ul-Haq, after a visit to Peking, put forth as "an idea of his own" the suggestion for an international conference to meet after the departure of Soviet troops from Afghanistan that would include "representatives of the Afghan people" as well as those of the "riverine states" (Iran, Pakistan, the USSR, China) and the United States "in its role as a great power."

For the moment, Kabul is sticking to its May 1980 and August 1981 proposals aimed at a political settlement: three-way negotiations with Iran and Pakistan, in the presence of the UN Secretary General or his representative, and multilateral consultations with a view to developing international guarantees. Kabul, however, does not look for the pullout of Soviet troops until the tripartite negotiations and the multilateral consultations have led to some acceptable plan.

Moscow of course has supported the Afghan government's proposals, making it clear that the talks could touch "only on aspects external to the Afghan problem," since, as TASS officially pointed out, "The internal affairs of the country concern only the Afghan people."

"The question surrounding the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan could be examined and settled within the context of such a political settlement."

The Truth According to Moscow

Shortly after the Soviet invasion, Moscow came out with an explanation all its own for this military action against a neutral, independent, and unaligned nation. Calling into play the fine art of prevarication of which the communists are past masters, the Soviet media delivered the Kremlin view of the Afghan problem. First came PRAVDA, with an interview with Leonid Brezhnev, then NOVOSTI news agency produced an article headlined "The Truth about Afghanistan."

The official Soviet agency, cunningly distorting the facts, had this to say:

"In order to repel foreign imperialist aggression, the new leadership in Afghanistan asked the Soviet Union to lend it moral, political, economic, and military aid. The Soviet Union responded to that request and sent limited contingents of soldiers into Afghanistan with the sole mission of helping the Afghani to fight the aggressors. It was understood that the Soviet troops would leave Afghan territory when their mission was accomplished.

"This aid is in no way directed against third countries, nor does it violate their interests," NOVOSTI goes on. "It is valid and legitimate, given the fact that it is in full consonance with the spirit and the letter of the treaty of friendship, good neighborliness, and cooperation signed by both countries on 2 December 1978 and recognized by international law, specifically Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which grants states the unalienable right to collective and individual self-defense against aggression."

Brezhnev, in his statement on 13 January 1980 to a PRAVDA correspondent, gave it as his view that, had Soviet troops not been sent into Afghanistan, that "would have meant that we were standing idly by while a serious threat to the security of the Soviet state was building on our southern frontier." He asserted that "the Afghan leadership had several times asked the Soviet Union for help," and that this request "stemmed from specific clauses in the treaty and was in harmony with the United Nations Charter." Brezhnev, however, refrained from identifying the aggressor, while NOVOSTI made it plain that it was "imperialist aggression." Lastly, Brezhnev stated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops would come "once the reasons for the aid requested by the leaders of Afghanistan have ceased to exist."

As one studies these two almost identical texts, one notices certain significant details glossed over by the usual untruths. For one, the Kabul government is referred to as the "new leadership of Afghanistan," a euphemism to cloak the fact that on 27 January there was no longer a government or a head of state in Kabul: the man who had held that post, Hafizullah Amin, had been slain.

Brabak Karmal, who was stopping in Prague at the time, did not reach Kabul via Tashkent until 29 December, 6 days after the invasion.

Brezhnev maintained that the Soviet troops had gone into Afghanistan as victims of foreign aggression, to ensure the security of the Soviet Union along its southern border. Well, that border runs from China to Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq -- and all the way to Turkey. Furthermore, from 1973 to 1979, there had never been the slightest evidence of aggression or even the threat of aggression against Afghanistan.

In citing the Soviet-Afghan treaty, Brezhnev puts a very special interpretation on it. According to him, this treaty is analogous to the Warsaw Pact, since identical clauses are contained in both. The Warsaw Pact, in its Article 3, deals with stationing of Soviet troops in the Pact member states under the terms of separate treaties signed with Moscow. Afghanistan, however, has never signed any such clause with Moscow, and Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan treaty refers solely to cooperation and military aid.

Babrak Karmal, in his radio speech broadcast on 29 December 1979, when he had taken power, not once said that he had invited Soviet armed forces into Afghanistan.

Lastly, invoking the United Nations Charter, Brezhnev artfully twisted the meaning of Article 51. That provision stipulates that "nothing shall stand against the inherent right of states to individual or collective self-defense if an attack is launched on a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the requisite measures to keep the peace and protect international security," Afghanistan had no chance to appeal to the UN, since at the moment of the invasion it had neither a head of state nor a government to call upon the Security Council. Such an appeal, of course, would unquestionably have proved futile in view of the almost certain Soviet veto.

The West's Big Mistake

Since the death of Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov's rise to the summit of the CPSU, the West is gleefully given to understand that the Soviet Union would be "favorable to a political solution" in Afghanistan.

This idea first saw the light of day following interviews Andropov granted to selected communist leaders from abroad during the funeral rites for Brezhnev. They, in turn, dutifully reported the tenor of those conversations to the people in their own countries who had a right to know. What it all actually amounted to was a new Soviet campaign of news-poisoning and disinformation.

The West keeps on making the same mistake when it comes to Kremlin policy, to wit: looking at it as if it were arrived at like their own. In the Soviet Union, decisions are made by a collegial leadership, meaning by members of the Party Politburo after discussions there, and announced by its secretary-general; the Central Committee merely ratifies them. Insofar as the invasion of Afghanistan is concerned, the Politburo rallied to the views of two of its members, important because of the constituencies they represent: Marshal Dimitri Ustinov, defense minister and hence spokesman for the army, and Yuri Andropov, chief of the KGB, the powerful agency that not only controls an army of 35,000 men (border guards, the Kremlin guard regiments, and peace officers), but also some 400,000 spies scattered all over the world, 900 of them in Afghanistan alone.

The notion of the political solution floated by Moscow has fallen on sympathetic ears among those westerners who still believe in detente. These people, though, do not seem to take into account a vital issue that flies in the face of any peaceful settlement. The Kremlin would be "favorably disposed toward a political solution reached by political means," according to unofficial Moscow sources, but Soviet troops will stay in Afghanistan "so long as foreign support is supplied to the rebellion." That brings us back once more to the so-called justification for the Soviet invasion to help the Kabul forces fight an imaginary aggression from outside Afghanistan's borders.

Contrary to the way the thinking runs in certain Western leadership circles, the Soviet Union has toughened its apparatus by seating a kind of troika in the CPSU Politburo, representing the Party, the army, and the KGB. Konstantin Tchernenko, a simon-pure product of the CPSU, was simultaneously appointed to head the Supreme Soviet's foreign affairs committee -- a post that has been vacant since the death of Mikhail Suslov -- a member of the Politburo, and of the Secretariat. The army is represented by Marshal Ustinov, and the KGB by its boss, Andropov.

The Situation in Kabul and on the Battleground

The situation in Kabul is steadily deteriorating. On the one hand, resistance action is broadening in scope: executions of traitors or of high-ranking officials in the Kabul regime like Deputy Transport Minister Mohammad Dalili, killed by the mujaheddin; in Kabul early in November; bomb attacks in capital neighborhoods frequented by the Soviets; roads blocked around the capital; destruction of outposts manned by the Soviet-Afghan forces. On the other hand, tensions between the two rival factions in the PDPA -- the Parcham and the Khalq -- are mounting. This is clearly demonstrated at the noisy weekly meetings of the cabinet. Verbal fisticuffs between Interior Minister Goulabzoy and Dr Najib, who heads the secret police (Khad), backed by the minister for tribes and nationalities, are commonplace and open.

That state of affairs was made public on 14 November 1982 by A.K. Sawar, former director general of records in the prime minister's office. A.K. Sawar, who worked for 13 years in the prime minister's office, took advantage of a mission entrusted him by Prime Minister Sultan Ali Keshtman, to the valley of Panjshi, to flee to Peshawar and join the resistance, with which he had always had contacts.

By reason of his office, Sarwar had knowledge of all the decrees passed by the cabinet, and he was able to lay bare the machinery of the government's apparatus. All decisions submitted to the cabinet had to be approved in advance by the prime minister's Soviet advisers. He would then send them to a working committee that met every Tuesday and included the ministers of interior, communications, finance, and industry, which would go over them. In the cabinet, proposals advanced, duly approved by the Soviet advisers and Goulabzoy, are regularly rejected even if they are reasonable. Those suggested by the defense minister, however, are routinely approved. The defense minister had opposed a proposal to upgrade police weaponry, called for by his colleague at Interior, and got the cabinet to rule that the Khalq police had no need of weapons: in his eyes, they were suspect. When they learned of that decision, the Khalq police refused to turn in their weapons and, faced with that threat, the government revoked the decree.

Morale among party members is low. In Kabul, the authorities are counting on the Parchami to make night patrols in the capital, but unfortunately they are an undisciplined lot. Furthermore, absenteeism is a major problem, because for a patrol -- say 12 men -- only two show up for duty. They have had to turn to the Khalqi, and they can hardly count on them, either. Meanwhile, Kabul is patrolled by night by two tanks, one Soviet and the other assembled by Khalqi.

Inside the administration, the majority of officials in the prime minister's office is either sympathetic to the resistance or non-political. The Khalqi have been ousted, as have the Pathans, and replaced by people from the North, mainly Hazara -- members of the ethnic minority to which Keshmand belongs. The newly installed officials lack experience, and must rely on the few old hands who have managed to keep their jobs.

Out in the field, the military situation is no more favorable to the Kabul government than is the political state of affairs. The fighting has not stopped, despite the winter, especially in the eastern provinces like Pakthia, Kunar, and Nangarhar. In Nangarhar, the government forces have been decimated by the Soviets. On 1 November 1982, some 80 officers in the government forces, including their commanding officer, Gulam Jan, who had flown from Lowgar province, were shot by Soviet soldiers at Jalalabad airport. They had been charged with plotting to murder the Soviet officers at that airport.

An Official Visit Cut Short

Out in the western provinces, security is not assured, as Brabak Karmal found out at first hand. The head of state had gone in mid-October on an official visit to Herat, capital of the province of the same name on the frontier with Iran. That trip, initially planned to include a 4-day stay, was reduced to a single morning. Local resistance forces, alerted 2 weeks in advance by the Kabul Mudjadin, handed out pamphlets calling on the people to stay at home, to close their shops, and to observe a voluntary curfew. A few days before Karmal's scheduled arrival, the Soviet-Afghan forces mounted an operation to neutralize the town. The resistance reacted sharply, destroying 12 tanks and armored vehicles. The security forces, backed by a Parchami contingent flown in from Kabul, withdrew, but not without firing a few artillery shells at the suburbs of Herat to intimidate the resistance.

At dawn, a few hours before Karmal was due to arrive, the Mudjadin set up a mortar barrage against government-held positions, and damaged the Hotel Mafaq, where the official lunch was planned and where the head of state was to stay. Arriving at the airport, Karmal and the official entourage drove at top speed into Herat, although the 4-kilometer road into town was lined with a cordon of Soviet and Afghan troops. Karmal, ensconced in a Soviet armored limousine, entered the city at the very moment when a guerrilla fighter had managed to slip in among the soldiers and fire his rocket-launcher at a fuel tank truck, which took fire. The explosion blew up some nearby gasoline cans, but the official procession continued its route through a pall of dense black smoke. The security forces, in the general confusion, were unable to catch the Mudjahad, who had been spirited away to a hero's celebration. His photograph was distributed in the city he had been able to leave without a hand's being laid on him.

Karmal, hoping to stick to the established program, went to the stadium where the police had rounded up enough citizens to provide an adequate audience for the head of state. They rose up from their seats en masse and forced the gates of the stadium, leaving it deserted. Karmal had to be content with haranguing a handful of aged dignitaries hustled to the prefecture under military escort. Having got there in the morning, Karmal was back in Kabul by early afternoon.

Despite the worsening situation for Kabul, the Soviet Union will never pull out of territory bordering on its own once it has set foot there, whether or not some westerners don't like the idea. The Afghan leaders now in office can be replaced or physically eliminated like Daoud, Taraki, and Amin. Before the Kremlin opts for a political solution to the Afghan problem it must, before all else, make sure that Afghanistan is irrevocably a satellite: then it can withdraw its troops.

SOVIETS BELIEVED LOOKING FOR WAY OUT OF AFGHAN IMPASSE

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jan 83 pp 20-21

[Article by George Hardy]

[Text]

Since the death of President Brezhnev speculation has naturally concentrated on likely shifts in Soviet policies. Particular interest has been shown in the question of whether the new Soviet leadership will tackle what is arguably the most awkward legacy of Brezhnev's foreign policy – the invasion of Afghanistan with the imposition of a puppet regime in Kabul three years ago.

Since the beginning of 1980 Soviet troops, arms and money have been poured into Afghanistan in an effort to stabilise the Karmal regime, but it remains almost totally dependent on Soviet support. The Afghan resistance, on the other hand, appears stronger and better organised.

The fundamental factor to reckon with is that for the Russians Afghanistan represents only one of a number of complex, inter-related problems, and that only a reassessment of foreign policy in general is likely to result in a major change in Soviet policy on Afghanistan.

Estimates of future policy changes are made more difficult by lack of open public debate in the USSR, but even so there are many clues. Brezhnev's state funeral on November 15 was made the occasion for a long and gracious welcome to General Zia ul Haq of Pakistan, and a correspondingly low-key welcome to Soviet protégé Babrak Karmal. Some observers claim that General Secretary Yuri Andropov, along with other new leaders, never approved of the Afghan adventure, and are particularly keen to end Soviet involvement.

However, no realistic observer can ignore the obstacles in the way of rapid solutions to the Afghan crisis. Much has clearly gone wrong in Soviet calculations since 1978, both about internal Afghan resistance and the strength of international protests at the Soviet intervention, but it is stalemate and not military defeat

the Russians face. The embarrassments on the international scene and the costs in money and men are hardly severe enough to force a humiliating withdrawal of troops and the immediate collapse of Karmal's government.

What the Russians will surely try to obtain are firm guarantees that Afghanistan remains essentially in the Soviet sphere of interest, and that a government – not necessarily communist – in Kabul will be stable and closely linked to the USSR in all important respects. "Finlandisation" is how some analysts describe this type of relationship.

Soviet interference in Afghanistan has alienated a majority of Third World states, notably Muslim states, and it has been a major grievance also for China, Western Europe and the US. If Soviet foreign policy priorities are, as is generally agreed, restoring some form of detente with the West and establishing better relations with China, then Soviet concessions over Afghanistan to bring about a negotiated settlement are a distinct likelihood.

A major stumbling block in the way of any negotiated settlement is the lack of agreement on what sort of guarantees are necessary, who would give such guarantees, and who or what alternative government would be acceptable to the Afghan people. Many different states have interests in the Afghan crisis, and there are many rival Afghan parties and fronts active in the resistance. All these rival claims obviously cannot be reconciled.

Unless a really capable Afghan leader with a truly national following emerges from the resistance it is a coalition of liberal or nationalist politicians from the pre-1978 era which is likely to form the nucleus of a provisional government capable of being recognised inside Afghanistan – and by the Russians also – as the best hope of getting peace and a

degree of independence for the country.

There have been signs since the spring of 1982 that Afghan attempts to form such a provisional government in exile, so far unsuccessful, have had help and encouragement from senior Soviet officials in Kabul. Afghans with diplomatic or political experience as ministers or officials in past Afghan governments before the 1978 revolution have left Kabul to make extended tours to Afghan centres of exile in Pakistan, India, Western Europe and the US. There are persistent and well-founded rumours current in Kabul that some respected and highly capable recent exiles now openly working abroad towards unity and peace left Kabul with the knowledge that their efforts to promote a moderate coalition government for national reconciliation were looked on with favour by Soviet officials.

Abdur Rahman Pazhwak is said to be one such envoy. Pazhwak left Kabul for New Delhi in March 1982, and since then has talked with Afghan exiles and foreign diplomats in India, Pakistan, Western Europe and the US. They listened because Pazhwak, a former president of the United Nations General Assembly, is a distinguished and trusted figure, an "elder statesman" as well as a fierce Afghan nationalist.

Many of the more moderate, experienced Afghan nationalists in exile no longer see an alternative – except anarchy and destruction – to some compromise with the Russians. The big question remains, how much faith would the Russians place in a non-communist coalition to bring stability back to Afghanistan, if Soviet troops were withdrawn?

At present, even the would-be architects of peace admit that there is no alternative in the immediate future to pursuing the guerilla war, if independence for Afghanistan is the goal. Only by strengthening the resistance to the Karmal regime, they argue, will the Russians be persuaded of the urgency of a political solution to a crisis which the Russians have so far understood more as a military challenge.

But even if the Russians are losing patience with the bitterly divided Khalq and Parcham factions, and have little confidence in them, there is as yet no obvious alternative government.

The Afghan parties based in Peshawar across the border in Pakistan claim to lead the popular struggle inside the country, but their leaders have not and probably could not in future combine to end their rivalries in one united government. The strategy which many observers believe is being adopted is that of undercutting the parties through independent nationalists appealing directly to local regional chiefs of the resistance inside Afghanistan, offering positions of power in a future Afghan government. It is also a strategy which the Karmal regime is trying, though it seems with only very partial success in the southeastern provinces.

One significant change in recent months has been General Zia's public statements, suggesting a softer line on a negotiated peace settlement, possibly reflecting secret discussions between Soviet and Pakistani representatives. Pakistan has a crucial part to play in such a settlement, because its territory is host to some 2.5 million Afghan refugees and Afghan political parties supplying the resistance with much of their arms.

Zia has recently made some shrewd suggestions for ending the war, calling for a neutral, free and Islamic Afghanistan which maintains friendly relations with the USSR. He has rightly stated that the USSR cannot tolerate an anti-Soviet state in Afghanistan along its central Asian borders, but he has also urged that the Afghan problem was caused by the USSR, and that the key to the problem lies in Moscow. Suggesting, like others before him, that the UN Security Council should guarantee a neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan, Zia proposed that the Karmal government as well as Afghan resistance leaders should participate in negotiations with the USSR, Pakistan, Iran, China and the US.

SOVIETS TAKING DRASTIC MEASURES TO SHORE UP POSITION

Senior Radio Officers Fired

Karachi BUSINESS RECORDER in English 29 Jan 83 p 5

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Jan 28. The Kabul regime had sacked a number of senior and high-ranking officers of radio Kabul on the pretext of disobeying the Russian Advisors. According to a press release of Afghan Information and Documentation Centre.

These officers were replaced by in-experienced ones, complete censorship had been imposed and nothing could be published by newspapers without vetting by the Russian advisors.

The press release further said that most of the localities of Kabul city were sunk in darkness for the last one month as a result of shortage of workers in the electricity department.

The people of city were facing tremendous difficulties as the city was also hit by acute shortage of kerosine oil and diesel. Hundreds of vehicles were off the road due to non-availability of diesel.—

Measures for New Government Reported

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 31 Jan 83 p 4

[Article by Balram Tandon]

[Text] KABUL--There have been persistent reports in Kabul of an impending overhaul of Mr. Babrak Karmal's government on the orders of the Kremlin.

In the short term, it seems, the changes would mainly be designed to make the People's Democratic party (as the Communist party of Afghanistan is known) and the government more cohesive and more acceptable to the people.

Most reports spring from the firm belief that the Russians are nursing a second line of leadership in Moscow.

Pre-eminent among the personalities in Gen. Mohammed Rafie, Deputy Prime Minister and formerly chief of the Defense forces. He has been on a course in Russia since the autumn last year.

Russian policy planners for South Asia have grown weary of the bitter infighting between the Parcham (the ruling flag) faction of the People's Democratic party and the Khalq (the masses) faction which was eased from power with the arrival of Russian troops.

To all outward appearances the Parcham faction is still in favour with the Kremlin.

Elders Taken Hostage

Manila BULLETIN TODAY in English 4 Feb 82 p 3

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Feb. 3 (Reuter)--Soviet and Afghan troops have taken 100 local elders hostages in a big offensive against a guerrilla stronghold in Afghanistan's southeastern province of Logar where they captured a French doctor, Afghan resistance sources in neighbouring Pakistan said yesterday.

The sources said both sides suffered heavy casualties in two weeks of fighting last month and the Islamic guerrillas had retreated from their positions because of severe cold and snowfall.

The capture of the French doctor, Philippe Augoyard, was announced by state-run Radio Afghanistan last Saturday. A French medical organization, Aide Medicale Internationale, said in Paris later that he was one of three French doctors working among civilians in Logar with the resistance group Harkat Inquilab Islami.

The two other doctors, including a woman, arrived in Pakistan on Sunday after the guerrillas succeeded in moving them to a safe place, the sources said. They were identified as Gilles Albanel and Odile de Baillenx.

The sources said Augoyard was captured when guerrillas were moving him from the battle area.

CSO: 4600/305

REPORTAGE ON PREPARATIONS FOR NONALIGNED SUMMIT

Organizations Invited

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 4 Jan 83 pp 1, 7

[Text] External Affairs Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao has addressed letters to 12 countries and eight international organisations inviting them to attend as observers of the Seventh Nonaligned Summit in New Delhi next March.

These very countries and organisations had attended the Havana Summit in September, 1979 as observers.

The list of guests to the New Delhi Summit is yet to be finalised.

It is as yet not known if France would be invited as a guest. In any case, the Government of India is not empowered to extend such an invitation because France was not invited as a guest to the last Summit. If the New Delhi Summit decides to invite it as a guest, only the summit itself (or the Nonaligned Coordinating Bureau) can take a decision in the matter.

Spain and Portugal were invited at the last summit as guests. The difference between a guest and an observer is that whereas a guest can attend only the ceremonial and formal functions of the summit, an observer can participate in all the sessions including committee meetings and place its views on record.

The countries invited as observers are: Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela (which has applied for membership in the movement), Colombia, El Salvador, Dominica, Barbados; Papua-New Guinea, Philippines, Costa Rica and Ecuador.

The organisations invited are UN the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organisation, Arab League, Islamic Conference, Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (South Africa as it will be called after its liberation from white minority rule), the Socialist Party of Puerto Rico, the Organisation for African Unity and African National Congress.

All the 20 observers were present at the Sixth summit in Havana in 1979.

In his letter to the Observers, Mr Rao is understood to have drawn their attention to certain critical issues, including the nuclear arms race, the military build up in the Indian Ocean and other areas of tension posing a threat to peace.

Effort To Narrow Differences

Madras THE HINDU in English 5 Jan 83 p 9

[Article by G.K. Reddy: "Delhi Summit Will Try To Narrow Differences"]

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 4--A major effort will be made at the coming non-aligned conference to narrow the differences among member-countries on contentious issues like Afghanistan, Kampuchea, the Iraq-Iran conflict and the Palestine problem.

As the host country, India will have to tread very carefully in reconciling its national position with its role as chairman of the summit in evolving a consensus on each of these issues based on majority opinion with which the dissenting minority is ready to acquiesce in the larger interests of unity and cohesion of the nonaligned movement.

Spelling out some of these delicate responsibilities at a press conference, the Secretary-General designate of the summit, Mr K. Natwar Singh, said India felt encouraged by the cooperative attitude of many member-countries which were equally interested in preserving the solidarity of the nonaligned community. Though there was scope for honest differences, the movement itself would not be faced with any grave dissensions, in the absence of any unanimity on controversial problems.

Kampuchea seat to stay vacant: The Kampuchean seat, he said, would be kept vacant in pursuance of the decision taken at the Havana summit. As host country, India had no right to reverse any such decision unless the coming summit decided to change it. He ruled out the suggestion that Prince Norodom Sihanouk could be invited to address the conference in his individual capacity as one of the founders of the movement, since there was no precedent for extending such personal invitations.

The senior officials of the External Affairs Ministry who have been visiting various countries to discuss the broad concepts of the political and economic declarations, have returned with the impression that the majority would prefer relatively short and precise declarations focussing attention on primary issues like peace, disarmament, South-South cooperation and global negotiations.

The drafts were being prepared placing the primary emphasis on cooperation rather than confrontation, acknowledging differences while endeavouring to reconcile differing opinions to evolve broadly acceptable approaches to most problems. These drafts would be circulated at least five to six weeks before the summit to elicit the views of all member-countries before finalising them.

Concern over security: As the host, India is more immediately concerned with the physical arrangements for this largest conference ever held in Delhi, with the participation of as many as 70 to 75 heads of Government posing tremendous security problems. The Indian security authorities are in constant touch with the countries concerned about the special requirements in the case of each of these heads of Government. The security teams of many countries

have already visited or are due to visit Delhi to discuss and finalise the arrangements.

All the heads of delegation, numbering 96, will be lodged in five of the top five-star hotels--Ashok, Samrat, Taj, Maurya and Oberoi--which are to be treated as special security zones. A good many of the 3,000 delegates will be lodged in other hotels, while the supporting staff will be housed in the Asian Games village.

The Government of India will treat as its guests only the heads of delegations and their wives and five others from each delegation, while all others will be required to meet their expenses in accordance with the established practice at all nonaligned summit conferences.

The Government will place at the disposal of each delegation a new Mercedes car and five other Indian-made vehicles, and their respective embassies will have to meet any additional transport requirements.

Seating arrangements: The main hall at Vigyan Bhavan, which is being renovated and provided with additional seating arrangements, can accommodate only 1,400 persons. The heads of Governments would be seated on the main dais with the outgoing and incoming chairmen at the opening and concluding plenary sessions, while the available seats on the main floor will have to be shared between the foreign ministers and others representing member countries, observers and guests.

There is no firm indication yet as to how much money is going to be spent on this conference, since the expenditure will be incurred as in the case of the Asiad under different heads and by different agencies of the Government. But the External Affairs Ministry is stressing that it would be only a small percentage of what other countries had spent to host these nonaligned summit conferences.

First of all, no new conference complex as such is being built and no new villas and hotels constructed to house the heads of Government and other delegates. A good bit of expensive equipment is being borrowed from Iraq to avoid unnecessary expenditure. And some of the more affluent member countries will be sharing the expenditure following the established convention.

CSO: 4600/1605

OPPOSITION OFFICIALS COMMENT ON ELECTION RESULTS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Jan 82 pp 1, 7

[Text] New Delhi, Jan 7--Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee, president of the Bharatiya Janata Party, today demanded that Mrs Gandhi resign immediately as Prime Minister or seek a fresh national mandate from the people. The election results from Andhra, Karnataka and Tripura "clearly and decisively" had shown that she ceased to have a mandate to rule the country, he said.

Mrs Gandhi had approached the present Assembly elections as if they were a referendum for her policies and personal style of ruling, Mr Vajpayee said in a statement issued here. "No expense, effort, misuse of power or naked coercion was spared in trying to subvert the poll and obtain a fictional mandate." Yet, Mrs Gandhi's party was routed in all three States.

The ruling party had been routed in Andhra and Karnataka, traditional Congress (I) strongholds since Independence. Even in Medak, Mrs Gandhi's own constituency, the Congress(I) was trounced. "This should be an eyeopener for all," he said.

The BJP chief recalled that Mrs Gandhi had been very vocal during the days of the Janata Government in demanding the resignation of the Prime Minister when Janata failed to win elections in any State. And he asked: "What does Mrs Gandhi have to say, now that a nationwide pattern has emerged, amounting to a total rejection of her personal style and attitude?"

The Janata Party said today that it "salutes the people of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh" for the political wisdom and maturity they demonstrated in rejecting "Indira Gandhi and her anti-people policies and autocratic methods."

P.M.'s Waterloo

In a statement, Mr Syed Shahabuddin, general secretary of the party, said that "the election results in Andhra and Karnataka prove that personal charisma cannot override corruption inefficiency, mismanagement and the deliberate erosion of democratic values.... Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh have become the Waterloo for the dynastic ambitions of Mrs Gandhi, and her dream to ensure the succession of Rajiv Gandhi has shattered forever."

Mr Shahabuddin warned Mrs Gandhi that any effort to deny a democratic Government would create a sharp reaction among the people against her Government and her party throughout the country.

Mr B.D. Singh, Chief Whip of the Lok Dal Parliamentary Party, in a statement hailed the rejection of the ruling party as an "historic verdict" by the electorate in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. "The electorate deserve congratulations," he added.

Significant

The politburo of the CPI(M) similarly congratulated the people of Tripura, Andhra and Karnataka and said that the rout of the Congress(I) was an event full of significance for the future.

None, including the ruling party, expected the Congress(I) to win in Tripura. But its collapse in the other two States was not expected. "It has only revealed how the Congress(K) regimes in these two states had lost the confidence of the people because of their bankrupt anti-people policies, their moral and political corruption and trade in defectors."

CSO: 4600/1611

FURTHER PRESS COMMENT ON OUTCOME OF ELECTIONS

Gandhi Mistakes Discussed

Madras THE HINDU in English 7 Jan 83 p 1

[Article by G.K. Reddy: "A Shattering Blow to Congress (I)"]

[Text]

NEW DELHI, Jan. 6.

The debacle in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, which looked as though it was only a jolt when the first results came in, turned out to be a big rout with the ruling Congress (I) suffering a humiliating setback in these strongholds, a shattering reversal for the party since its victorious return to power at the Centre in 1980.

The Congress (I) leaders, who were hoping to get at least a near or narrow majority in Andhra Pradesh and fare considerably better in Karnataka, had no immediate explanation to offer how they had misjudged the mood of the people in these two States so miserably.

A brave attempt was, no doubt, being made to give the impression that the voters continued to have faith in Mrs. Indira Gandhi's leadership, but had given expression to their sense of revulsion at the arrogant behaviour and rampant corruption of her minions in the two States. But this laboured apology did not carry any conviction since Mrs. Gandhi herself tried to transform these elections, at any rate in Andhra Pradesh, into an epic fight between her and Mr. N. T. Rama Rao, as though it was a referendum on her own rule.

The Prime Minister's charisma has apparently not worked in these elections. She made the big mistake of belittling Mr. Rama Rao's mass appeal by looking down on him as no more than a cruel joke on the Telugu people.

Vulnerable position: She also placed herself unwittingly in a politically vulnerable position by refusing to join issue with him on the three issues of misrule, corruption and constant interference from Delhi. She kept on flogging dead horses, as it were, by concentrating her fire on the evils of communalism, casteism and regionalism, as though the Congress (I) was not guilty of them.

The absence of an Indira wave led the Congress (I) to imagine that there was no anti-Indira wave either in these elections. But in the end the ruling party was overtaken by the NTR tide that swept with varying degrees of intensity in the three regions. It was thought that

he had no organisation worth the name to convert crowds into votes, little realising that voters need no coaxing or prompting in this sort of situation.

The shock is even greater over what has happened in Karnataka, where the Chief Minister himself has been defeated with several of his Cabinet colleagues. The Congress (I) never expected that it was in for this heavy punishment in what was generally reckoned to be a safe State.

The electoral alliance of the Janata Party and Kranti Ranga, backed by the two communist parties, has worked well in confounding the Congress (I), although it is debatable whether the party would have received a still more severe mauling if all other Opposition groups had turned up in a common front.

Though nobody here expected that the Congress (I) would do so badly both in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka, those with hindsight are now attributing the debacle to her excessive dependence on the advice of the smart alics, the whizz kids, who have wormed their way into her entourage. She was clearly taken in by their smooth talk backed by charts and computer projections from a central control room set up at one of the attached offices of her residence.

"Remote control": These ambitious young politicians, whose only qualification has been their proximity to the household, had no special knowledge of the local conditions. The attempts to run the campaign by remote control from Delhi, while Mrs. Gandhi herself was blazing her way through the two States, had clearly misfired with disastrous consequences. A few heads are going to roll as more and more details reach her of the mishandling of the selection of candidates and conduct of the campaign.

The Prime Minister has good reason to be worried that the rout in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka will embolden the Congress dissi-

dents in other States, notably Maharashtra, Gujarat and Rajasthan, to campaign openly against the Chief Ministers despite her efforts to shield them. It is going to be extremely difficult for Mrs. Gandhi to resist the mounting pressures for changes in these States which are equally plagued by incompetence and corruption.

The forthcoming elections to the municipal corporation and metropolitan council in Delhi will acquire added importance in the wake of the Congress (I)'s poor performance in the two Southern States.

The Assembly and Parliamentary poll in Assam and Meghalaya that follow a little later would be no less unpredictable, since the setback for the ruling party in the South has

come as a shot in the arm for the defiant students who are bent on stepping up their agitation to boycott the elections.

The Akalis, too, might be on the warpath again, imagining that the Centre would relent in the wake of increasing pressures in other States. The hardliners among them will not be in any great hurry now to arrive at some agreement with the Centre, since they would probably prefer to bide their time hoping to extract better terms.

The New Year has begun rather badly for the Congress (I) which in taking a calculated risk in Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka in opting for what virtually amounted to a snap poll had grossly overrated Mrs. Gandhi's vote getting capacity in the changed circumstances.

Dilemma for Congress-I

Madras THE HINDU in English 8 Jan 83 p 9

[Article by G.K. Reddy: "Election Debacle Poses Dilemma for Congress(I)"]

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 7.

The post-mortem on what really went wrong in Andhra Pradesh leading to a total rout of the Congress (I) is taking place against the general background of the ruling party's far from satisfactory performance in almost all the Assembly elections held since last year.

Though it was able to form Ministries in Haryana and Himachal Pradesh with the help of defectors, the Opposition parties had fared better than the Congress (I) in both these States.

It was not expected to put up more than a token fight in West Bengal while in Kerala the Congress (I) was able to get together a noncommunist coalition. Despite the merger of the Antony Congress with it, there is no certainty that the present Ministry headed by the Congress (I) will be able to last the full five-year term in this highly volatile State.

But the shattering blow in Andhra Pradesh, followed by the defeat in Karnataka, has made the Congress (I) quite panicky about its ability to sustain its grip over the other States. There is a disconcerting feeling in ruling party circles that the point of diminishing returns has been reached, posing the cruel dilemma whether it would be more advantageous to opt for a parliamentary election while the going is good or hang on to power till 1985 in the hope that it should be possible to regain its lost influence.

The Andhra-Karnataka debacle has also made the Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, painfully aware of the inadequacies of her Government at the Centre itself in coping with the mounting problem. Amidst the shock of what happened in the two southern States, a meeting of the Economic Committee of the Cabinet had to be held yesterday at short notice to take stock of the very serious

financial crisis facing the country that is not generally known outside the inner circles of the Government.

Many challenges: The calibre of the present Cabinet is not adequate for improving the quality of administration to deal with many such problems during the critical months ahead, when the Centre may have to deal with many political challenges.

Nor is the party leadership endowed with the necessary experience to display the requisite highmindedness and bigness of heart in giving the rank and file a fuller sense of participation.

It remains to be seen whether the Central leadership of the Congress (I) has learnt the right lessons from the Andhra-Karnataka debacle and will be able to benefit from this humiliating experience.

Apart from the fact that a lot of totally incompetent persons have been allowed to catapult themselves into pivotal positions of power both at the Centre and the States, the Prime Minister has failed lamentably to exert any degree of control to enforce at least a semblance of probity in public life.

The three issues that Mrs Gandhi refused to take cognisance of during the Andhra-Karnataka campaign--arrogance of power, appalling corruption and constant Central interference in States--will continue to haunt her party unless she is prepared to take firm steps, better late than never, to restore inner party democracy, respect dissent, stamp out dishonesty and reward more deserving party colleagues.

'HINDU' Editorial

Madras THE HINDU in English 8 Jan 83 p 8

[Editorial: "Results Pregnant With Meaning"]

[Text]

THE UNSEATING OF the Congress (I) in the two southern States long regarded as safeholds and its decisive failure to wrest the northeastern State of Tripura from the Left Front headed by the CPI (M) is, beyond ambiguity, a major political reverse for the party ruling at the Centre. The defeat must appear the more galling for the fact that the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, chose to stake her reputation heavily in these elections and, in some ways, made them appear as a kind of referendum on the quality of her party's rule. Behind the rout in Andhra Pradesh and the shock in Karnataka, there was a simple common factor at work: the disenchantment of the people with their rulers and with their lot. It is this that provided a solid base standing on which Mr. N. T. Rama Rao's Telugu Desam — an infant in the political field, barely nine months old — was able to carve out a remarkable, runaway triumph unprecedented in

Indian political experience; and it is this which enabled a hardly united Opposition in Karnataka to score an upset good enough to yield it the gaddi against all odds. For the losers as well as winners, the writing that has been on the wall for quite some time now must be read seriously: there is political restiveness beneath the surface, wherever you dig in the country. The people are demonstrably eager for results (their patience with misrule or not-good-enough rule getting progressively short), they are quite willing to try out fresh political packages or slogans or faces, and they are far from conservative in giving short shrift to those who do not inspire or satisfy them. Given such a mood, it is no surprise that "stability" (which is often interpreted as the trait of staying with one party) is much less of a sacred cow with the ruled than it is with the rulers. It has become increasingly clear over the last few years that, in a country as vast, as

multisided and as complex as India, there is no reason to frown on the phenomenon of political pluralism. Another striking feature of the political health of the country is this: recent elections have demonstrated that while unequal deployment of resources tends to place competitive political forces in unequal situations to start with, this is neutralised to a heartening extent by the fact that popular votes (including those of the large number of illiterate people and the weaker sections) cannot be purchased and the traditional "vote-banks" have had to go out of business.

There are, of course, several more specific reasons for the shocks that the electorate unleashed in the two southern States. These include factors such as the handling of the issues involved in the "farmers' agitation" (in Karnataka), the assaults on democratic rights and repressive practices (in both States) and the widespread knowledge that the administration was not clean. But the present task calls for something beyond an analysis of the factors responsible for the political swing. The Telugu Desam assumes office with the advantage of a better than two thirds majority in the Andhra Pradesh Assembly and with a leader who has been able to sway the electorate all by himself; its legislators include youth and a number of professionals and highly educated people. If it can develop a constructive development vision and get on with the job of providing a State of splendid resources (and fairly good growth rates) with a type of administration that is ever responsive to people's welfare needs and expectations, its future will be promising. In Karnataka, the situation is somewhat more tricky but if the Janata-Kranti Ranga combine —

which will undoubtedly be asked to form the Ministry, as the single largest grouping with a near-majority — can assure itself the backing of the other Opposition parties and avoid the infighting and the ideological traps that did the earlier Janata experiment in, it can also contribute positively to the development and political processes despite its being a coalition. In Tripura, the Left Front can be expected to consolidate its advantages and the projects it has under way. In every one of these cases, it must be understood in all quarters that there is no sound alternative to the people's verdict being respected fully.

There are major common issues and problems facing those, with varying political and ideological background, in the four southern States who have been entrusted by the people with the task of governance. The barriers constituted by language and other types of narrow pulls should not be allowed to stand in the way of a broad and liberal-spirited cooperation among these States, for instance on the concrete issues of food, energy, water and industrial products. Along with the problems and advantages that are to be shared (in a manner compatible with the interests of the people of each State), there are the experiences and lessons of the development process. In this connection, the Zonal Council can be profitably activated (or revived) as an instrument for promoting cooperation and debate on the issues that matter. The best way in which the victors can show respect to those who sent them into the corridors of power would be to turn their attention, in a businesslike way, to development priorities of this kind.

CSO: 4600/1612

BENGAL CPI OFFICIAL COMMENTS ON ULYANOVSKIY ARTICLE

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 7 Jan 83 p 7

[Text]

CALCUTTA, January 6.

IN a 11-column interview published in his own party daily in two instalments, the CPI state council secretary, Mr. Biswanath Mukherjee, maintains that his party has never been under the political guidance or direction of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), because there is no longer any international communist control centre since the days of the communist international.

The context for the statement, of course, is the controversial viewpoint of a Soviet academician, Mr. Uliyanovsky, regarding the Indian political scene. But Mr. Mukherjee makes it out as if he has been provoked by the constant "slander" of "bourgeoisie newspapers", especially two unnamed but mass-circulating local newspapers. To that extent his effort may have been as much an exercise in trying to end confusion, if any, in his own party rank and file.

BHATINDA CONGRESS

But in doing so he has taken the party much nearer to the CPM politically than ever done so explicitly, especially in regard to one immediate issue. Referring to the party's Bhatinda congress and the recent national council's Hyderabad session deliberations, Mr. Mukherjee makes it clear that the BJP no longer remains an untouchable in a general sense.

"On specific issues, principally inside parliament and, if the need arises, even outside parliament, we are ready to oppose the government along with the BJP; because on such issues there is need for maximum and widest possible mobilisation to oppose the government's misdeeds or reactionary policies". But then, Mr. Mukherjee makes it equally clear, that it is not improper to call the BJP reactionary in all respects; "Therefore, we do not want that state power should go to that party at the centre or in any state; we do not even like the BJP's accretion

of strength as an opposition party in parliament or any legislature, because this will not be beneficial for the people".

As for Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the Congress (I), Mr. Mukherjee says "on some specific issues like world peace, friendship with socialist and other progressive governments, non-alignment, India's security and integrity, communalism and regionalism" the party is willing to co-operate with the Congress (I). But in regard to internal matters, the Congress (I) policies "are steadily getting more anti-people and reactionary, and, therefore, we fight such policies and want removal of the party from power and its replacement by a left and democratic government". Sections of the bourgeoisie can join this combination or front. But as long as the bourgeoisie will continue to control state power, the "crisis in the economy, administration, culture and society as a whole" will only deepen and, Mr. Mukherjee adds in parenthesis, "this is why we cannot agree with the conclusions in comrade Uliyanovsky's article."

Mr. Mukherjee concedes, however, that the article directly and indirectly suggested that "unity of the left with Congress (I) to fight the right reaction is most essential". But, he maintains, this is the academician's "personal view". Neither the CPSU central committee nor the politburo has expressed itself in support of this view, nor has the academician has claimed so. "On our part, we have not only refused to accept this view, but have also reiterated our true relationship with the CPSU".

In regard to this relationship, Mr. Mukherjee says there is no control centre of international communist movement and, like the other communist parties, "we decide our own political line in the light of our own understanding of Marxism-Leninism and in this no other communist party advises us just as we do not do so in the affairs of other parties". He then explains that the CPI has been maintaining this position since the early forties.

FINANCE MINISTER ADDRESSES ECONOMIC RELATIONS MEET

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 7 Jan 83 p 4

[Text] New Delhi, January 6.

The Union finance minister, Mr Pranab Kumar Mukherjee, today called for immediate measures aimed at the recovery of the world economy, which was "precariously balanced with many potentially destabilising factors."

Especially important among these factors were a further retreat into protectionism on the part of industrialised countries, the precipitation of the international debt crisis and large-scale contractionary adjustments by developing countries forced by their inability to finance their current account deficits.

A worsening of any of these fronts could trigger chain reactions leading to cumulative deterioration all round. "This," Mr Mukherjee said, "underscores the need to implement immediate measures aimed at world economic recovery if we are to avoid entering into an irreversible downward spiral."

The finance minister told a three-day conference on "Rethinking global negotiations" that the measures for recovery must necessarily involve a resumption of expansionary domestic policies in developed countries and an increased flow of financial resources to developing nations to help finance current account deficits while a medium-term adjustment took place.

Mr Mukherjee said a second important feature of the current situation was the very substantial degree of mutuality of interest between the North and the South, especially in orchestrating a revival of the world economy. The present high unemployment in the industrialised countries, with the associated gross underutilisation of productive capacity, was not in the interest of the South.

It gave a spurt to demands for protectionism, restricted growth of Southern exports and delayed structural adjustment in the North. Nor was it in the interest of the North that developing countries, unable to finance their current account deficits, should be forced to adjust their balance of payments through contraction. Such an outcome would not only seriously disrupt their development efforts but would also deepen the world economic recession.

The third important feature to which Mr Mukherjee drew the attention of the conference was the fundamental asymmetry between the North and the South. Although the crisis was global and encompassed both the North and the South, there was also a fundamental asymmetry. The economies of the South were much weaker than those of the North and far more vulnerable. Therefore, the burden of adjustment in orchestrating a world economic recovery must be equitably distributed between two groups keeping in mind their relative economic strengths.

The present international economic system, when it was set up at the end of World War II, called for a vision of international cooperation completely unprecedented in history. Mr Mukherjee said: "a similar vision of international cooperation is needed today if we are to break the present deadlock and move to an international system that is both efficient and equitable."

Lack of Cooperation

It was a sad commentary on the lack of international understanding and spirit of cooperation in the world today that the progress of global negotiations had been painfully slow, the finance minister said.

Mr K.B. Lall, chairman of the conference, said the countries which were prosperous and wielded power had begun to look inward rather than take a broader view. Consequently, hopes of a new era in international economic cooperation aroused by the first UNCTAD and the UN special assembly session had remained unrealised.

If India, had been found wanting in taking a broader view, Mr Lall said, it was because of the constraints of the international environment.

Mr Lall said that the three-day conference, sponsored by the Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations (New Delhi) and the International Economics Research Centre (New York), would attempt to discuss the frozen attitudes of the Group of 77 as well as the OECD countries and see how best the North, the South and the East could be brought into the mainstream of development cooperation.

CSO: 4600/1608

FINANCE MINISTER ADDRESSES ECONOMIC JOURNALISTS

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 8 Jan 83 p 7

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 7--The Union Finance Minister, Mr Pranab Mukherjee, today called for continued vigilance on the price front when even a minor change in the supply-demand balance could once again stroke the fires of inflation, reports PTI.

UNI adds: Mr Pranab Mukherjee, said the external payments situation "continues to cause serious concern and that for some time to come we have to finance the balance of payments deficit." The Government had taken steps to tap various sources of finance, he added.

In his inaugural address to the First National Seminar of Economic Journalists, the Finance Minister said the economy continued to suffer from a large balance of payments deficit, mainly because of the high import bill for crude and other petroleum products. Though international oil prices were not rising now they remained high compared to the situation a few years ago.

This drain on foreign exchange reserves had been coupled with a decline in the export markets for some of our key commodities due to international recession and protectionism, he said.

The Finance Minister said that such financing of the balance of payments deficit was only a "very temporary solution." It enabled "us to gain some time to achieve a more fundamental adjustment" to reduce the balance of payments deficit to "more manageable limits without jeopardizing growth."

This called for more effective import substitution by increasing domestic production of items like petroleum, fertilizers, steel, cement, aluminum and edible oils where there was scope for efficient displacement of imports. It also called for a much stronger effort in the future and for encouragement of investment and remittances from abroad.

Mr Mukherjee described 1982-83 as a year of "consolidation of gains" of the previous two years in some ways and a "testing time" for the economy in some respects.

Mr Mukherjee said unfavourable international economic environment, coupled with a severe drought within the country, posed numerous problems.

The underlying "strength and resilience" of the economy enabled the country to absorb these shocks without causing any major disruption in plan priorities.

There had been a decline in kharif production but the food situation had been kept within effective control.

There was every reason to hope that there would not be any significant decline in food production for the year as a whole. This, in many ways highlighted the success of the agricultural strategy of extending irrigation with assured supply of improved seeds, fertilizers, credits and other inputs.

CSO: 4600/1611

CPI-M LEADER'S STATEMENT SCORES SIKH LEADER

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 6 Jan 83 p 4

[Text]

CPI-M Polit-Bureau member Harkishan Singh Surjeet, MP has criticised the latest call of Akali leader Gurcharan Singh Tohra for disenfranchising migrant labour in Punjab as a 'disastrous slogan' serving neither the interests of the Sikhs nor of the country.

In a statement on Wednesday, Mr Surjeet lamented that Mr Tohra had not given serious thought to the repercussions of such a call.

The slogan, in his view, was put forward with the ostensible aim of maintaining a Sikh majority in Punjab. But in reality Mr Tohra was 'toying with the idea of a Sikh nation and the necessity to protect its interests,' he added.

Maintaining that such a call would undermine the country's unity, Mr Surjeet said: 'Perhaps he (Mr Tohra) forgets that Sikhs in thousands are residing in various parts of the country and they have acquired lots of properties there. What happens if the same slogan is raised against them in other States. Already Mr Gundu Rao, the Karnataka Chief Minister, has raised the disruptive slogan of 'son of the soil' and the Shiv Sena in Bombay had been attacking the linguistic minori-

ties.'

Mr Surjeet sharply assailed the Government for its policy of drift in finding a rational settlement to the Punjab problem and deplored that as a result the 'leadership (of the Akalis) has started passing to the extremists from the hands of experienced politicians.' In this context he referred to the recommendation to make Sant Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale head priest of the Akal Takht from a gathering of ex-servicemen; and the Akali leadership's refusal to condemn the recent murder of a Nirankari.

He said the Government was under the false impression that the law and order situation being under control and the Congress-I saddled in power in the State it was in a position to tackle the situation. 'But it fails to understand that the activities of the extremists, and the consequent communal polarisation, will seriously disrupt communal amity and it would be difficult to head the wounds for years.'

UNITY

The values of national independence and Indian unity were about to be lost and hence who remained in power was immaterial, Mr Surjeet said. The nation

will have to pay a heavy price. Why is the Government not aware of these consequences? The Government is caught in its own net and is not prepared to take a principled stand on political issues with the cooperation of other political parties,' he alleged.

He made it clear that the question of presenting 114 villages of Fazilka and Abohar to Haryana should not be based on the communal principle but on linguistic conditions. That is they should not be handed over to Haryana merely because the inhabitants of those villages happen to be Hindus. 'Once we accept the transfer of villages on the basis of religion, we would be indirectly strengthening the forces of Sikh extremism which stands for Khalistan.'

The CPI-M leader underscored the need for the Government not to stand on false prestige but to find a solution to such a problem on a 'rational basis' on the principle of language and contiguity with the village as the unit. If this principle was agreed to 'even if more villages go to Haryana nobody can oppose it' since the 'Akali leadership for the present is committed to this principle.'

DASGUPTA DEATH SAID TO END ERA IN CPI-M

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 8 Jan 83 p 8

[Article by Sivadas Banerjee: "New Problems Facing CPM"]

[Text] Calcutta: An era can be said to have ended with the death of Mr Pro-mode Dasgupta, a gowering personality who held a number of important posts in the CPM. He was a politburo member, secretary of the party's West Bengal unit and, more importantly, chairman of the ruling left front.

Changes in various spheres in which he operated are inevitable with his passing away, for he was in charge of the party units in some other states in the eastern region. Also, as chairman of the left front, he had played a key role to make the body what it is today. He had provoked interaction among the opposition parties through his activities, especially by his brash utterances, but there was complete harmony between himself and another powerful personality, the chief minister, Mr Jyoti Basu.

In the state committee, which he dominated and where nothing happened without his knowledge or concurrence, the changeover has been slow. The induction of Mr Gopal Bose, secretary of the 24-Parganas district committee, and Mr Lakshmi Sen, secretary of the Calcutta district committee, to the secretariat (perhaps more than Mr Saroj Mukherjee's elevation as Mr Dasgupta's successor) are significant developments. This is because, Mr Dasgupta with his intimate knowledge of party affairs and qualities of individual members and activists at all levels, alone had exercised the might to place functionaries at various points not only to ensure efficiency but also to balance the contenders. But now veteran district leaders can be expected to have a bigger say in these matters.

Both Mr Bose and Mr Sen, are, no doubt, powerful persons by virtue of their position in the party, but whereas Mr Sen at times shines in reflected glory or importance, Mr Bose has already made himself acceptable as a state-level leader in spite of his tiff with Mr Dasgupta in the late '70s which had possibly blocked his way up the hierarchical ladder during the latter's lifetime. So, it is Mr Bose who needs to be closely watched.

Succession Issue

Soon after Mr Dasgupta's death in Beijing, it was thought that the younger people at the highest level of the state committee nursed ambitions on the succession issue but these rumours were quickly scotched by party veterans. It was felt that when equally senior and highly respected people were already heading other district committees, catapulting one of these youngsters to succeed Mr Dasgupta would cause intraparty bickerings. Given this leadership configuration, though the new state committee secretary, Mr Saroj Mukherjee, has been a party member longer than Mr Dasgupta, he is most unlikely to be as assertive in organisational matters as his predecessor. A period of collective leadership can be forecast.

Now that Mr Dasgupta is no more, the chief minister Mr Jyoti Basu will naturally gain more power and authority in his own party as well as in the left front. This will have to be acknowledged by others. Mr Basu's plate, which is already full will have even more in it. The importance of the left front committee which Mr Dasgupta chaired will consequently be slightly downgraded even though the party has decided to keep separate the offices of chief minister and front chairmanship. During the last six years, the left front's other partners did not take an antagonistic position towards Mr Basu or his government but from now on much will depend on how Mr Basu copes with his new responsibilities.

A major challenge may develop from within as a sizable section in the party is disenchanted by its role in power. The leadership is aware of this but unable to strike a convincing balance between its earlier posture as a militant opposition and its current status as a ruling party operating within the constraints of the system.

To say this is not to suggest that extremism is again rearing its head within the party. It is not. The partymen are more convinced than ever that in their scheme of a people's democratic revolution, armed insurrectionary methods in the present world context will be sheer madness. But there is an awareness that they have not been able to do what they should.

Limited Scope

Mr Basu and also Mr Dasgupta, when he was alive, used to emphasise at public forums that even though the left front government experiment was limited in its scope, it was necessary and vital to make the people understand in precise political terms the exact limitations of the existing system, which they aimed to overthrow. This argument was good as far as it went but in real terms the difficulty, as some sections of the party see it, is that the CPM's political base does not extend beyond 25 per cent of the population and comprises mostly the middle class, and urban pressure groups like teachers and white and blue collar workers.

Another drawback is that the political training of even these friendly sections leaves much to be desired. Also, there is a feeling that though the left front government "compromises" on financial matters like the overdraft, willy-nilly

it is at the mercy of Delhi, especially the Prime Minister, Mr Gandhi. This puts the CPM in a none-too-happy position in matters of development spending.

This is regarded as a dangerous drift because, in the CPM's thinking, it leaves all the political and administrative leverage in Mrs Gandhi's hands. Yet another fear is whether the support base of the party will be able to hold together and fight back when the crunch comes. Doubts in this regard are surfacing in the absence of a viable alternative political line.

Corruption in different spheres of public life is also causing serious concern. To curb it, it was decided that the party unit secretary should hold an elective post in the panchayat or municipality. This measure has been partly implemented. Side by side, prima facie corruption cases involving panchayat officials are being promptly handed over to the police. All these efforts were started during Mr Dasgupta's lifetime. One can imagine how painful it must have been for him and Mr Basu to take these decisions in the face of stiff opposition from within the party.

Now, in the absence of Mr Dasgupta, the challenge is far too serious to allow room for complacency. If the leadership fails to refurbish the front's image and rally the other left and democratic forces behind it to present a national alternative, it will be accused of attempting only to stay in power and thereby fall into Mrs Gandhi's trap. And the trap, as they see it, is to allow the CPM a long rope in West Bengal in the hope that it will hang itself.

CSO: 4600/1609

PLAN TALKS REPORTED TO BEGIN WITHOUT MIDTERM REPORT

Calcutta THE STATESMAN in English 5 Jan 83 p 1

[Text] New Delhi, Jan. 4--Talks between Chief Ministers and the Planning Commission on the State's Annual Plans for 1983-84, the penultimate year of the Sixth Plan, begin on Friday without the benefit of the results of the mid-term appraisal of the Plan's progress.

The mid-term appraisal was to have been finalized many months ago, but there is no indication that this will be made public in the near future, if at all.

The exercises have long been completed at the official level and have revealed serious slippage in many key sectors, notably power and steel, and lack of progress in several welfare schemes.

This comes at a time when the economy is slowing down because of heavy shortfall in agricultural production following an erratic monsoon, and a distinct decline in industrial production. Foodgrain production in 1982-83 is likely to be lower by around nine million tons than in the previous year, while industrial output is unlikely to register more than a 4% rise.

The Sixth Plan envisages an average annual growth rate of 5.2%, but because of the poor performance of the economy in 1982-83 this will now be much lower in the first three years. Although part of the reason is the weather, there has also been slow investment in real and nominal terms.

The shortfall in public sector investment--in key areas like power and major industrial sectors--is said to be around Rs 10,000, while real investment has been affected to some extent by inflation, although prices have been rising slower than in previous years.

Official-level talks on the annual Plans for 1983-84 have stressed the need to achieve physical targets and the additional resources to be raised by the States to make this possible. Special efforts are to be made to improve generation as this is a major constraint on industrial and agricultural production.

The States' financial position is not happy and the decision to check overdrafts by converting these into loans on a one-time basis has not worked out. Some States have again resorted to overdrafts and hence their entire financial position will have to be reviewed.

BANKS EYED TO PROMOTE TRADE, INDUSTRY, AGRICULTURE

Tehran KEYHAN in Persian 29 Dec 82 p 13

[Text] In regards to the government proposal to the Majlis concerning the elimination of usury and the proposed amendments of the coordination council of the Islamic societies of the banks of the country, several issues need to be discussed. For this reason, this week, we are holding a discussion on the philosophy of the proposal to eliminate usury, to study the aspects of this proposal from a banking and economical standpoint and to offer suggestions on this issue.

As we know and as it has been pointed out frequently, in the Koran (Verse 39 of Sura Rome, Verse 130 of Sura Al-e 'Emran, Verse 160 of Sura Nesa' and Verses 9 and 274 of Sura Baqarah), usury is strictly prohibited. Since in the Islamic government, usury cannot be recognized in any shape or form in the various economic sectors and considering that the existing banking system has been formed and is operated based on usury, steps must be taken without delay to eliminate this infamy and great sin from the pure face of the Islamic Republic of Iran. What is understood from the Koran, especially Verse 245 of Sura Baqarah, Verse 12 of Sura Ma'edeh, Verse 20 of Sura Mozzammel, Verse 17 of Sura Taghabon and Verses 11 and 18 of Sura Hadid, is that it is strongly recommended that monetary transactions operate on the basis of interest-free loans. Considering the strict prohibition against usury by the Koran and its emphasis on interest-free loans and considering the relationship between interest-free loans and usury, we understand for certain that the Koran has made interest-free loans central to the fight against usury. This is an issue which must not be overlooked or discussed merely ceremoniously in regards to an Islamic banking system. A quick look at the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran reveals that Article 43, referring to interest-free loans, emphasizes that the economic policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran must be established so as not to result in the accumulation of wealth in the hands of special interest

groups or individuals and such that the government will not become the sole large employer. Hence, it is important to note these two important points in the Constitution: first, granting interest-free loans and, second, preventing the banks from turning into centers of absolute financial power.

It must be added that since this council has only recently been informed of the contents of the bill presented to the Majlis and has not had ample time to study it, it will present its views only briefly and will offer them in more detail in the near future, God willing.

Attention to the Philosophy Governing the Proposal to Eliminate Usury

Concerning the proposal of the government, the first and foremost issue is to attend to the important consideration of which direction the implementation of the proposal will take the banking and economic systems of our country.

The philosophy and the spirit of the proposal is to educate the people as a principle in the banking system. Those who have prepared it believe that considering the fact that at the present time, there are large amounts of long-term savings and deposits in the banking system and that these resources are among the most important contributing factors to a bank's ability to carry out its duty, any solution must give strict consideration to attracting and utilizing these resources. But, since, at the present time, it is assumed that the allocation of interest to this kind of deposit is the most important factor in the preservation of these resources in the banks and that they can no longer be paid on the basis of Islamic reasoning, naturally, the funds of the banks must be made profitable, not through usury, but through Islamic contracts. Therefore, in this system, there is no other way but to make profitable investments. In short, the actual results of this idea in practice will, in the long term, necessarily be as follows:

1. The banks will become partners in most of the moderate and large commercial, industrial and agricultural establishments in some way and naturally, participate, directly or indirectly, in their management.
2. In order to gain more profits, the banks will naturally pay attention to those establishments which are more profitable, to be able to capitalize on the profits and make the banking system profitable and to be able to pay shares to the investors in order to provide incentive for them to keep their funds in the bank.
3. Due to the large level of partnerships in the various commercial, industrial, agricultural and housing areas, the banks

will be involved in the production and, to a large extent, the distribution markets. Since the banks in the proposal are to be independent of the government, this participation will not necessarily be in harmony with the policies and programs of the government. It is possible that because of the weak control, adverse effects will also result.

4. Considering the structure of the banking system, that group of economic establishments which show weak profits on their balance sheets, even though they might need to be supported for economic development and growth, will either have bank resources denied them or will be given second priority. This will also be the case with those economic establishments which are not, for whatever reason, prepared to enter into partnership with the banks.

5. When banking is centered on profits, two [as published] consequences are unavoidable. First, the banks will move towards profiteering. Second, the rapid return of money (being put back into circulation) will become one of the important goals of the operators. Third, the choice will be made in favor of more profits rather than the needs of the society.

6. In the administrative area, among the most important standards for identifying competent bank managers will be a larger profit margin on the balance sheet, which does not necessarily conform to the economic needs of the society.

7. Possibilities for credit planning in this system are minimal and this issue will burden the economy of our country, which requires more planning every day.

8. Considering that banks will have the right to buy and sell such things as machinery, housing, raw materials and spare parts, they can be expected to expand their involvement into various affairs, such as critical implementary issues, bureaucracy and, God forbid, financial corruption.

A. Studying the Situation from a Banking Standpoint

1. The banking system will not substantially change as it is not precisely clear what goals the proposed banking system will follow and exactly what duties it will have in connection with the economy of our society.

2. In the proposed system, the issue of interest-free loans is treated as a ceremonial side issue and is by no means a central issue.

3. The banking system will gradually become an economic giant. On the one hand, it will enjoy great results and, on the other,

it will have the market under its control. This does not agree in the least with the spirit of the Constitution, especially Article 43.

4. The banks will gradually lose their main role, which is the monetary management of the society, and turn to commercial, industrial, agricultural and other kinds of management.

5. The projected tools for the Central Bank to control the cash flow of the society, despite their quantity, are qualitatively weak, since almost all those projected are connected with the "profit" gains from bank investments, whereas, the relative uncertainty of profits at the end of one fiscal period cannot be the logical basis for imposing monetary policies. In other words, such a factor should be utilized for the long term and has no short term, immediate (less than one year) applicability.

6. For example, with regard to the agricultural issue, which has been determined as central to the economic movement of our society, banking has its own characteristics. In other words, because of the traditional structure dominating our economic production, our great technological backwardness, the existence of small, dependent farms and agricultural units, we cannot logically expect massive production.

On the other hand, considering the very large amount of capital in this sector in terms of number and the low averages of the loans needed, how could one imagine that bank resources can be utilized in the form of various kinds of partnerships in this sector and profits made use of as well, especially given the fact that our villages--because they are scattered and because of cultural issues and, more importantly, because of poverty and the extreme needs of the villagers--have been suffering for many years in the claws of usurers, speculators and various kinds of opportunists. The banking system must certainly solve this problem in the best manner and in the shortest period of time, but the existing plan offers no solution to this problem.

B. Studying the Situation from an Economic Standpoint

1. The role and duty of the banks have not been clarified in the economic system, especially as they concern ever-increasing inflation, the extensive cash flow, the floating capital in the society, the relative shortage of many goods and the structure and mishandling of distribution, which is itself one of the most important factors contributing to inflation and shortages. What are the banks' goals and duties, considering the great role they will play in the regulation and management of money in regard to preserving its value?

2. The role of the banks cannot be formed in isolation and stagnation, without relation to the other economic issues and on the basis of profiteering. For example, if one of the decisive and certain duties of the Central Bank is to preserve the value of money and control inflation under any circumstances, given the chaotic situation in the production market, especially in the area of distribution, the banks will see no reason in the proposed system not to take into consideration some share for themselves. In other words, while the duty of the banks is to control inflation, they actually will become a factor in increasing it.

3. A very important issue which, unfortunately, has not been taken into consideration is that of the cooperatives and providing monetary resources for those units which are created and managed on a cooperative basis. On the whole, the banking system has not clarified its position in the area of providing funds and allocating resources for each one of the three sectors: government, cooperative and private.

4. The economic banking system will lead us into a direction in which the standards and yardsticks for every activity will be to gain more profits. In other words, the needs of the society will be neglected.

Suggestions

1. The goals of the banking system must be clarified precisely and its role in the economy of our society must be generally determined.

2. It must be determined whether or not the intended objectives can be achieved should the proposed methods be implemented.

3. Before relying on profits, the banks must consider their most important duty the monetary management of the society and must expend all their efforts in monetary and credit planning in conjunction with the government programs.

4. The future banking system, especially the Central Bank, must consider the control of inflation one of its main objectives and decisive duties. Considering that bank profits through investments are important in raising production and service expenditures, the issue of making interest-free loans a central issue in banking activities must be given special attention.

5. In order to prevent unorganized monetary markets outside the banking system, complementary methods and particularly the procedure for the management of interest-free funds must be taken into consideration in the complementary divisions of the banks.

This in itself will be a very great factor in attracting the attention of the masses of the people to the banks.

6. Interest-free loan funds, raising current account deposits in the banks and the immediate offering of banking services are among the very important factors in attracting the surplus funds of the people to the banking system. The idea that something must replace usury to attract the surplus resources of the people to the banks is necessarily incorrect.

7. One of the most important duties of the banking system in the future will be to create a balance and harmony between the goods and services markets, on the one hand, and the monetary and credit markets, on the other, in order to provide the grounds for economic growth while avoiding stagnation or inflation. Hence, the banking system must clearly determine its tools in this regard.

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CSO: 4640/86

PROGRESS MADE IN ECONOMIC VENTURES REVIEWED

East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jan 83 p 54

[Text]

War has not halted the economic life of Iran. Having faced sanctions from the West and difficulties following the freezing of its assets in US banks in the early years of the revolution, the Islamic government has sought to diversify its economic connections. The accent is now distinctly on cooperation with non-western partnerships and with such non-Nato European countries as Malta, as well as with South American states and Japan.

Tehran has recently expanded economic cooperation with the Soviet Union, India and Pakistan. Iran is to buy a variety of goods from Malta, including foodstuffs, metals, chemicals and machinery. Maltese Foreign Minister Alex Scceberra was recently in Tehran where he met the Iranian premier Husain Musari and other ministers.

Iranians have also shown their willingness for partnership with Malta in shipbuilding. Libya and Algeria also hold shares in Maltese shipbuilding companies. Maltese experts will help Iranian ship-repairers. An Iranian delegation is due in Malta soon to work out the details of an agreement in this field.

Iran is also buying food and machinery from Brazil under a \$160m contract. Brazil will, as a part of the agreement, supply Iran with diesel fuelled refrigerators for Iranian villages which have no electricity. The rest will be spent on purchases of Brazilian soya cake oil, corn and vegetable oil. Brazil will be importing oil, mineral ores, dates and pistachio nuts. Oil supplies to Brazil were halted after the overthrow of the Shah.

An Iranian delegation visited Czechoslovakia recently. It comprised officials of the ministries of industry, mines and metals, energy, oil, foreign affairs, commerce, agriculture and of the central bank. They visited manufacturing and industrial centres. The delegation was returning the visit to Iran by the Czech foreign minister last February.

A \$12m contract has also been signed with a Japanese firm for the supply of six 150MW gas operated turbines for Mashhad. At the Toshiba electric light plant in Rasht three manufacturing units have been installed as a part of an expansion scheme. The plant has, in the last six months, produced 11 26m bulbs and 2 59m fluorescent tubes. The target is to produce 27m bulbs and 5m fluorescent tubes by March 1983.

Meanwhile, Mohsen Nurbukhsh, governor of Iran's central bank, has claimed that the Iranian economy has improved this year. According to him, foreign exchange reserves have shown signs of stability, bank deposits are on the increase and banks are well placed to make investments abroad. The Iranian banks will provide \$12m as interest-free loans to farmers in war-ravaged areas of Iran.

Nurbukhsh also said that the inflation rate has been brought down from 27.7 per cent in December 1981 to 15.2 per cent in June 1982. Oil exports have gone up by 44 per cent and tax revenues have recorded a substantial increase, despite the closure of many private companies at the time of the revolution.

MONARCHIST PAPER ANALYZES DEVELOPMENTS, EVENTS

Paris IRAN LIBRE in French 22 Jan 83 pp 2-4

[Excerpts] Iran is ruined, economically. Of the structure built stone by stone over a 50-year period by the Pahlavi dynasty monarchs, nothing remains any longer. It is not the destruction of enterprises that is the worse evil. What is more serious is the braindrain. Of all the nation's executives exiled by tyranny, how many will come back to the country if the present situation continues for several years longer? And the financial crisis is nothing in comparison with the moral one.

Some pretend to be worried by the revelations that have finally been made by Amnesty International. Now, the "humanitarian" organization has singularly minimized the facts. In the Islamic Republic, not only are men and women persecuted, arrested, tortured and shot; there is an entire young generation which is being shamefully sacrificed and doomed to the most frightful decay. The schools have been converted into centers of corruption where all moral values disintegrate. As to the universities, they have become flea markets. For young people, there is no longer any work, there is no longer any activity, there is no longer any ideal, there is no longer even hope. The religion perverted by Khomeyni cannot even play the role of distraction. One goes to Thursday prayers only to devote oneself to the black market. Condemned to idleness and shut away in their homes, young people are giving way to despair. To flee reality, some become alcoholics, others take drugs. The Tabatabai scandal--which we mentioned last Monday--proved that the dignitaries of the regime were themselves organizing the traffic in drugs. With its living strength impaired, the Iranian people is threatened by death. It is not only a question of "human rights." What is involved is the right to life of an entire nation.

The strategy invented by the Carter-Breszinski duo and taken up again by their successors is calamitous for our country. But contrary to appearances, it is just as calamitous for the West. In any case, it is never in vain that one violates all one's own moral principles. But in the case in point, the danger is even more immediate for the Americans, the Europeans and their allies.

Politically, to encourage on one's own territory the activities of a faction whose ideology is poles apart from that of the receiving country can

ultimately be only a source of worst difficulties. Mr Radjavi's broadcasting of propaganda over the air in a state which includes a population of 3 million Moslems is an obvious element of destabilization.

To the political danger is added the economic one. There is no use selling if the buyer cannot pay. Iraq gives us a good example of this. Forced to meet the large-scale military expenditures brought about by the conflict which the West thought fit to plunge it into, the Baghdad government is incapable of repaying its debts and sees itself obliged to ask for their "adjustment." It is the French people who are especially the victim of this process. It is unfortunately not the first time since January 1979. The number of balance-sheet deposits registered on that date shows it sufficiently. In truth, we are all marching to disaster. Like the Roman Empire, dead because it wanted to dupe the East, the empire of the West is dying because it wanted to dupe Iran.

For a long time, the BKA [expansion unknown] had suspected Mr Tabatabai of indulging in drug traffic but had hesitated to punish his activities, knowing he was protected by Mr Genscher (FRG minister of foreign affairs) and especially by Mr Weschnenski (known to have negotiated the liberation of the Somali hostages), who vowed a too pronounced friendship to the henchman of Khomeyni. Indeed the quantity of opium seized in Tabatabai's luggage has a market value of only 40,000 marks, a pathetic amount for a billionaire of that caliber. But converted into heroin or cocaine, this opium would have been worth more than a million marks. Let us remark, without drawing any special inference, that Mr Tabatabai is not only a Shiite but a chemist.

Mr Nassri, an American by nationality but of Afghan origin, has just given a very revealing interview to the NEW YORK TIMES of 17 January 1983. In it he recounts under what conditions he was arrested in Iran, from which he has just escaped. A Moslem by conviction, he had gone to the Islamic Republic convinced that Khomeyni was the champion of Islam. Now, once on the spot, he quickly saw that a considerable amount of equipment intended for the Soviet Army in Afghanistan was passing in transit through Iran. Thus the USSR could therefore use, in the north, its border with the Kabul regime and, in the west, that of the Islamic Republic. We already knew that Khomeyni was being armed by the Zionists. We now learn that he is helping the Soviet Union to crush the resistance of Afghanistan's Moslems. The limits of infamy have been crossed.

9434

CSO: 4619/29

BRIEFS

JAMAAT DENIAL--Muhammad Iqbal Khan's letter "Dirty Tricks" (Arabia, August) accused the Jamaat e Islami Pakistan of being a willing tool of US policy in Pakistan since 1947. It also said that General Zia was a close relative of Jamaat chief, Mian Tufail Muhammad. I have worked with Mian Tufail Muhammad since 1966. I know all his relatives. General Zia is not related to him. Nor is any relative of Zia in Jamaat. Jamaat has never been an exponent of US policy or any other country's interest. It has been critical of the government of Pakistan's leaning towards the United States. The manifesto of Jamaat published in October 1970 clearly states: "We want to keep Pakistan altogether out of the conflicts of the great powers and their blocs and therefore wish to end our association with pacts like Seato and Cento. The foreign policy of Pakistan in our opinion should be completely independent and in accordance with our own interests and principles." Many other Jamaat resolutions speak of its rejection of any form of foreign domination. [Muhammad Aslam Saleemi] [Text] [East Burnham ARABIA THE ISLAMIC WORLD REVIEW in English Jan 83 p 8

CSO: 4600/302

MALDIVIAN FISHING INDUSTRY TAKING NEW TURN

Colombo DAILY NEWS in English 12 Jan 83 p 4

[Text]

The islands of the Republic of Maldives are scattered on a geographic area of 106,000 square kilometers of which only 300 square kilometers is land area. With so vast a sea area rich with marine resources there exists great potential to improve the fisheries of the country.

Since the islands are small and lack other natural resources it is not surprising that the country's economy depends highly on marine resources. The entire visible export consists of marine products and the main occupation of the people is fishing.

In recognition of the important role played by the fishermen a "Fishermen's Day" is marked on 10th. December of each year. This is an important day throughout the Republic.

In the past, almost the entire catch of fish was processed into "Maldivian Fish" and exported to Sri Lanka. However, with the decline of the Sri Lankan market, for Maldivian Fish in 1972, and with opening of new markets for certain products, the marine products have been diversified to include fresh fish, canned fish and dried shark fins.

Since 1976 frozen fish has surpassed all other marine products exported

by weight and value. The other marine products exported from Maldives include, dry salted fish, shark fins, tortoise shells and corals.

The current frozen tuna price in the world markets is severely affecting export prices.

The method of fishing has remained unchanged. The duration of a fishing trip is one day and pole and line fishing for tuna and trawling for reef fish are the main methods of fishing.

The vessels used in fishing are traditional crafts called Dhoni. However, a modified design of traditional fishing vessels has been introduced recently. A long-range fishing vessel has also been built and is about to be tested for feasibility in the traditional pole and line and long line fishing.

These experiments are being carried out under the Technical Cooperation Program of the United Nations Development Program, in conjunction with a fisheries project financed and executed by International Development Association. This project has so far shown very encouraging results.

The predominant type in the fish catch is ~~jack~~.

The other varieties include tuna frigate mackerel and reef fishes such as jacks, snappers groupers, dolphin fish and sharks.

Recently, fish aggregating devices have been deployed successfully in Maldives, under the Technical co-operation Program of the FAO and has increased the yield in areas where such devices were used. Training fishermen in fishing operations were carried to increase the efficiency of fishing operations.

The Government has introduced a mechanization project for traditional fishing vessels. It has increased the catch per vessel by three folds and the vessel has more manoeuvrability on the fishing ground.

Another aspect the Government has given its attention is the safety of the fishermen. In this regard, navigation aides are being installed at different spots in the country.

The Maldives experience intrusion of foreign fishing vessels right into the internationally recognised Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic. The Government is taking steps to check the encroachment of foreign vessels into this zone.

Maldivian Fisheries Corporation has been established to carry out commercial fisheries by intro-

ducing modern fishing technology to the industry. A Fishery Advisory Board has also been set up.

The fisheries sector of the Republic is still at its early stages of development and the Government accords high priority to improvement of its knowledge of fish stocks, increase fish catch and export while ensuring enough for local consumption, diversify marine products and export market, development of efficient fishing vessels and techniques, improve the safety of fishermen at sea, and raise their educational standards.

The Government has begun to address itself to some of these development issues by inviting I.D.A. and Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development to finance mechanization schemes and marketing infrastructure.

Realising that world fisheries have gone through a technological revolution the Maldivian Government has been seeking foreign aid from friendly countries and international organizations.

Since 1971 the Government has received aid in fishery from Japan, Iran, India, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Thailand, UNDP, FAO, IDA/World Bank and Islamic Development Bank, and with their combined assistance the Maldivian fishing industry is taking a new turn.

SOVIET THREAT OF 'HOT PURSUIT' OF AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS EXAMINED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 Dec 82 p 5

[Article by Abu Zar Ghaffari: "Soviet Threat of Hot Pursuit of Afghan Freedom Fighters--An Analysis of Incidents in the Light of Facts"]

[Text] The official Soviet organ PRAVDA in its recent editorial expressed the view that Soviet soldiers and soldiers of the Karmal administration have the right to enter Pakistan in hot pursuit of Afghan freedom fighters and punish them accordingly. Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq, president of Pakistan, commenting on this issue in his press conference in Ottawa, said that the Soviet threat of attacking Pakistan has always existed, particularly in view of the many Afghan refugees that have been forced to leave their homes as a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and live in Pakistan near the Afghan border. The United States also expressed deep concern over this threat, warning the Soviet Union against sending its troops and those of Babrak Karmal into Pakistan under any pretext because such an action would escalate the war in Afghanistan and threaten to shatter world peace.

According to the latest reports, the Soviet Union has sent more troops and military equipment into Afghanistan this month and the Karmal administration has decided to assign Afghan soldiers along its border with Pakistan. It has also been reported that along with regular soldiers, "protectors of revolution" and voluntary units will also be posted on the borders. They will be under the command of trusted generals of the Karmal administration, to stop "elements of enemies of revolution allegedly being trained in Pakistan," a figment of Russian imagination, from infiltrating Afghanistan territory. Besides this, these units will serve to put pressure on Pakistan.

The question is how the Soviet Union can implement its threat of entering Pakistan in hot pursuit of Afghan freedom fighters and how Pakistan can meet such a threat.

In this context, it is necessary to clarify three facts. First, that the Pakistani armed forces are considered to be among the best in the world. It is not right to hold the Pakistani Army accountable for the destruction of East Pakistan in 1971. It can be said with full confidence that if the Pakistani Army was not unarmed and if ignorant Bengali Muslims had not rendered it helpless, the Indian Army would not have dared to enter Pakistani

territory. In December 1979, when the Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan had only outdated arms and equipment. Therefore, there was the danger that the Soviets might force Pakistan to carry out its demands. Now that the Pakistani Army is being equipped with sophisticated arms, it is in a position to face any situation.

Second, Afghanistan has become a quagmire in which Moscow is becoming more deeply mired every day. Although Afghanistan is under Soviet control, Afghan freedom fighters have surrounded Soviet forces on all sides. In 1980 and 1981, this writer had the opportunity to go about 80 miles inside Afghan territory for a few days with the Afghan freedom fighters. At that time, I saw that the Soviet and Karmal soldiers were surrounded on all sides by Afghan freedom fighters.

Third, the Afghan war of liberation differs from that of other nations in that it does not require training and rest camps in other countries, and neither does it require more arms and equipment. Palestinian guerrillas made Lebanon their base for directing their attacks on Israel. Similarly, the Namibian freedom fighters are using Angola as their base and South Africa in its hot pursuit has been carrying out armed raids into that country. But against this, the Afghan freedom fighters have laid a network of bases throughout the country and thus have entrapped Soviet and Afghan soldiers. The Soviet soldiers do not dare leave the besieged areas until they are fully protected from above by their air force. People who have seen the 1,400-mile-long border in the high mountains know that the Babrak Karmal regime will need hundreds of thousands of soldiers to effectually control this border area. The biggest problem the Karmal administration faces in assigning soldiers is that if at any check post fewer soldiers are assigned, then that check post will be destroyed by the Afghan freedom fighters. If on the other hand a larger number of soldiers is assigned, then the army will be faced with the problem of delivering supplies. Besides, the Afghan freedom fighters can also encircle their adversaries in areas between Kabul and the Soviet border. In that case, they can very easily surround them near Pakistan's border. In such a situation, if the Karmal administration decides to assign a large contingent of soldiers to the Pakistani border on the orders of the Soviets they will find themselves in great trouble. This will facilitate the Afghan freedom fighters in their hunt for victims. If all the Afghan and Soviet soldiers were to be posted on the long border, the vacuum thus created in Kabul and other cities would be filled by freedom fighters, who would create havoc in the country.

This would ruin the Soviet plans to put pressure on Pakistan, but no doubt it would greatly increase tension. When the Afghan freedom fighters have no need to attack the Afghan border along Pakistani territory then there will be no Afghan freedom fighters in hot pursuit of whom the Soviet and Karmal soldiers will be crossing into Pakistani territory, in which case the talk of crossing the Pakistani border in hot pursuit of Afghan freedom fighters becomes meaningless.

It is quite possible that Soviet and Karmal soldiers, using the pretext of "hot pursuit" of Afghan freedom fighters as a hoax, could attack the Afghan

refugee camps inside Pakistani territory. Pakistan's president pointed to this possibility in his recent statement in Canada. Now the question is, what might be the nature of such an attack. As we all know, movement of Soviet and Karmal soldiers is very difficult. Attacks from tanks and armored vehicles will be within the range of attacks by Afghan freedom fighters. Besides this, the Soviets and the Karmal administration can never trust the Afghan soldiers and thus cannot allow Afghan soldiers to enter Pakistani territory and run the risk of losing them. The Soviet Union and its puppet Afghan government know very well how the Afghan military have been hijacking tanks and asking for asylum in Pakistan. In view of this, there seems to be little likelihood that Soviet and Afghan soldiers will intrude into Pakistani territory and attack Afghan refugee camps.

All the same, the possibility of attacks on Afghan refugee camps by the Soviet and Karmal air force and helicopters cannot be ruled out. The Soviets had been doing this in 1980 and 1981. It is worth pointing out that the Soviets cannot trust Afghan pilots, because in the past many Afghan pilots along with their planes sought asylum in Pakistan. The problem that faces the Soviets is that if they send Afghan pilots to attack Afghan refugee camps, the pilots can abscond or can drop their bombs far from the targets. In that case, the Soviets will have to become much more involved in air attacks. It is clear that being engaged in air attacks against Pakistan is fraught with danger for the Soviet Union. Pakistan and the United States signed a treaty in 1959 according to which the United States is obliged to give military aid to Pakistan under such circumstances.

As far as the question of Pakistan being able to face these designs of the Soviet Union and the Karmal administration is concerned, once the sophisticated F-16-type planes join the Pakistani Air Force, the Soviet Air Force will think twice before entering Pakistani air space. If the Soviet Union and the Karmal administration persist in carrying out air attacks against Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, then the United States will have to immediately provide Pakistan with F-16 fighter planes and in increasing numbers so that Pakistan is in a position to give an appropriate response. In addition, the refugee camps can be transformed into military camps and it is quite possible that the United States may supply missiles to Afghan freedom fighters to fight against the Soviet planes and helicopters. In which case it will become impossible for the Soviets to save Babrak Karmal.

In the end it is necessary to point out here that the Soviets by carrying out air attacks against the Afghan refugee camps may want to force Pakistan to move them farther from the border. When the Soviets captured Bukhara at the end of the last century they killed hundreds of thousands of Muslims and forced hundreds of thousands of Muslims to flee to Afghanistan, and then it put pressure on Afghanistan not to allow these Muslims to live in the northern parts of Afghanistan. But this time the Soviets cannot succeed in their designs. Afghan freedom fighters are spread all over the country and it is beyond any power to frighten the Afghan refugees and Pakistan.

9315

CSO: 4656/73

ULEMA'S VIEWS ON WOMEN'S EVIDENCE REPORTED

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 9

[Text]

Nine religious scholars yesterday demanded that the six MRD leaders retract publicly from the position they held in a statement published on Tuesday regarding the women's evidence under the proposed Law of Evidence.

In a signed statement the Ulama belonging to Jamiatul Uloom-il-Islamiyyah, Allama Yusuf Binori Town, quoted Verse 282 of Al-Baqarah and Hadith from "Saheeh (correct) Bokhari," Page 363, saying that the evidence of a woman is half of the man's evidence and that in the absence of two men, a man and two women could give evidence.

The religious scholars said all experts on Islamic Jurisprudence are agreed on the point that the evidence of two women was equal to that of one man. Besides, the evi-

dence of a woman alone would not be acceptable unless she was accompanied by a man, except in an exceptional situation.

They said the MRD leaders should have consulted the Ulama on an issue which is purely of an ecclesiastical nature, and about which they lack knowledge. However, to issue a public statement, "in conflict with the Islamic tenets is reprehensible," they added.

The signatories to the joint statement are: Maulana Mufti Ahmad Rahman, Maulana Dr Abdur Razzak, Maulana Badiuzzaman, Maulana Mufti Wali Hasan, Maulana Mohammad Idrees, Maulana Misbahullah Shah, Maulana Mufti Abdus Salam, Maulana Mufti Mohammad Yusuf, and Maulana Qari Abdul Haq.

CSO: 4600/306

BALUCHISTAN MRD CRITICIZES POWER SHORTAGE

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 12

[Text]

QUETTA, Feb 1: A special meeting of MRD Baluchistan, has expressed deep concern over Provincial Government's recent order about load-shedding of electricity and directives issued for shopkeepers of Quetta city and other areas to close down their business by 5 p.m.

The meeting held here today under the chairmanship of Mr Ali Ahmad Kurd, Convener of Provincial MRD and General Secretary of defunct Baluchistan PPP, was of the view that this order not only affected the business community but it also caused difficulties for persons in service and those who came from distant places to make purchases of items of domestic use during winter. The MRD meeting demanded that the order of load-shedding should immediately be withdrawn in view of special conditions obtaining in Baluchistan.

The meeting also resolved that the compensation for lands to be acquired by the Provincial Government under the Land Acquisition Act in Quetta city and outside, should be paid in mutual consultation with the concerned parties. The compensation was being paid on the basis of rates fixed much

earlier.

The Baluchistan MRD, in another resolution, demanded immediate withdrawal of Government, Municipal and Local Council taxes levied on purchase and transfer of property in the province. The meeting also called upon the Government to formulate a correct and just policy for application at the time of production of important crops like potatoes, onion and fruits.

The Provincial MRD decided to hold a meeting on Feb 6 on the occasion of the second anniversary of the Movement. It further decided to meet on Feb 13 at Sibi.

The meeting demanded immediate release of detained political leaders, workers, and students including Miss Benazir Bhutto, Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, and Maulana Fazalur-Rehman.

The meeting was attended by leaders of component defunct parties of Baluchistan MRD including Haji Ghulam Sarwar Khan Yasinzai, Dr Enayatullah Khan, Mr Nawab Khan, Mr Khudai Noor, Mr Anwar Durrani, Mr Mohammad Rahim Kakar, and Mr Jamal Jogezi.

CSO: 4600/306

DUPLICITY IN WALI KHAN'S STATEMENTS QUESTIONED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 7 Jan 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Wali Khan's Two-Faced Statements"]

[Text] Veteran politician Khan Abdul Wali Khan expressed his views on various national problems in a press conference in Karachi the other day. What he said was true and went to the heart of the matter. In regard to the elections, martial law, Islamic administration and other political issues, he expressed views similar to those of other politicians. He warned, as have some other politicians, that if political activity is not restored, the people might take to the streets. When he talks about such matters, Wali Khan sounds like a Pakistani politician and is no different from any other Pakistani politician. But when he talks about the Afghanistan problem, he sounds like a spokesman for the Karmal government. Expressing his views on the Afghanistan problem in the press conference, Wali Khan uttered not a single word that in any way expressed unhappiness with the presence of Russian troops in that country and their cruel treatment of the Afghan people, nor did he have anything to say against Karmal and his government, which have been kept in power by the Russian forces. Many Afghans have been painfully martyred by lethal chemical weapons, but Wali Khan took no notice of that; however, as the Russian communications media and Karmal government spokesmen have done, he did accuse the Pakistani Government of complicity in supplying arms to the Afghan Mujaheddin. Wali Khan conveyed the message of the Karmal government that it wants to sit at the negotiating table and solve the Afghan problem peacefully, but he did not demand the participation of the Afghan Mujaheddin in these talks. Wali Khan did issue a warning as to what would happen to Pakistan if Russian forces in pursuit [of the Mujaheddin] entered this country, but he did not bother to advise Russia against making the same mistake that the United States committed in Vietnam. Wali Khan conveyed Babrak Karmal's message to us that Pakistan and Iran should guarantee their nonintervention in Afghanistan, but he said nothing to condemn Russia's armed intervention in Afghanistan. There is such a dichotomy in Wali Khan's views that even his good advice becomes unacceptable. We wish that Wali Khan could speak like a Pakistani in regard to the Afghan crisis as well.

9863

CSO: 4656/87

WALI KHAN ACCUSED OF REPRESENTING KARMAL INTERESTS

Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Jan 83 p 5

[Editorial: "All This Is Your Own Doing"]

[Text] Khan Abdul Wali Khan, leader of the defunct National Democratic Party, is worried about why people are hounding him and saying things against him.

We think that Wali Khan's complaint should be directed against himself and himself alone because he is responsible for starting the whole sequence of events. He went to Afghanistan and sat shoulder to shoulder with the traitor of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal, who came to power riding on the tanks of foreign troops. His pictures with Karmal appeared in all the newspapers. But all of the serious-minded politicians of Pakistan remained silent because in the past, at least, Wali Khan was an outstanding leader of the opposition party; making an issue of his activities outside the country at this juncture would have damaged the politicians' cause in the country and strengthened and sanctioned military power. But Wali Khan did not appreciate the judicious silence of his contemporaries and, forgetting his own demands for democracy in the country, began a campaign to gain recognition for the military-backed government of the agent of foreign masters. His father started voicing threats and warnings of an impending storm that he said could be averted by political action, which to him meant recognition of Babrak Karmal's government as the legal and representative revolutionary government of Afghanistan. Wali Khan did not stop there but went a step further and without cause or reason began a reprehensible campaign of unfounded charges against the leaders of Tahrik-e Islami [Islamic movement] and in his accusations sank to unimaginable depths of maliciousness. It seemed that Wali Khan's campaign was aimed at dragging the war between Karmal and the Mujaheddin opposed to him from Afghanistan into Pakistan and settling the quarrel here.

But when his countrymen began to take notice of Wali Khan's activities, and different circles and schools of thought began to analyze his role and question his mysterious activities, Wali Khan was upset. Now he complains that he is being subjected to mudslinging and accusations, and he threatens to go to court, to do this and to do that. Commenting on the situation, Chowdhary Mahmood Ahmad, secretary of the defunct Jama at-e Islami Party of Punjab, stated, correctly, that Wali Khan should reflect for an instant on what kind of moral code justifies and sanctions the campaign of vilification and character

assassination that he and his friends are conducting against other leaders and parties. Wali Khan is offended because he is being accused of taking money from outsiders and trying to break up the country, when in fact there is no need to be worried or offended. The most straightforward way to refute the charges and reassure the nation is to explain to the people what his sources of income are and where he gets the money to pay for the royal manner in which he and his family live.

In any case, Wali Khan should take note that up to now the accusations leveled against him and his family have come from the direction of the rulers and the guardians of the rulers' interests; hence, he did not have to bother to answer these allegations because people usually pay little attention to accusations brought against the leaders of the opposition party by those in power and generally tend to disbelieve them. But this is probably the first time that the rulers have been silent and the shower of accusations against Wali Khan is coming from the direction of contemporary political circles and his companions from the past; thus, the people cannot dismiss these charges as the ill-intentioned fabrications of those in power and those with ulterior motives. Wali Khan will have to present evidence to clear himself of these charges.

Up to now, Wali Khan has been in the habit of making his own claims as arguments in his defense; for example, "If I were guilty of such and such acts, why would I have been offered the presidency at such and such a time? Why would I have been offered the premiership?" etc., etc. He can no longer refute charges by using his own claims as alibis. He will be asked to name the occasions when he was asked to become president and when he was offered the premiership. Are there any documents or independent witnesses who can attest to such offers having been made? Such tactics of creating one's own image have become hackneyed and are no longer effective. These so-called offers are in fact Wali Khan's own unrealized dreams. He was born in a family of landowners who, in return for having cooperated with the Congress Party, were given the rulership of the Northwest Frontier Province before the creation of Pakistan. Wali Khan inherited the lands and an aristocratic temperament, but not his uncle's leadership; so he often dreams of this "inheritance" and talks of his dreams in terms of imagined offers.

Unless Wali Khan has entirely lost all commonsense, he should recall how those against whom he has been conducting a campaign of charges and accusations have behaved toward him in the past and how important a part their assurances and guarantees have played in establishing Wali Khan's credibility in national politics. If he has decided to forget the past, then he should not voice complaints against others but place the blame squarely on his own decisions. As the verse says, This is all your own doing, Wali Khan!

ISRAR AHMAD WARNS OF DANGER OF SEPARATISM IN LETTER TO ZIA

Karachi JANG in Urdu 6 Jan 83 p 3

[Open letter from Dr Israr Ahmad: "It Is Not Easy To Establish Islam in a Society Deteriorated in Mind and Thought"]

[Excerpts] (Editorial Note: Dr Israr Ahmad needs no introduction. In a recent letter to President Zia, he made certain suggestions about the establishment of an Islamic system in Pakistan. Although JANG's board does not agree with some of his views, it here publishes the letter.)

As far as the propagation of Islamic ideals and the enforcement of Islamic laws in this country, or in other words, the establishment of an Islamic system, are concerned, I have nothing to say, the real reason being, and forgive me for saying this, that I have lost all hope of such a thing ever happening. Complaints are made only when there is some expectation, and in this matter I have lost all hope.

I am well aware that it will not be an easy task to establish an Islamic system in this society, which has seriously deteriorated from the mental, moral, practical and every other point of view. What will be needed is righteous courage based on firm conviction and a course of action founded on the knowledge of truth. God granted you an opportunity that you could have utilized; and if your best efforts and most courageous actions to establish the faith had, God forbid, failed, you would at least have left behind something for history to record. As the verse says: If you could not win the prize, you could at least have staked your life for it. If a nonbeliever (the Prince of Wales, later the Duke of Windsor) could give up the throne of the most powerful country in the world for the sake of a woman, then a Muslim chief administrator of martial law could have sacrificed his office and power for the sake of Islam.

As I stated in my speech in the Ulema convention on 20 August 1980, the first 3 years were the most important in the sense that Tahrik-e Nizam-e Mustafa [Movement for the Islamic System] was still in its heyday and enthusiasm for it was running high, and the national atmosphere was such that measures of even the greatest magnitude could have been taken towards the establishment of an Islamic system without any hindrance. But these years were frittered away under the influence of "silver tongued" and "imaginative" educated

elements who were incapable of action. Thus was repeated the same mistake that was first committed by the initial leadership of Pakistan.

When the zakat and limitations ordinance was put into effect and the Shias protested, there was abject surrender. Even more regrettable and significant, the issue of zakat opened the door to dissension between the Shias and Sunnis. In the Advisory Committee meeting of 18 August 1980, I pleaded, in the name of God, that rather than create differences and discriminate between Shias and Sunnis, it would be better to take back the entire zakat ordinance and restore the previous system under which zakat was a matter of individual choice.

Moreover, the clarification of the article in Pakistani law governing the [holy] book and the sunna [tradition] that you have included in the body of the laws in connection with sectarian differences gives a legal basis to all differences in the interpretation of religious laws and blocks the way to the predominance and promulgation of the book and the sunna on the level of national law. The first matter of importance in human societies concerns the family and social systems. You have not had the courage to place family laws under the jurisdiction of the Sharia court because on the one hand you fear adverse reaction by some Westernized women and ladies of the higher class; and on the other hand, in regard to the differences that erupted in our country the last few days concerning the role of women in society, modesty and the veil, or in your own words, Islam's point of view regarding "the veil and the enclosure," though you did make some statements reassuring to the religious elements, in practice you threw your full weight on the side of the Western-oriented classes.

That is why I can no longer hope that you will be able to carry out successfully the great task of establishing and promulgating an Islamic system in Pakistan.

Nevertheless, I will offer a suggestion in regard to the survival and strengthening of Pakistan, which in truth is the reason for my writing this letter. My own observations, knowledge and analysis of events make me fear that future historians might say, "The greatest of all Muslim states, Pakistan, which was created in 1947, was split in two by a band of drunkards of ill-repute in 1971, and was then further shattered and Balkanized by a pious, religious and righteous man." May God preserve us from such a calamity!

If you remember, in a confidential conversation with you on 18 August 1980, I asked you, "How do you plan to fill the vacuum created by martial law? I look upon such a political vacuum as being tantamount to political suicide." You replied with deep emotion, "Doctor, I have probed my conscience and find that I do not have the courage; (which I took to mean that you were referring to the late President Ayub's course of action); but I regard handing over the reins of government to the present political parties as simply suicidal. And there is no third option." I then remarked, "But there is a third option: to hold elections on a nonparty basis and on the shortest possible notice." You replied, "We are considering holding elections on short notice and on a nonparty basis with an LFO [expansion unknown]." I said, "That is

a good idea. But how long do you intend to think about it? Please hurry, because time is running out for you." Two years and 3 months have passed since that conversation, but unfortunately the political vacuum still exists, and you have taken no action to remedy the situation.

Meanwhile, you probably feel reassured because so far no public movement against you has succeeded nor is there any possibility that such a movement will succeed in the near future. I would like to say in this regard that for God's sake, do not be deceived by this state of affairs which, in reality, is the result of the international situation. World conditions have deterred patriotic Pakistanis, especially those with a religious bent of mind, from taking any risks. But everyone knows that the international situation can change at any time; moreover, although the international situation may be important to a certain extent for the survival and strength of a country, the most important factor in this regard is the confidence of the people. You must be aware of the lava boiling in Sindh Province; although I do not overlook the possibility that sometimes the wall of people around those in power isolates them from an awareness of the true state of affairs. God alone knows the truth. In my view, what the separatists are doing in Sind is similar to what happened in Bangladesh, with the difference that East Pakistan was far from us and cutoff from the rest of the country as a result of which the central government was unable to control the situation there; but Sind is connected to us by land and any similar movement there can be easily crushed. But I think that it would be short-sighted to rely too much on this factor.

Following the loss of East Pakistan, our political observers and analysts thought that among the reasons for the separation of East Pakistan, the most important was that the martial law imposed by Ayub Khan had created a sense of political deprivation among the people of that region and provided the separatists with their most potent argument, namely, that since the armed forces were composed of the inhabitants of West Pakistan, military government meant that West Pakistan was ruling East Pakistan. The separatists of Sind today use the same argument: that since the greater part of the armed forces is composed of Punjabis and a small portion of people from the North-west Frontier Province, the conclusion is that Punjab is ruling Sind under the guise of martial law; and every passing day increases the force of this argument.

Hence, I request that, for God's sake, you take unequivocal steps to end this deadlock lest this volcano burst forth and render all well-wishers of the country incapable of taking any action.

In other words, I am afraid that it will not be long before the confrontation toward which the country is gradually moving will result in an explosion. The delicate balance that you have maintained so far between Russia and the United States has changed following your trip to America, and India and Russia will both try to take the utmost advantage of this changed situation. The result will not bode well for the country.

9863

CSO: 4656/86

NUSRAT BHUTTO'S POLITICAL ACTIVITIES SCORED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Feb 83

[Text]

MUNICH, Feb. 1: Begum Nusrat Bhutto, chief of the defunct Pakistan People's Party, is not suffering from cancer but tuberculosis.

This was the verdict of the specialists of a local clinic where she underwent thorough check-up soon after she left Pakistan, according to reliable sources.

These sources said she had been accordingly advised to carry on treatment for tuberculosis.

It may be recalled that the Pakistan Government had allowed Begum Bhutto to go abroad for treatment although he had refused to subject herself to medical tests to diagnose her illness.

It may be pointed out that Dr Abdul Hayee, her personal physician, had campaigned through the Press most actively that his patient was suffering from cancer and should therefore be allowed to get treatment abroad. He accompanied Begum Bhutto to Munich and returned to Karachi after an

absence of five weeks.

It is not without significance that on return to Pakistan he has not said a word about the results of the medical check-up at Munich. While in Pakistan he was issuing regular bulletins on the health of Begum Bhutto and it was natural to inform the people about the results of the check-up at Munich. But he kept quiet as the announcement of the clinical results would have exposed Begum Bhutto's game.

The diagnosis of the Munich clinic that Begum Bhutto is not suffering from cancer has explained her real motive in seeking permission to go abroad, political observers said.

Did she want to secure permission to leave the country to enable herself to indulge in political activities to give boost to the terrorist organisation, Al-Zulfikar, sponsored by her two sons, Murtaza Bhutto and Shahnawaz Bhutto? Or was the motive something else?

She has met her two terrorist sons and some other leaders of

the PPP, including Dr Ghulam Hussain, Ghulam Mustafa Khan and Major-General (retd) Imtiaz. She is trying to patch up the differences in the party, co-ordinate the activities of Al-Zulfikar and improve the image of the party abroad. One source close to PPP circles hinted that some financial deals were also involved.

The factual state of her health is evident by her hectic political activities and travels. She is in Libya for the last two weeks, hardly a place for a cancer patient to get treatment.

It is also learnt that she was able to meet her two sons in Paris and Tripoli with the help of locally provided assistance.

It may also be recalled that the hijackers of the PIA plane had chosen Libya as their final destination. The plane flew from Damascus to Tripoli but the Libyan authorities changed their mind and withdrew the earlier permission granted to the hijackers to land in Libya —PPI.

SOUTH AFRICA STRONGLY CONDEMNED

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Feb 83

[Editorial: "Arms Embargo Against South Africa"]

[Text]

THE election of Mr Shah Nawaz, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United Nations, as chairman of the Security's Council's Committee on Arms Embargo against South Africa, is in a way a recognition of this country's constructive and sincere efforts to help the cause of all the peoples held in colonial bondage in various parts of the world. Pakistan has always been in the vanguard in organising world opinion against the imperialist and colonialist Powers which have refused to listen to all appeals in the name of justice, fairplay and sanity in world affairs, voiced through the United Nations, the Organisation of Islamic Conference and the Non-Aligned Movement. The apartheid regime in South Africa, upheld by a White minority of about 17 per cent. through terror and suppression, is one of the ugliest remnants of 19th century colonialism. In cruelty and illegality it ranks with the Israeli hegemony over the usurped Arab lands or the puppet regime in Afghanistan bolstered by foreign troops. The United Nations, the OIC and the NAM, representing practically all the peoples of the world—with the unenviable exception of the supporters of the apartheid regime—have been exerting their moral pressure to force South Africa to give up its illegal rule over the Black majority but all to no avail.

The mainstay of the apartheid regime is its overwhelming military strength as compared to that of the native population and its supporters in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Like all the imperialist Powers, ancient, mediaeval or modern, sheer brute force is the sheet-anchor of the apartheid regime. The White minority in South Africa has been able to build up its formidable striking power with the active help of its allies in the West which keep it supplied constantly with war material, apart from sustaining the regime through moral, political and

economic support. Apparently, there is no way to force South Africa to see reason so long as it continues to be supplied with military wherewithal by its allies. It is the task of the Committee, of which Mr Shah Nawaz has recently been elected chairman, to see to it that the arms embargo clamped on South Africa a few years ago by the United Nations, is "observed fully." Obviously, without depriving the apartheid regime of its chief means of support and stay, it is not possible for the Black population to get freedom.

South Africa has accumulated a tremendous firepower. In fact, it is a nuclear Power. Under these conditions it is unlikely that the White minority will be easily thrown out. The job of the Committee on Arms Embargo on South Africa is a difficult one, more so because the apartheid regime is shielded by some of the most powerful States in the West.

Speaking after his election, Mr Shah Nawaz pointed out: "The least the international community can do is to deny South Africa the resources with which it can augment its formidable military capability. It is this capability which enables it to perpetuate the inhuman system of apartheid and to continue its oppression of the Black population of South Africa and to terrorise and harass the neighbouring independent African States." It is clear that the success of the Committee depends on the willing cooperation of the most powerful States in the West, which are the real pillars supporting the Whites in South Africa. In view of the extensive political, military and economic stakes of the USA, UK, other Western States and Japan, it is unlikely that they will agree to withdraw their support to the apartheid regime only for the love of the Black majority in South Africa, and because justice, legality and fair-play demand it. In today's world set-up, dominated by the two Power blocs, morality, legality and justice have no place. It is all based on brute force and its main aim to exploit the weaker peoples for the good of the more powerful nations. South Africa, with its immense economic resources and minerals of great strategic importance, is a rich prize for the Western world and it can be liberated not by appeals and peaceful efforts but by making the stay of the White usurpers in South Africa impossible. But that, of course, falls outside the purview of the Committee in question. Anyway, we hope the committee will be able to acquit itself with credit.

MINISTER ASKS WOMEN TO DONATE GOLD TO MEET ENERGY CRISIS

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 20

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 3: Maj-Gen (Retd) Rao Farman Ali, Federal Minister for Petroleum and Natural Resources, on Thursday asked women to donate at least one tola of gold each to the Government to help it meet the present energy crisis in the country.

The Petroleum Minister, who was inaugurating a new well at Toot oil field, about 117 kilometers from here, told a gathering that daily production of oil and gas from this field has reached 3,300 barrels and 12 million cubic feet respectively.

The Minister said the OGDC men had contributed a lot in the search of oil and gas, but finding economic wells was a matter of luck.

He said in early 1982 oil production from Toot oil field reached its lowest, when it declined to less than 1,000 barrels a day.

The successful completion of Toot 14, 15 and 5, he said, has given

a new life to Toot oil field.

The Minister said the present energy crisis in the country was a direct result of lavish use of fuel by the people.

He urged upon the masses to give up the habit of buying costly electronic gadgets.

The Minister said presently there are 15 wells drilled at Toot. OGDC, he said, had now developed its own techniques of drilling with the help of which it has completed the latest well Toot 14 and 15.

OGDC has also decided to drill and rehabilitate the old wells either by taking remedial measures, or by drilling replacement. The process of drilling new wells, he said, involved considerable financial outlays, which, the Government alone could not bear at this stage.

The Minister also announced one month's extra salary for OGDC workers.

CSO: 4600/309

15,000 REFUGEES MOVED TO PUNJAB SO FAR

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 17

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 3: An overflow of nearly 15,000 Afghan refugees have so far been shifted to the Punjab from NWFP since the middle of December last, Brig (Retd) Said Azhar, Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees, said here on Wednesday.

In an interview to APP, he said it had been decided to accommodate about one lakh refugees at a new tentage village set up at tehsil Essa Khel, District Mianwali. He, however, said initially 40,000 refugees would be housed in the new place. The daily average of the shifting was now between 600 and 700 refugees, he added.

Brig (Retd) Said Azhar said adequate arrangements had been made to provide facilities to these refugees in the Punjab which included medical care, water supply, and education, besides shelter and food.

He said all the arrangements were made by the Federal Government with the cooperation of the

Punjab Government on the same pattern as in NWFP and Baluchistan. The Commissioner, Sargodha Division, was acting as the Provincial Refugees Commissioner to look after these arrangements, he added.

The Chief Commissioner for Afghan Refugees further said that the purpose of shifting the refugees was to lessen the administrative burden of the Government of NWFP which was oversaturated by the refugees.

He said that out of total 2.83 million registered refugees, 2.15 million were living in NWFP and 0.68 million in Baluchistan.

Answering a question, he said the daily expenditure being incurred on the maintenance of the refugees was about Rs 15 million. Half of this amount was spent by the Government of Pakistan while the balance was contributed by the United Nations agencies and other countries.

CSO: 4600/309

PLEA TO HAVE FERTILIZER, CEMENT IN PRIVATE SECTOR

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 10

[Text]

FAISALABAD, Feb 2: Syed Nazar Hassan Shah, President of the Faisalabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Vice-President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, has suggested that the cement units and the fertiliser factories operating in the country should be handed over to private sector in the wider interest of the nation.

In a Press statement issued here on Sunday he said that the State Cement Corporation and the Na-

tional Fertiliser Factory could not control their undue expenses despite the installation of the latest machinery and adoption of the modern technology.

He said that according to the statistics provided by the State Cement Corporation the enhancement accruing through the recent increase in oil prices was a bare Rs 102 per ton whereas the current production of cement was four million tons which was likely to be burdened to the extent of Rs 40.8 million through enhancement of

the petroleum and oil prices.

Likewise, he said, the impact of oil prices on the production cost of fertiliser was much less than what was being professed through official sources.

He appealed to the Government to provide adequate subsidy for balancing the prices of fertiliser and cement as these industries were already paying more than 100 per cent of their total cost of production by way of excise duty to the government.

CSO: 4600/307

COMPUTER POLICY BODY HOLDS MEETING

Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 3 Feb 83 p 3

[Text] Islamabad, Feb 2: In pursuance of the directive of President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq the 12-member Computer Policy Committee met here yesterday in the morning to evolve a national policy on computer usage and development in the country.

The Adviser to the President on Science and Technology and Secretary of the Committee Brig (retd) M. Sardar Hussain gave a resume of the present computer environment in Pakistan.

A seven-member subcommittee was also constituted to formulate a two-phased action plan for the national computer policy. It is headed by the Senior Electronic Adviser of the Ministry of Science and Technology Brig (retd) M. Sardar Hussain.

The committee discussed in detail the technical and economic advantages of computer usage the present state of computer usage in Pakistan the scope of computer applications in future and the constraints/opportunities and measures necessary for the promotion of computer usage in Pakistan.

Microcomputers

The committee was told that microcomputers were finding their way in large numbers into offices, schools and homes all over the world. These small computers have versatile capable application in commerce industry medicine, research planning and agricultural operations etc. The use of computers has potential to increase the productivity and efficiency of the economy.

The meeting was informed that at present there were 83 medium and large-size general purpose computers in use in the country out of which 51 were in the public sector and 32 in private sector. However maintenance and repair facilities are mostly provided by vendors and suppliers through local engineers and technicians.

It was noted that about 300 programmers and 40 system analysts were produced annually. This output hardly meets the growing requirements of the country. This problem has been aggravated by the emigration of a number of computer professionals to Middle East countries.

It was observed that in order to promote computer usage, efforts should be made to train adequate number of computer operators, programmers, system analysts, data base managers, etc. in the government and private institutions and universities.

It was felt that pay scales and prerequisites of computers personnel needed to be made attractive to deter computer professionals from emigrating and to enable growth of this high technology area in the country.

Duty Structure

The committee agreed that the present duty structure on computers was too high. Besides adequate incentives for indigenous production of computer hardware and software was also minimal. It was stressed that to encourage indigenous production of computers in the country possibilities of readjust or even elimination of duties on components of computer be examined.

It was observed that there was considerable potential in the country for the economical production of software for export at competitive prices.

Those who participated in the deliberations included among others, the Additional Secretary in charge of the Ministry of Science and Technology, Mr M. Masihuddin the chairman of the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council, Dr Amir Mohammad; the member of the University Grants Commission, Dr Tahir Hussain; the Director of the Pakistan Computer Bureau Dr Abdus Sattar and the Director of the Army Data Management Directorate GHQ Brig Khalid Mahmood Qureshi.--
APP

CSO: 4600/307

WORLD BANK TEAM HOLDING VITAL TALKS

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 pp 1, 20

[Text]

ISLAMABAD, Feb 3: A World Bank team is currently here holding discussions with various economic divisions and ministries' officials in preparation for the Consortium meeting in April. The team has also held discussion with Dr Mahbubul Haq, Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission.

Meanwhile, the Planning Commission, which is currently engaged in sharp and close examination of policy issues for the Sixth Plan, is said to be adhering to its decision to publish the outline of the next Plan by the end of the month.

One of such rounds of discussions on policy issues was held this week in Tarbela in which a lot of policy issues were sharpened with a view to resolving them before the outline of the Sixth Plan is defined.

The Planning Commission is said to be conscious of its limitations, both in terms of available human expertise and the sophisticated tools, needed for major task like economic planning. But at the same time, it is believed, it is making full use of all the available means to be in a position to formulate the Plan on as correct a base as is possible in the given situation.

CSO: 4600/309

RISE IN EXPORTS REPORTED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 pp 1, 12

[Text] RAWALPINDI, Feb 2: The Federal Export Promotion Board met here today under the chairmanship of President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq.

A detailed in-depth review of performance in the field of exports was carried out. The Board was informed that during the first six months of the current fiscal year (July-December 1982) overall exports amounted to Rs. 12640.1 million as compared to Rs. 10925.5 million during July-December 1981 registering an increase of 15.7 per cent.

It was further stated that exports in December 1982, increased by 32 per cent over December 1981. The Board was informed that the most heartening feature of export picture during July-December 1982 was the diversification reflected in a very substantial increase (83.8 per cent) in items other than the ten major items of export.

The share of these items in export earnings has gone up from 25 per cent to 40 per cent. Almost among the major items, export of raw cotton registered an increase of 29.2 per cent from 41,229 metric tons in July-December 1981-82 to 53,276 metric tons in July-December, 1982-83.

The export value went up by 31.5 per cent from Rs. 585.7 million to Rs. 770.3 million. Export of cotton yarns also showed upward trend registering 60.8 per cent increase in terms of value from Rs. 786.6 mil-

lion to Rs 1264.7 million.

The export of fish and fish preparations went up by 29.5 per cent from Rs. 445 million to Rs. 576 million.

Earnings from the export of readymade garments increased by 2.9 per cent. Upward trend was also noted in of cotton cloth from Rs. 139.2 million to Rs. 1442.8 million, leather goods from Rs. 495.6 million to Rs. 498.5 million, guar and guar products from Rs 107.9 million to Rs 132 million.

Cigarettes

Among other items major increase occurred in export of cigarettes which almost doubled from Rs. 11 million to Rs. 20 million, synthetic textiles (Rs. 32 million) tents and canvas (Rs 84 million) towels (Rs. 22 million), knitwear (Rs 12 million) and footwear (Rs. 9 million).

The Board reviewed bilateral textile agreement with the United States, EEC countries, Canada, Sweden and Finland under the Multi-Fibre Agreement-III (MFA-III) during 1982, with a view to further accelerate the export of textiles and clothing.

The Board expressed the hope that textile and clothing exporters would fully benefit from the possibilities existing under these agreements and in particular would concentrate on the export of

finished textile items that is clothing etc. to earn maximum foreign exchange against the limited quotas. The Board was informed that according to the GATT figures, out of the 30 major exporters of textiles and clothing, Pakistan ranks 8th in textile and 26th in clothing and as such every effort needs to be made to improve Pakistan's position in the export of clothing.

The Board decided that existing Secretaries' Committee in collaboration with representatives of concerned textile and clothing industry, should examine the requirements of the industry and suggest how best to help the manufacturers of readymade garments, hosiery and towels in further improving their production and export.

The rehabilitation of the existing Karachi Harbour and early creation of an autonomous Karachi Fish Harbour Authority and reorganization of the Federal Marine Fisheries Directorate also formed part of the policy proposals.

The Board reviewed the affairs of the National College of Textile Engineering, Faisalabad, which was functioning under the control of the Federal Government and decided that the institution may be made an autonomous body to work under the board of governors, which will include a representative of All Pakistan Textile Mills Association.

It was decided that an annual cess of Re. 1 per spindle may be levied on textile mills for generating sufficient funds for efficient functioning of the college.—APP

STUDENTS BLOCK ROADS, DISRUPT TRAFFIC

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 pp 1, 12

[Text] A group of students obstructed vehicular traffic at six different places by deflating tyres of seized buses and burning rejected tyres and tubes in the city yesterday.

In the morning, a group of students seized some buses and took them to Malir Halt where they disrupted the road traffic by deflating their tyres.

Vehicular traffic was restored when the giant cranes cleared the railway level-crossing.

As a result, the employees of the Pakistan Steel reached late for their duties.

Later, the students stage a noisy demonstration outside the Airport Police Station where six of demonstrators were rounded up by the police on Monday.

They also obstructed traffic at Liaquatabad No. 10, Native Jetty Bridge, Court Road, and Shahra-e-Liaquat (former Frere Road).

At Court Road, the demonstrators set some old tyres on fire in the centre of the track. No arrest was made yesterday, but the police registered cases against the demonstrators.

The students are demanding release of some of the accused persons arrested in the University murder case, restoration of Semester System and Honours classes at the University of Karachi.

In the morning, students belonging to the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba held separate meetings at some educational institutions in which they reiterated their demands.

The President of the NED University Students Union, Mr Altaf Shakoor, told a Press conference yesterday that the Board of

Faculties of the NED University at its last meeting had decided to abolish the Semester system and to replace it with the bi-annual system.

He said that the reason given for abolishing the Semester system was that facilities were not available at the University and felt that the solution was to provide the facilities.

He demanded release of the arrested students of Karachi and NED Universities and for the acceptance of the students' demands.

The NED University students yesterday boycotted the classes and held a meeting in protest against the arrest of some students on Monday. They also reached the Airport Police Station in buses, and staged a demonstration there and met the arrested students, Mr Shakoor said.

The Dow Medical College Students Union yesterday held a meeting to condemn Monday's police action against the students and demanding release of arrested students and the acceptance of the demands of the Karachi University students, says a Press release.

On the other hand, the Chairman of Democratic Students' Alliance (NED University), Mr Afzal Ahmed, has criticized the "attempts to involve NED students in the movement of the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba," says a Press release.

The Karachi President of National Students Federation, Mr Kamran Mirza Rizki, also appealed to the Karachi University students not to get involved in "lawlessness."

Ghafoor's plea

Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad, Naib Amir of the defunct Jamaat-i-Islami, yesterday urged the authorities to consider sympathetically the students' demands, withdraw the cases against those arrested and release them unconditionally.

In a statement he said: "It is a matter of great regret that the local administration has taken a rigid attitude towards the students for the last one month and has, thus, forced them to come out on street." He said: "It goes to the credit of the students that during the protest they have refrained from indulging in any rowdism."

Prof. Ghafoor urged the Sind Governor to intervene in the matter before the situation gets aggravated and, as a first step, order the release of all the arrested students.

PPI adds:

Remand obtained

Six students who were rounded up by the police on Monday on the charge of creating disturbance at Karachi Airport were yesterday remanded to police custody till Feb 6 by SDM Malir, Ahmed Fahim Mughal.

Those remanded are Ifrikhar Burney of Sind Medical College, Afaq Akhtar of Dow Medical College, Mohammed Musharaf Hussain of Karachi University and Rizwan Sabir, Masrur Ahmed and Rao Mohammad Shahid of NED Engineering University.

All of them were arrested after airport police resorted to lathi charge to disperse the demonstrating students at the airport Terminal.

COMMENTARY ASSAILS STUDENT ATTITUDE, IMMATURITY

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 7

[Article by Ghazi Salahuddin: "Hurdles in the Way"]

[Text]

TO TRAVEL hopefully is said to be a better thing than to arrive. But what do you do when you are trapped in a traffic jam, created largely by those who have lost their sense of direction? If you can sweat it out, a study of those who are locked in the jam becomes very instructive. They shout and quarrel and accuse each other of violating rules. Sometimes, they drive themselves into a ditch and are thrown completely out of gear.

It is not only that I want to use traffic as an analogy. In itself the traffic reflects the state of our society. Its waywardness leaves the individual law-abiding motorist helpless and vulnerable. A seminal flaw in our planning is confirmed by the shortage of buses and the abundance of private cars. We play out our passions on the road. The minibus drivers even exercise their tribal sense of freedom.

I had written about traffic disruptions in Karachi about a year ago in the context of boredom dispensed almost as an instrument of psychological oppression. I had said that the increased chaos on Karachi's roads symbolises our clogged lives.

This week, the traffic situation and some other developments I find significant tell a different story. Some of the contradictions

inherent in our existing social arrangement are coming to the surface. There is a sense of movement. Some tensions are beginning to show.

Let us begin with the traffic. The Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba continued its campaign in Karachi and was very successful in blocking traffic for short periods in different localities on successive days. I had referred to this campaign last week, with reference to a quick Summary Military Court conviction of other students who had demonstrated in Rawalpindi. But IJT has strengths that other student organisations lack.

On Monday, the show was staged at the airport and the demonstrating students were teargassed at Terminal II. Initially, the students had planned to hold the rally at the time of the President's arrival in the forenoon. He had come to bid farewell to the Nigerian President. But this obviously could not be allowed and to sabotage this plan, all buses going to the Campus to fetch students were stopped at the NIPA roundabout until early afternoon, stranding hundreds of students for hours.

As before, there were photographs of the various feats performed in blocking traffic. On Monday, they even seized two NLC container-trucks and blocked traffic on Sharae Faisal. At another point on the same road, they used two buses to repeat the performance. The standard practice is to deflate the tyres of the hijacked buses.

On Tuesday as yesterday's news.

papers reported, the IJT students created disruptions at six places in the City. The airport encounter, after which six students were arrested, seemed to have given them addition fervour. But how long can the agitation go on like this? Will there be a serious confrontation with the administration? Also worth reporting would be the experiences of people who are affected by the traffic disruptions. Such demonstrations are believed to be self-propelling. Does it go to the credit of IJT and the authorities that there has been no wider involvement in the agitation? Is it because of the nature of the students' demands — or the general mood of the people?

More questions are raised by other conflicts which show fragmentation and increasingly militant divisiveness in society. Take the sectarian clash in New Karachi. It was quite serious, leading to arson. Is religion not a unifying factor? However, sects, schools of thought, groups, parties and even separate individuals have strong, even fanatic views about what they believe is divinely ordained.

Another dimension to such divisions and contradictions — almost of an antagonistic nature — was provided by the Lowari Sharif incident. I am unable to explore the meaning of what began with the shocking murder of seven persons and involves the tradition of disciple-system at our religious shrines, and the feudal structure of the rural society. I must also admit that the story, highly dramatic in its setting as well as continuing developments, was not well reported.

Lowari Sharif is in the interior. Here in Karachi, this week has produced what could be a grand parable in the context of corruption and the role of police. When the Anti-corruption Establishment staff raided the Ferozabad police station, to arrest a sub-inspector accused of taking bribe, some kind of a factional fight was the result. This was very prominently reported, with pictures of the room in which they exchanged blows. It seemed an achievement for the anti-corruption people to arrest five policemen, including the SHO.

But what followed behind the scenes was only partially reported in some papers. As expected, the police was believed to have taken it as a humiliation. It is not easy to go and arrest the police officials. The

facts of the case should be seen as irrelevant. There were reports about the transfer of the anti-corruption S.P. and about the local administration giving in to the police by immediately releasing on bail all except the main accused. Later, a magisterial probe was ordered.

There was speculation about the Wifaqi Mohtasib calling for the report of the case. But it could be wrong, for it was later officially stated that the Mohtasib would take charge in a few weeks' time and that people should not start sending him their complaints.

So we have more time to think about what we can do about corruption. Perhaps to know who is doing what is not enough. An ordinary day in an ordinary man's life will throw up instances that would provide ample evidence of corruption and moral deprivation.

I have no space this week for a lot more that exposes our inherent contradictions and shows how conflicts can lead to a kind of stalemate. Take the case of the proposed auction of the municipality building in Hyderabad. Here is another parable on how the local bodies have evolved.

Still, let me just quote the tailpiece from the week's digest of Dawn's 'Economic & Business Review': "5,000 guests including government officials, councillors and sajjada nasheens attended a party near Bahawalpur to celebrate circumcision of a councillor's son. A dancer earned Rs. 70,000 on the occasion".

In the midst of all these abrasive contradictions, music offered peace and salvation. The presence in Karachi of Ustad Munawwar Ali Khan from India is an event I am unworthy of fully appreciating. I was present at the Consul General of India and Shrimati Shanti Parthasarathy's "Indo-Pakistan musical evening" Tuesday night. Mehdi Hassan was billed with Munawwar Ali Khan. It was an exciting feast of vocal music. The elite was there and the younger set was rather excited about the presence of cricket stars.

Sitting there, I almost forgot the vow made by a splinter group of IJT to disrupt all the musical functions in the country. Two raids have already been made in Karachi on functions arranged by students. "Aalat-i-mauseeqi tor do", said their pamphlet. Has the time come to break things up?

STUDENTS DISRUPT TRAFFIC ON KARACHI MAIN ROADS

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 pp 1, 12

[Text]

Two students, one of them injured, were rounded up by the Gulbahar police as supporters of Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba disrupted vehicular traffic by deflating the tyres of seized buses and resorting to bonfire on main roads yesterday.

Some students also pelted stones near the Dow Medical College. Police fired teargas shells to clear the way for vehicular traffic.

Some students seized four KTC buses near Rashid Minhas Road. They drove three to the campus Convocation Ground and one to the NED Campus. There the students deflated their tyres. The buses were stated to be there till evening.

The arrested students were identified by the Police as Imran and Kamran who sustained head injuries when the police charged on the demonstrators. Kamran was removed to the Abbasi Shaheed Hospital where he was put under arrest.

The demonstrators disrupted the vehicular traffic at North Nazimabad Bridge, Karimabad Bridge, Lasbella Bridge and M.A. Jinnah Road near the Dow Medical College. Some demonstrators brought old tyres and set them on fire near the DMC to disrupt the traffic.

The demonstrators occupied the roof-top of a DMC block from where they pelted stones on the police. No one received injuries.

The police have received no complaints from the KTC management about the seizure of its buses by the students and detaining these at the University of Karachi and NED University Campuses.

However, Police have registered a number of cases against unidentified demonstrators who al-

legedly pelted stones on policemen, obstructed vehicular traffic, and who committed other offences.

Our Campus Correspondent adds:

The KTC buses seized from Rashid Minhas Road at about 12.30 p.m. and brought to the Karachi University Campus had not been removed till about 4 p.m.

These were deflated by the supporters of the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba whose Acting Nazim for Karachi University, Mr. Nasir Mahmood, told newsmen these will be retained till the Police returned the university buses.

The two university buses were taken away by the police at the airport on Monday, he said.

He said the passengers travelling by the three seized buses were off-loaded at Rashid Minhas Road.

At the Campus, the students also deflated a private car and a motorcycle and took the occupants to the Vice-Chancellor's office for identification. Later, they allowed the occupants and the vehicles to leave.

The President of Dow Medical College Students' Union, Qazi Tanveer, and the General Secretary, Mr. Sohail Butt, have demanded the release of a DMC student, Mr. Afaq Akhtar, and the other arrested students and withdrawal of cases against them, says a Press release.

The Chairman of the United Students Movement, Mr. Hasul Baluch, has said the present movement of the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba was aimed at seeking the release of those arrested in connection with the murder of Qadeer Abid, says a Press release.

He claimed the students "have rejected the IJT."

STUDENTS BLOCK TRAFFIC

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 16

[Text]

Vehicular traffic on M. A. Jinnah Road remained disrupted for over two hours from about 10.30 a.m. as a group of students pelted passing vehicles with stones, from the rooftop of the DMC building yesterday. At around 1 p.m. the students raised a 'white flag' and were allowed to leave the place. However, the City Division registered a case of 'mischief'.

When vehicles were diverted to Chand Bibi Road from Saeed Manzil, another group of students attempted to block traffic there also. It was finally diverted through Nishtar Road. Traffic on Chand Bibi Road was also restored when police chased the students out of the area.

A Press release of the Islami Jamiat Tulaba claimed that police fired teargas shell first and the students retaliated by pelting them stones. However, police sources de-

IJT meeting

IJT supporters held meetings at the University campus, the NED University, Dawood College of Engineering, and the Shipowners College, and reiterated their demands including release of students held after the firing at the campus on July 1 last.

The IJT Press release said another group of students also blocked vehicular traffic at the Landhi bridge.

CSO: 4600/309

STUDENT HURT IN FIRING INCIDENT IN LAHORE

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 12

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb 2: A student leader Ahmed Kamal was injured as a result of a firing incident in Government College Lahore today.

The police have registered a case against five students under Section 307 and 148.

Last year Mr Kamal was a candidate of the Punjab University Students Alliance for the office of the General Secretary in the University elections.

The police sources, when contacted, refused to divulge the names and affiliation of the five students but confirmed that an FIR had been registered against them on the complaint of some students. They also maintained that the FIR

had been sealed and as such no further details could be made available.

The Principal of the college, Prof. Majid Awan who had a meeting with the senior police officers, said that the college council would start investigations about the incident on Monday and would submit its findings to the Government.

Meanwhile, the Punjab University Students Alliance at a hurriedly convened Press Conference today alleged that Ahmad Kamal was attacked by the members of the Islami Jamiat-i-Tulba while the Jamiat denied the charges and claimed that the incident had taken place due to personal rivalry between the injured and the assailants.

CSO: 4600/308

PROBE INTO SPREAD OF VIDEO GAMES BEGINS

Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 1

[Text]

The Government has started inquiries into the manner and circumstances of import of video games into the country and the emergence of video games shops in the city, especially the posh localities.

The probe is being conducted by the Karachi Directorate of the Vigilance Wing of the CBR. It has been instituted because import of video games is "strictly prohibited," official sources said.

Investigations conducted so far indicate that some firms, including a major concern, imported the components and spares of video games and assembled them here.

Officials said the inquiry was on two main fronts: if the components and spares were declared to be meant for the purpose for which they were used, and (ii) whether the parties had the required sanction of the Government for the assembly of video games.

The official position is that if certain components like TV set screen etc were imported for use of the TV assembly industry, these could not have been used for any other purpose without the specific ap-

proval of the Government.

It is also stated that in certain cases complete units (foreign assembled) were also imported. In such cases the traders would be asked to produce necessary documents.

Video games shop-keepers contest allegations that these involved gambling.

Social welfare organisations and Mohalla committees however, question it also on the ground that it induced children and youth to waste money and made them addict to the video games.

At the video games shops in various localities, one can usually witness a crowd of youths and children of school-going age.

There are shops where there is an entry fee; at others entry is free and children buy time to play the game.

Social welfare organisations claim that video games had already earned a bad reputation even in the advanced Western societies, and that it leads to the gambling habits.

The other argument is that the factors for which the Government prohibited their import into the country were relevant to their sale and public use also.

CSO: 4600/306

PUNJAB SUGAR, TEXTILE UNITS TO BE DENATIONALIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 1

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb 3: The Provincial Government has prepared a formula for the denationalisation of takeover industries under which the textile and sugar units in the Punjab would be handed over to the private sector within a prescribed time schedule.

This was disclosed here today by the provincial Minister for Industries while talking informally to newsmen.

Under this formula the Punjab Government has prepared a phased programme stretched over a period of three years by selling back, first the sugar and textile units, maximum within a period of next three years.

Any party agreed to give prices after negotiations with the Government, would be handed over the charge of a unit.

According to details of the plan there was no such provision as to denationalise all the takeover units, at the same time. But gradually each sector of industries would be covered under the programme of denationalisation.

The Minister said that "productive workers will not be replaced and as such it is incorrect to say that denationalisation will create problem of joblessness".

Though no exact figures were given of the units listed for denationalisation during the next three years yet the Minister indicated about 10 to 15 such units.

The Punjab Government was also working on a plan to establish high cost industries and at a later stage hand over them to the private sector, the Minister added.

CSO: 4600/309

JUI LEADER'S PLEA FOR TRANSFER OF POWER

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 12

[Text]

Maulana Siraj Ahmad Dinpuri, Amir, defunct Jamiat-i-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur Rahman group), yesterday urged the Government "to accede to the politicians' demand for polls under the 1973 Constitution and a peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives."

Talking informally to newsmen at the Karachi Press Club, he said, "we, of the MRD, have sincerely avoided confrontation even at the cost of being accused of lethargy and inaction. But, a situation might develop when the politicians will become helpless."

Answering a question the Maulana said that for launching a "peaceful, democratic movement" the rank and file had to be organised and "this is what the MRD is doing at present through a countrywide organisational drive."

In another context he said that in the presence of the 1973 Constitution, which remained intact, there was no need to have a new political framework. "Such a course will create confusion in the body politic and will boomerang on the Government itself," he added.

Maulana Siraj Dinpuri told a correspondent that "an unrepresentative government has no locus standi to enforce Nizam-i-Islam." Besides, the way Islam was being

treated as a "mere slogan," it had "dampened the fervour of the common people," he observed.

Wifaqi Mohtasib

In his view, the appointment of "Wifaqi Mohtasib" (Ombudsman) indicated Government's failure to check corruption, nepotism and other social evils. How could a Mohtasib, with limited powers at his disposal, succeed in doing his job conscientiously? he asked.

Replying to a question, the JUI leader said, the statement of the nine religious scholars of Karachi with regard to women's evidence under the proposed Law of Evidence was "correct" and "we endorse it."

He said it was wrong to imply that the statement of the six MRD leaders, criticising the move, reflected the thinking of the MRD on the subject of women's evidence.

The question, he explained, was not discussed at any of the meetings of the MRD Central Action Committee.

Besides, Mr. Musheer Pesh Imam was out of station and Khwaja Khairuddin, when contacted by the Maulana, told him he did not know that such a statement was being issued in his name as well, he claimed.

DEVELOPMENTS SEEN EMERGING ON POLITICAL SCENE

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 12

[Article by Nisar Osmani]

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb 2: President General Mohammed Zia-ul-Haq's categorical statement that he was not in a hurry and the nation should not expect anything "sensational" during the current calendar year, has cleared the mist created by wishful thinking in certain political circles as also by what he himself described as 'kite-flying' by the Press.

However, although in view of the various related factors, it would not be very wise to hazard a guess at this stage, some "developments" appear to be emerging on the scene, mostly in the light of the President's own commitments. These are: announcement of the proposed political set-up by August 14, consultations on it by the President with his "colleagues and friends", plan to hold elections to the local bodies in September and general elections at the earliest — by the end of 1984, some wish to believe.

The President is on record having said that in view of the paramount importance of the prop-

osed political structure, he would like to seek the support of the people, but at the same time he has ruled out a referendum on the issue. The crucial questions are: will he refer the structure to Majlis-i-Shoora and later to the elected councillors? And will the differences between the proposed Islamic structure and the "secular framework of 1973 Constitution" require amendments to the Constitution?

As for the mode of election, the President categorically stated that the scheme regarding the registration of political parties would be retained and there could be no compromise on it. The other option could be: polls on a non-party basis subject to some restrictive qualifications for the candidates such as scrutiny by the elected councillors or some other body.

The situation would, however, start crystallising only when the political structure has been disclosed and until then the nation would be required to wait for the crucial announcement.

SO: 4600/308

RAILWAYS ACCUSED OF MAKING PUBLIC PAY FOR MISMANAGEMENT

Karachi JANG in Urdu 7 Jan 83 p 3

[Editorial: "Why Should the Public and the Workers Bear the Burden of Financial Loss?"]

[Text] The federal minister of railways, Said Qadir, told journalists in Lahore that it would be necessary to raise railway fares to relieve the heavy burden of a billion-rupee loss suffered by the railways. Earlier, it was reported that 32,000 [as published] employees would be laid off to decrease the railways' financial burden. These two items prove once more the bankruptcy of administrative ability and severe financial crisis facing the railways. The other day, a statement by the leader of the railway [employees] union, PREM, was carried in the newspapers asking if it were not possible to decrease the loss suffered by the railways by cutting down the lavish expenditures of railway officials, their commissions, bribes and the millions spent to maintain their lavish and regal way of life. The PREM leader also revealed that hundreds of thousands of rupees had been spent recently on redecorating the private residence of a high railway official rented in Islamabad. The question is, why should the people and poor railway employees bear the burden of administrative mismanagement in the railways? Why shouldn't the high officials be made to bear the burden as an object lesson to other departments? If the lavish expenditures of bureaucrats and indiscriminate plunder continue in departments, financial crises will occur periodically in the railways and other such departments, even if fares are doubled and the pay and number of employees halved. It seems that the railway administration has reversed its list of priorities and has forgotten that its first duty is to provide better and cheaper passenger and freight-hauling service and create a source of jobs. But we see high officials prospering and their families amassing wealth while poor workers are unemployed and the people disgusted with the trying conditions of rail travel. We suggest that the railways set their priorities straight, remedy their administrative shortcomings and reduce losses by cutting down lavish bureaucratic expenditures.

9863

CSO: 4656/87

PLEA MADE TO RESCIND ORDER, RESTORE 1973 CONSTITUTION

Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Jan 83 p 34

[Text]

MR. ZAKIUDDIN PAL, former judge of the Lahore High Court, has said that the rule of law is not being kept in view and that by promulgating the Provisional Constitution Order, the Government has set aside that order of the Supreme Court in the Begum Bhutto case under which the present regime has been granted legitimacy. He said that after the annulment of the judgment in the Begum Bhutto case, there was no valid reason for the Provisional Constitution Order to remain in force. That is why he had decided not to be sworn in as a judge under the PCO. The PCO, he said, had been enforced so that decisions taken by military courts, through which individual liberty was being curtailed, could not be challenged in the high courts. Mr. Zakiuddin Pal also disclosed that when he was judge of the High Court, certain writs of political import were pending before him and that he had been under considerable pressure in those days. When the profession of law is under attack, the dignity of the judiciary also suffers and that is the reason why the PCO (was promulgated, according to Mr. Pal).

These are the views of a man who has been associated with the judiciary for a very long time and who is held in esteem. His views cannot be said to be based on his personal prejudice against the Government. Whatever he has said does not appear to be without reason or without weight. He has

opened a very sensitive constitutional issue and pointed out that we are being caught in a quagmire because of orders based on non-technical and unprofessional advice. The judge concerned has highlighted an attitude of Government while he was serving on the Bench which is more indicting than any political or Press criticism. His views have dealt a telling blow to the Government's reputation. The President was literally showered with questions regarding the suppression of democratic rights in Pakistan during his recent visit to the United States, Canada and other countries. The judge's revelations only confirm the accusatory nature of those questions. If callous disregard of even the most serious problems continues to remain the order of the day, the Government will remain insensitive to even a single syllable of the judge's words. However, if there is an iota of responsibility and seriousness of purpose left with the Government, it should immediately take steps to repair the damage caused to it by the judge's pronouncements. This can be done if the proposal made by the judge and the people at large is accepted. And that proposal is that the unpopular and unreasonable amendments made in the Constitution, . . . should be withdrawn, the fundamental law of the land should be restored and elections held without delay.—JASARAT, Jan. 23.

PUNJAB MOSQUE SCHOOL PROGRAM LAUNCHED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 10

[Text]

LAHORE, Feb. 2: The Punjab Education Department on Tuesday launched an extensive mosque-school programme to promote primary education in the rural areas of the province.

The programme, being started for an interim period of five months, envisages opening of 4000 mosque-schools all over the province. The continuation of the project would depend upon its success at the initial stage.

Provincial Education Secretary, Mr. Ahmed Sadiq, formally inaugurated the programme by starting a mosque school at village Ali Razaabad on Multan Road on Tuesday morning.

Speaking on the occasion, the Education Secretary said that the traditional system of mosque education was being revived in the country so as to achieve universal literacy and also to link education with religion.

He expressed the hope that the mosque schools would help raise the rate of literacy in the rural areas where talent remained mostly neglected due to inadequate educational facilities.

Mr. Ahmed Sadiq urged the local

Councillors, the teaching community and the Imams of the mosques to work hard so as to make the experiment a grand success.

Mr G.M. Malik, Director Schools, Mr Gulzar Bhatti, project Director of the programme and Mr Ahmed Hasan Shah, Vice-Chairman, Union Council, Ali Razaabad, were also present on the occasion. Sweets were also distributed amongst the children.

PPI report adds: As many as 4,000 mosque-schools set up in the Punjab to universalise primary education under a crash programme costing Rs. 103.9 million, started functioning from Tuesday.

Mr Ahmed Sadiq said the scheme would constitute an important break-through for the objective of enhancing ratio of literacy.

He said that one PTC teacher had been posted at each mosque-school and the Imam of the Masjid had also been enlisted for imparting religious education. He would be paid an honorarium of Rs. 150. per month for this teaching duty by the Government.—PPI.

CALL FOR FREE UNIVERSITY EDUCATION

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 9

[Text]

The Chairman of the Organising Committee of Jeay Sind Students' Federation, Mr Rehmatullah Hasbani, has demanded free education up to university level and job guarantee after the studies.

According to a Press conference at Karachi Press Club yesterday, he stressed the need for increasing the number of teachers and making adequate provision for laboratory equipment in educational institutions.

He demanded restoration of Semester system; withdrawal of rustication orders and warrants against some students and immediate holding of the student unions elections.

He called for an end to the "intervention of law-enforcing agencies in educational institutions" and demanded release of students including Syed Ali Haider

Shah, Dr Khan Mohammad Laghari, Mataro Diahri, Shams Gopang, Ghous Ali Shah, Ghulam Nabi Khushak, Abdullah Shah, Imdad Chandio, Asad Ghadi, Ahmed Ali Soomro, Ghansham Parkash, Mohammad Alam, Ayub Baluch.

He also demanded the release of political leaders including Imtiaz Alam, Benazir Bhutto, Jam Saqi, Rasool Bux Palejo, Sher Ali Bacha, Shoukat Hayat, Miran Khan Mandokhel and Asghar Khan.

Demanding restoration of democracy in the country, he urged promotion of friendly ties with neighbouring countries.

He opposed the settlement of non-Sindhis in Sind.

He alleged that the Sind University has refused to take back students whose rustication orders had been declared null and void by the court.

CSO: 4600/307

OMBUDSMAN'S OFFICE: PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS DISCUSSED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 pp 7, 10

[Article by Sultan Ahmed: "Task of Ombudsman in a Legislative Vacuum"]

[Text]

AN Ombudsman in a modern State tries to redress the grievances of its citizens against the bureaucracy. Modern administration in the increasingly depersonalised industrial societies has become so complex and insensitive to individual needs or hardships that large gaps are left even where the government is democratic and a vigilant parliament functions most of the time.

Primarily a Scandinavian institution in its origin, when it was set up by Sweden in 1809, and the first Ombudsman was appointed the next year, he was known as "the parliamentary agent for justice." Pakistan does not have a parliament, and Majlis-i-Shoora is merely a nominated body whose membership even a year and a half after its birth has, about half of its originally proposed strength of 350. Hence Sardar Mohammad Iqbal has been appointed the first ombudsman, and his powers defined, through a Presidential Order.

Even where there is an elected parliament it has not been effective without a free Press to inform, instruct and guide it. News and comments in the newspapers help legislators to take up issues in parliament through questions, ad-

journalment motions and other means. In extreme cases, they can lead to the moving of no-confidence motions by the opposition. Pakistan does not now have the advantage of having either of these institutions.

Double vacuum

That double vacuum makes the ombudsman function in a rarefied atmosphere. And that enhances his burden manifold. The absence of a really free and vigorous Press can handicap him further. His office may have to work far harder to get to the truth of some of the complaints lodged with him. In the kind of political vacuum he will be functioning his burden will increase not only qualitatively but also quantitatively.

In many of the democratic countries a large number of complaints and protests from the people are solved by the newspapers raising them, agitating for them, and the parliament and democratic government responding to them. In the absence of such institutions, Sardar Iqbal may have to cope with thousands after thousands of complaints against the officials, of which many may be of a very serious nature.

Undoubtedly the modern world finds the office of ombudsman helpful. So, though other countries were late in following the Swedish example, Finland set up the institution in 1919, Denmark in 1955, and

Norway in 1963. Since then ombudsmen have sprung up far and wide, including in Britain and in far off New Zealand where one was appointed in 1962.

Not content with having ombudsman to deal with civilian grievances, Sweden set up a military ombudsman in 1952, and West Germany in 1956.

The functions of the ombudsman specifically, says Encyclopaedia Britannica, is: 1. redressing individual grievances (2) improving the quality of the administration and (3) helping the legislature to supervise the bureaucracy. But in Pakistan he will be having only the first two tasks, as we do not have a parliament. In fact, the stress is likely to be on the first - of redressing individual grievances to the extent possible in a political vacuum.

Good intent

In view of the enormity of his burden the government has been able to find a suitable person for the office after a protracted search, and after several persons considered suitable had declined to undertake the unenviable and largely thankless task in our midst. As a former chief justice of the Punjab High Court, Sardar Iqbal is a well-heeled judicial officer who will have to cope with executive excess through his recommendations or "findings".

Because of the overwhelming

task that he has to undertake, Sardar Iqbal does not raise high hopes among the people. And so many institutions with such good intent have failed in Pakistan, that setback to one more will not produce shock waves. To that extent he is on a somewhat firm ground.

The extent of his success depends on the means at his disposal to achieve his declared purpose. He has to have the necessary authority, adequate organisational strength, sufficient funds and the power and prestige to get his findings or awards implemented by the numerous relevant agencies beyond his control.

The President on his part has invested the Ombudsman with all the authority that he needs to investigate the complaints filed with him. Attempts have also been made to shield him from external pressures and keep him above the common temptations and trends in our midst. The term of office is only for four years, and he will not be eligible for any extension. He can be removed from office on grounds of misconduct, or if found incapable of performing his duties properly. He need not try to please the government so as to prolong his term beyond the fixed four years.

His authority is really extensive. His office has the powers of a civil court, and he has the contempt powers of the Supreme Court. No suits can be filed against him, and there can be no appeal against his findings in any court of law. In addition to sending his findings, to a relevant official agency for execution, he can send a report to the President as well.

Rules for the working of his office are to be made by himself. And he can not only seek the help of any official agency in the country or individual, but also recommend payment of cost and compensation in case of serious losses suffered by any complaining individual.

The Mohtasib can set up inspection

teams for the performance of any of his functions, and they can inspect any premises, document etc. He may establish standing or advisory committees as well as have the services of advisers, consultants and fellow to assist him. He may authorise a public servant or agency to undertake the functions assigned to him.

Earlier, there were proposals to appoint provincial ombudsman as well; but nothing has been done about that now. Instead, the Presidential Order says that he may, if he considers it expedient, ask any agency or public servant or other functionary working under the control of the provincial government to undertake the functions assigned to him. While he will do this with the approval of the provincial government, it is the duty of the public servant or agency to undertake the assigned task.

Budget

The basic question and a very big one — is how large will be the budget of the Mohtasib? It has to be really very large if the functions assigned to him are to be done well, and in a manner that is beyond reproach.

But even with all the money that he may need at his disposal, he will still face the problem of getting his "findings" enforced by the numerous relevant offices or agencies. How is he going to ensure that? His powers for punishing contempt on par with that of the Supreme Court are useful for investigation and not for enforcement of his findings. He can send a report of his findings to the President as well with his additional recommendations; but such reports cannot be too many. So, even if he can reach the right finding with the help of many agencies and individuals his Achilles heel will be their enforcement.

In case anyone is disappointed with the findings of the Mohtasib

he can appeal to the President. Clearly, such appeals will be even more in the case of non-compliance with his findings by the relevant department or agency. And that will make the President a super-ombudsman. Appeals and complaints go to him now as well. But hereafter such complaints will include delays on the part of the Ombudsman as well as non-implementation of his findings by the departments.

The President can also refer any complaint to him and the Ombudsman can initiate investigations by himself. But when the President asks him to investigate some complaints his findings are likely to be complied with promptly because of the Presidential vigilance. Other findings may not carry the same weight.

Complaints against the Police, taxation departments, like Income Tax, Customs, Excise, and public utility agencies like WAPDA and KESC, the Telephone Department, water supply agencies and gas companies can be many. Grievances against the Railways, PIA and government operated bus corporations and banks can be numerous. It is certainly advisable to have a deputy or assistant ombudsman in each of these agencies. The test of the ombudsman may lie in the success he can achieve in relation to these departments or agencies with whom millions of people are dealing with all the time.

It is equally imperative that the annual report of the Mohtasib to the President should be published six months after its receipt with the decision or action taken thereon. Otherwise the Mohtasib may not carry the kind of weight he should have to become a success. His burden is too heavy and his task too arduous. He needs all the help and prayer in the world that he can get to do his job even modestly well.

VIDEO CRAZE ANALYZED; LACK OF HEALTHY ENTERTAINMENT CRITICIZED

Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 7

[Editorial: "The Video Craze"]

[Text]

VIDEO games, which have contributed to the emergence of a new kind of gaming parlours in Karachi, have finally attracted official attention. As a report in this newspaper has disclosed, inquiries have been initiated into the circumstances of the import of video games and their commercial utilisation in numerous shops. Typically, this interest speaks of a delayed response. What underlines this fact is the revelation that import of video games is "strictly prohibited". How could, then, the video game shops be doing their business? It has been disclosed that some firms have imported the components and spares of the games intending to assemble them in the country. Smuggling of video games under this cover cannot be ruled out. However, the Karachi Directorate of the Vigilance Wing of the Central Board of Revenue is primarily concerned with the circumstances in which the games have been assembled. They have to investigate if the components were declared to be meant for the purpose of assembling video games and if the parties had the necessary permission of the Government to do that. The official position is stated to be that components imported for the television assembly industry could not be used for any

other purpose without the Government's approval. In this sense, the whole enterprise would appear to be illegitimate. But no definite comment can be made in this regard without hearing the other side of story. Now that the authorities have taken note of the video game shops, they are also probing if the shops should be paying taxes and levies meant for the entertainment business. The games are mostly coin-operated and the Entertainment Tax Law does not cover coin-operated machines.

The official investigations that relate to legal and procedural issues, are somewhat irrelevant in the context of the possible social impact of these games. It is widely recognised that the games could be addictive and become a large distraction for youngsters, besides being a drain on their parents' financial resources. The news report tells of the concern expressed by social welfare organisations. There is no doubt that a certain stigma is attached to the games, which have become a formidable craze in some western societies. But a discussion of the social cost of the growing popularity of video games in Pakistan cannot be undertaken in isolation. At one level, our lives have been saturated with all kinds of im-

ported, electronic playthings. The "VCR culture" has already become a disruptive reality. All this fits into the overall pattern of our wasteful, conspicuous consumption. But the situation should also be looked at from another angle. Legitimate sources of healthy entertainment have almost dried up in our society. Cinema was the staple entertainment for our masses but it has almost been killed. We have no theatre or performing arts.

In the large city of Karachi, family entertainment is alarmingly scarce. This is not the occasion to probe the causes of this cultural deprivation. But it is easy to see that video games have filled a void even though in a limited way. What is now necessary for the Government to discuss, at the policy level, is the entire situation. It should ensure that, while clever operators are not allowed to make quick gains by providing dubious entertainment to the people, healthy recreation and entertainment are made available to society in an adequate measure. The attention being devoted to the video game shops should be the starting point in the search for a more imaginative approach to the planning and promotion of healthy entertainment for the people.

MORAL, CULTURAL DECLINE OF SOCIETY CONDEMNED

Lahore NAWA-I-WAQT in Urdu 29 Dec 82 p 4

[From the diary of M. Sh.: "May Ghalib Forgive Me for Speaking So Bitterly"]

[Text] Just like me, there are innumerable people who have seen the Quaid-e Azam with their own eyes and among them there may be some who have even shaken hands with him and have joined with him in some group photos, have listened to his press conference and read accounts of his press conference in newspapers. Quaid-e Azam was a very intelligent, extremely religious, self-respecting and foresighted statesman. He was not a prophet, and he never claimed to be an apostle of God, but just like Prophet Moses who followed God's command and saved the children of Israel from the pharaoh's slavery, relying solely on his faith in the Almighty, he gambled all his worldly possessions to embark on a mission to free his people from the slavery of the British and, following them, the slavery of the "native British." He dedicated his own health, fame and wealth for the sake of protecting his own Islamic nation from future danger. Thus, at the end of 10 years of heart-rending struggle, the Muslims of India achieved their cherished goal and only a year later, due to TB of the lungs, the Quaid-e Azam left this world and joined his Gracious Lord. Quaid-e Azam, just like Prophet Moses, endowed us with the happiness of governing God-given countries both in the east and the west. We who were ground under the domination of Sikhs, Marhattas, Jatts and the British became rulers and came to be known as the citizens of the fifth largest state in the world. We should have bowed our heads in gratitude in the exalted presence of God Almighty, and for being endowed with the blessings of freedom, we should forever have been grateful to Quaid-e Azam and Allama Iqbal.

But just like Jews, instead of being thankful to God we started piling up our worldly demands indiscriminately. We forgot our duties and obligations and turned our minds exclusively to gaining profits. God therefore treated us exactly as he treats all other ungrateful creatures. We lost East Pakistan, which was a double disaster, and became the laughing stock of the world.

As far as following Quaid-e Azam's principles, which are printed in bold letters in newspapers today, as usual we are still treading the old path of ingratitude. Quaid-e Azam declared his opposition to feudalism and landlordism in clear and unambiguous terms, so much so that he stated that

landlords and "waderas" were exploiting and plundering the people with both hands and if we could stop them from exploiting the people, then Pakistan would have been established in vain. Similarly, he spoke in strong terms against the abuse of power, smuggling, black-marketing, lawlessness and selfish deeds. But did we succeed in saving the country from these evil deeds? On the contrary, social evils have become so firmly established that even the rulers have been forced to acknowledge them openly. Love of constitution and democracy was very dear to Quaid-e Azam. But the country has continuously remained in the iron grip of civil and military dictatorships. Quaid-e Azam performed the miracle of restoring our individual and collective self-respect. Today, even the most inferior bureaucrat can molest the most respected citizen and trample his self-respect.

In the words of Chaudhri Mohammad Hussain Chatha, now following the Holy Koran and Imam Hussain Aleyhissalam, Quaid-e Azam and his political organization the Muslim League have also been included in the list of the suppressed. I witnessed this exemplary sight as I was strolling along in the streets of Lahore on 25 December. I saw that on the occasion of the birth of Jesus Christ all the churches in Lahore, whether they belonged to the Roman Catholic or Protestant faith, were filled to capacity with Christian men, women and children. But in all of Lahore, there was not a single function worth mentioning that was held to commemorate the memory of the man who freed us from 150 years of slavery. Yes, there were small meetings in some places and from the platforms of these meetings official tributes were paid to the Quaid-e Azam.

I can tell you for a fact that if we do not make the messages of Iqbal and Quaid-e Azam a practical basis of our national life, and if we merely believe newspapers, television and radio programs to be our ultimate goals, then as the late Hafeez Jullundri said:

"This nation is about to be wiped out (from the surface of the earth)
This chessman is about to be beaten"

God forbid that this frightening and dreadful sight materializes in front of our eyes as a stark reality.

I am aware that I have presented a very dim aspect of the situation. I have no alternative. I have visited the streets, the bazaars, the huts and the large mansions and what I have witnessed from within and without has made me feel quite miserable. Our society is moving toward its destruction at a very fast pace. Only the other day on Beadon Road I saw a handsome young man placing his head on the feet of a respected man, and I heard him say, "For God's sake please arrange to get me a bottle of liquor, or else I shall accept the Christian faith." This incident is no more than a kernel in a large pot. Despite the raising of slogans of Islam, we are drifting farther from the real spirit of Islam. I in my humble capacity would respectfully like to address President Gen Mohammad Ziaul Haq and, quoting Allama Iqbal, say: "Without the scepter there can be no miracle of Moses."

BRIEFS

'MULLAH CULTURE' CRITICIZED--NOT Dr. Israr Ahmad alone but all other 'muftis' and divines who were inducted into the Shoora and continue still to be its members have given their views on family 'welfare' (this latter word having replaced 'planning') Some of these pious men have even argued against family planning because of the "threats to our existence from all sides". This is not the first time these divines have attempted to foist the clergy's preferences on the faithful in the name of Islam. Such people have always impeded change and progress. Mullah culture has gone to the extent of distorting even Iqbal and instead of Islamic thought being reconstructed on progressive lines, they are mutilating it remorselessly. [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Jan 83 p 11]

CURBS ON QADIANIS CRITICIZED--BEFORE we end for this week, it would perhaps be worthwhile to note that the clergy, aided and abetted by the Naib Amir (or is he the Acting Amir while Mian Tufail is preaching in the West?) is once again raking up the old Qadiani issue. Now that they are the Constitutional non-Muslims, Chaudhry Rehamat Elahi's outpourings against them holding important jobs is really uncalled for. The Qadianis are entitled to any job they can hold on the basis of competence and merit. Since they are the most numerous non-Muslim group in Pakistan, it would be our attitude to them and not a handful of Buddhists or Sikhs that would verify our claim that we treat minorities well. [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Jan 83 p 11]

WOMAN PLEADS FOR RELATIVES--ACCORDING to a local Urdu daily, a woman has appealed to the CMLA-President, the Amnesty International and all the democratic and patriotic people of Pakistan to save the lives of her son and grandson, Nasir Baluch and Aasia Baluch, who are being tried in camera by a special military court under charges of abetting the hijacking of a PIA plane in March 1981. She stated that their trial by a special military court in the Central Jail, Karachi, was "unilateral and malafide" as they had refused to hire counsel to defend their case. "Their lives are in danger because the offence for which they are charged carries capital punishment and their trial is nearing completion. So I appeal to you on humanitarian grounds to make immediate efforts to save their lives. I also demand an open trial in a civil court," she added. [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Jan 83 p 13]

DECLARED PRISONER OF CONSCIENCE--RASOOL BUKHSH PALIJO, Secretary-General of the defunct Pakistani Awami Tehrik and the Pakistan People's Movement, who is

under detention since October 1979, has been declared a 'Prisoner of conscience' by Amnesty International, London, says a Press release of the Awami Tehrik. [Lahore VIEWPOINT in English 27 Jan 83 p 16]

ZIA REVIEWS LAW AND ORDER SITUATION--RAWALPINDI, Feb 3--President Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq presided over a meeting here today at CMLA Secretariat which reviewed the general law and order situation in the country and found it satisfactory. The meeting which lasted for over four hours, made an in-depth study of the crime situation and discussed measures for the control of crimes in the country. Adoption of measures for the registration of cases under the Hudood laws figured prominently in the discussions during the meeting. The methods of investigation and trial of cases under the Hudood laws were also discussed. Emphasis was laid on expeditious disposal of cases in this context. The meeting was attended by the Federal Interior Minister, Mr Mahmoud A. Haroon; Federal Interior Secretary, Home Secretaries and IGs of Police of the four Provinces including IG Police, Islamabad. [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 1]

COURT CONSULTS JURISTS, NEWSMEN--ISLAMABAD, Feb 3--The Federal Shariat Court has decided to hear Press representatives, eminent jurists and lawyers on Press and Publication Ordinance, 1963 to find out whether any of its provisions is against the Quran and Sunnah. According to the Court sources here today, the Court examined the Ordinance and decided to take into account the views of the Press representatives and other concerned personnel as it related to the freedom of Press. This will help the Court to examine the Ordinance. The hearing will be held in March in Islamabad and in April in Karachi. The exact dates will be fixed later. The request for appearance before the Court will be made to the Presidents and Secretaries of Pakistan Federal Union of Journalists, All Pakistan Newspapers Society and Council of Pakistan Newspaper Editors, besides eminent journalists, Mr. Abdul Qadir Hasan, Malik Tajuddin, Mr. Salahuddin and Mr. Minhaj Barna. The jurists and lawyers include: Qazi Mujibur Rehman, Mr. Mehmud Ahmed Gazi, Mr. S. M. Zafar, Allama Syed Mohammad Razi and Khalid M. Ishaq. [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 8]

15,000 VILLAGES TO BE ELECTRIFIED--MULTAN, Feb 3--A total of 15,000 villages would be electrified in the country in the 6th Five-Year Plan, Federal Minister for Local Government and Rural Development Syed Fakhar Imam, said here on Thursday. Talking to newsmen, he said the rural development strategy in the next plan would have five areas of priority, consisting of rural roads, water supply, electrification, education and health. He said both formal and non-formal education facilities would be upgraded during the plan. He said by the end of the plan 100 per cent children would be going to school at the primary level. Efforts would also be made to check the drop-out rate of students from the schools. The objective would be achieved by motivation, better teacher training and other allied steps. [Karachi DAWN in English 4 Feb 83 p 8]

PUNJAB GAZETTEERS--Lahore, Feb 2--The district gazetteers, being compiled in all the districts of the Punjab, should present a true picture of our social life and due importance be given to the data of various fields of national reconstruction. This observation was made by Mr Anwar Tamarips Director-General,

Gazetteer and Research, Government of the Punjab, while addressing participants of a workshop organised by the Directorate for the training of the gazetteer writers. The Director-General urged the participants to utilise their full energies in compiling these documents of national importance. Earlier, Dr Amanullah, Head of the Islamiyat Department, University of the Punjab, Lahore, presented his paper on "Islamic values and their projection in gazetteer writing," and said that the British rulers always kept in view their vested interests while writing these gazetteers and as such a number of remarks about Muslims were not based on facts in the gazetteers compiled before the emergence of Pakistan. He said special emphasis should now be given on incorporation of ever-lasting values of Islam while compiling the gazetteers. He said besides, mentioning the developmental data these gazetteers should also cover the activities of various religious, social and welfare organizations working for the propagation of Islam and welfare of the masses.--PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 10]

RISE IN AIR FARES--The Board of Foreign Airlines' representatives in Pakistan, including the PIA, has decided to increase air fares ex-Pakistan by 15 per cent from Feb. 7. The rise was necessitated to close the resulting gap of 16 per cent as a result of delinking of Pak rupee vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar on the local currency and also partially due to recent increase in petrol prices in Pakistan. It is learnt that the Board of Foreign Airlines' representatives in Pakistan, including the PIA, held two meetings here on Jan. 26 and 31 to review the situation. The board communicated its decision to the IATA. It may be mentioned here that the price of jet fuel was raised from Rs 4.59 to Rs 4.94 a litre from Jan 9. As from Feb. 7 passengers flying out of Pakistan will have to buy their tickets at 15 per cent higher fares. There has been no increase in the domestic fares of PIA.--PPI [Text] [Karachi MORNING NEWS in English 2 Feb 83 p 10]

PLEA AGAINST JI, IJT--Lahore, Feb 2--Sardar Shaukat Ali, Secretary-General, Pakistan Mazdoor Kisan Party, has appealed to the Government to take serious notice of the activities of Jamaat-i-Islami and Islami Jamiat-i-Talaba. In a statement here on Wednesday, he said that the Government should change its attitude towards the democratic forces and take notice of the activities of Jamaat-i-Islami.--PPI. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 10]

CRITICISM OF PIR PAGARA REFUTED--Peshawar, Feb 2--Mian Mohammad Iqbal, the provincial chief of defunct Pakistan Muslim League, has refuted the criticism against his party chief Pir Sahib Pagaro on a statement about 1973 Constitution attributed to him mistakenly. Talking to newsmen here today Mian Iqbal said, we as Muslim Leaguers firmly believe in Islamic democracy which the '73 Constitution--a unanimous document--provides adequately. He said the Constitution was a sacred national trust which should not be altered at any cost. If any harm to this document is done, God forbid, the country would stand nowhere.--PPI [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 3]

ADVISED ON OMBUDSMAN--Rawalpindi, Feb 1--The Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) will assume the charge of his appointment after a few weeks when the necessary establishment is created in Islamabad to enable him to discharge his duties. The people have been advised to withhold their applications till then. It was announced in a Press Note issued here today from the CMLA's Secretariat following the receipt of several applications addressed to the Wafaqi Mohtasib. The Press note added that it will take a few weeks to establish Wafaqi Mohtasib's Secretariat and to position the necessary staff. The Government is taking

necessary measures to make Wafaqi Mohtasib's office effective in the shortest possible time, the Press note concluded.--APP [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 12]

LUNCH FOR TRAIN PASSENGERS--Lahore, Feb 2--The Government is considering a proposal to introduce for the first time, four different categories of lunch-baskets for railway passengers. Official sources told DAWN here today that a meeting of the Advisory Committee of the Pakistan Railways was scheduled for Feb 9 under the chairmanship of the General Manager, PR, Mr A.U. Zafar, the members of the Committee had been asked to submit their suggestions for making improvement in the catering service. It had been agreed in principle that the proposed lunch-baskets or repast boxes, which would contain some sort of snacks should suit the purse of passengers from various income groups. The prices of these boxes on the lower side would be around Rs three to four, while on the higher side these would be between Rs five and ten and 10 to 15. Similarly, a repast box for two persons was also proposed which would be comparatively cheaper in price. However, the proposal was under initial stages of study and it would be finalised only after a decision was taken by the Advisory Committee of the Pakistan Railway. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 12]

IJT RALLY IN HYDERABAD--Hyderabad, Feb 2--The Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba, Hyderabad, on the appeal of Nazim IJT, Sind, Mr Rashid Naseem, observed "Yom-i-Yakjheti" and staged a peaceful demonstration here on Wednesday urging immediate acceptance of the demands of Karachi students and assuring them full support in their struggle in this respect. The Jamiat also held a meeting in "Goal Building" hall which was addressed by Mr Shahid Rafeeq and Mr Shahid Sheikh, Nazim Hyderabad Jamiat-i-Tulaba and Nazim IJT Government College, Hyderabad, respectively. They urged the authorities concerned to accept the demands of the Karachi students and release the arrested students forthwith. Similar meetings were also held at the Government College, Hyderabad, Government College, Latifabad, Ghazali College, City College and Sind College of Commerce. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 3 Feb 83 p 12]

ABBASI CRITICISM OF GOVERNMENT--Larkana, 17 Jan (JASARAT correspondent)--Jan Mohammad Abbasi, deputy leader of the defunct Jamaat-e Islami Party of Pakistan, said that martial law has sheltered the oppressors instead of coming to the aid of the oppressed. Addressing receptions held in Nasirabad, Gachi, Khwadre, Thari and Hajiran on the second day of his visit to Larkana district, Mr Abbasi said, "The reason for the reign of cruelty, oppression and injustice in the country is that several ministers, advisors, and high officials in the present martial law government are the same individuals who oppressed the people during the term of power of the People's Party. The proposals and policies of these individuals have led the country today to the brink of destruction, and they constitute the greatest obstacle to the restoration of democracy and the holding of elections." Expressing concern over the deteriorating condition of law and order in the country, Mr Abbasi said, "In the past year, 323 people were murdered in Larkana; 46 incidents of burglaries and thefts occurred, and 69 individuals were abducted. These statistics are based on police records; and the number of murders committed reminds one of the Iran-Iraq war. Abductions are now easily carried out, and the government has proved itself incapable of protecting the lives, honor and property of citizens; hence, it should hold elections speedily and hand over power to the representatives of the people." [Text] [Karachi JASARAT in Urdu 18 Jan 83 pp 1, 10] 9863

SUPPORT FOR URDU REGULATION--The Government of Punjab has ruled that individuals who do not know Urdu will not be able to acquire ration depots; to this end, it has amended the 1967 West Pakistan foodstuffs distribution order. Henceforth, only individuals who can read and write Urdu will be given ration-dispensing depots. One often hears official claims about promoting the national language, but in practice, English is still the dominant language on every level. Some gains have been made under the present government; President Zia himself has used the national language as the medium of expression on the highest levels, but English is still used in offices to transact day-to-day business and for correspondence. The oft-repeated excuse offered by the bureaucracy, a creation of the imperialist masters, is that there is a lack of technical, legal and administrative terms in Urdu. But the fact is that it is the bureaucracy that lacks knowledge, not that Urdu lacks terminology. By making knowledge of Urdu a necessary requirement for the allotment of ration-dispensing depots, the Government of Punjab has acted correctly. In the future, individuals who seek government jobs should be required to show that they are capable of using their national language in the fulfillment of their duties. [Editorial] [Text] [Karachi JANG in Urdu 9 Jan 83 p 3] 9863

SPORTS FACILITIES--Rawalpindi, Feb 1--The Federal Cabinet, which met here today under the chairmanship of the President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, reviewed at length the sports activities in the country during the last six months. Normally, such a review is done by the Cabinet after every three months. The Cabinet decided that the Ministry of Culture and Sports should ensure that better and more comprehensive facilities for sportsmen and spectators were made available at all the stadia in the country. It was also decided that after consulting concerned agencies and sports experts, appropriate strategy should be drawn up for competing in different fields in the forthcoming olympics. The Cabinet directed the Ministry of Sports and Culture to assess the functioning of various sports federations and suggest ways and means how their performance could be improved to ensure better results in future competitions. The Federal Cabinet approved and ratified a number of bilateral agreements in different fields with foreign countries. The Cabinet ratified an agreement between Pakistan and the People's Republic of China for the establishment of a Joint Committee for economic, trade, scientific and technical cooperation. The internal situation was also reviewed by the Cabinet.--APP [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 1]

BANKS SERVICE CHARGES--The State Bank of Pakistan has allowed the national and foreign banks, operating in Pakistan, to fix their own service charges. Up to now the State Bank had fixed limits of maximum bank charges. Under the new directives, the banks have been restricted to minimum limits only, with the exception of rates charged on home remittances, which have been fixed at the maximum. It may be pointed out that the commercial banks have been representing to the State Bank that the bank charges laid down in the tariff circulated vide BCD Circular No 30 of State Bank, dated October 26, 1977, as amended from time to time, but which basically remains almost the same (insofar as the rates of charges are concerned), needs to be revised upwards in view of their rising costs and inflation over the years. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 12]

BIZENJO BARRED FROM KARACHI--The President of the defunct Pakistan National Party, Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, was not allowed to travel to Karachi to depose before the Special Military Court, trying Jam Saqi and others. Mr Bizenjo received a summon on Jan 23 last from the Special Military Court asking

him to appear on Feb 14 as a defence witness. At the same time he received a communication from the Government of Baluchistan informing him that he would not be permitted to go to Karachi. Mr Bizenjo's movements were restricted to his home district Khuzdar when he tried to hold meetings in Karachi and Sibbi districts of Baluchistan in November last. He was later confined to Khuzdar district. In a letter to the Special Military Court, Mr Bizenjo expressed his inability to appear before it unless the Court directs the Government of Baluchistan to lift the ban on his movements. His son, Mr Bizan Baluch, also received a summon to appear before the Special Military Court as a defence witness for another accused, Mr Kamal Warsi. As he received the summon a day later than the date fixed for hearing, he requested the Court to inform him in future at least 15 days before the hearing. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 12]

WEAPONS FOR SIND POLICE--Mirpurkhas, Feb 1--Sind Police will be provided sophisticated weapons at a cost of Rs 130 million, and 15 new police stations and 12 checkposts will also be established at Karachi and Hyderabad division at a cost of Rs 450 million. This was stated by a high police officer here recently. He said the uniform of police in Sind will be changed. They will be provide with modern vehicles and boats under a Five-Years Plan. [Excerpt] [Karachi DAWN in English 2 Feb 83 p 4]

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